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Abstract 
 
The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (CRA) has altered the channels of communication between the 
judiciary and the political class. 
 
This thesis investigates the changing role of the senior judiciary in England and Wales in making extrajudicial 
comments. The underlying theme in this thesis is how approaches to, and judicial self-regulation of, 
extrajudicial comment and judicial communication centres on the core principles of the separation of powers 
and judicial independence. In particular, the thesis focuses on speeches and oral evidence to Parliament, as 
increasingly important forms of judicial-political communication after the CRA, and the post-CRA guidance 
to judges to consider when communicating via these means.  The thesis argues that, in order to assess the 
channels of communication, we must know: firstly, what things are being communicated between judges and 
politicians; and secondly, a set of criteria to assess the use of existing means to communicate these things. This 
thesis assesses the current channels of communication, and concludes that they are deficient, and a poor 
replacement for the pre-2005 state of affairs. To answer this deficiency, the thesis concludes by exploring the 
reforms currently being discussed in Parliament, and argues for a new process for triggering judicial appearances 
before Parliamentary committees.
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CHAPTER 1 - AN INTRODUCTION 
Rationale   
The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (CRA) introduced a number of important reforms, 
including the reform of the office of Lord Chancellor and the removal of the highest 
domestic court from the UK Parliament. In October 2009 a new UK Supreme Court (UKSC) 
was created to replace it.1 These changes significantly altered the position of senior judges 
on the constitutional map of the UK. The Law Lords were removed from Parliament where 
they had enjoyed a dual power: they were able to sit in the Appellate Committee of the House 
of Lords as the highest court in the land, and also to exercise their right as peers to participate 
in legislative debates. Deprived of their right to speak2 in the upper chamber, the senior 
judiciary3 has now lost what some of them regarded as an important means of 
communicating with the political class.4 Changes were also made to the role of the Lord 
Chancellor. Formerly, the Lord Chancellor was head of the judiciary in England and Wales, 
a Cabinet minister, and also de facto speaker of the Lords. As head of the judiciary the Lord 
Chancellor would preside as a judge, as well as performing a leading role in judicial 
                                                          
1 For an overview of constitutional reform in the United Kingdom from 1911 to the position prior to the 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005, see V Bogdanor, Our New Constitution, (2004) LQR 242  
2 It should be noted that following a statement from Lord Bingham in 2000, most Law Lords adhered to a 
self-denying ordinance, limiting participation in legislative debates. Lord Bingham’s own thoughts on this can 
be found in: T Bingham, The Business of Judging. Selected Essays and Speeches, (OUP 2000), pp.76-7 
3 Here senior judiciary refers to the Law Lords, Master of the Rolls and the Lord Chief Justice as well as 
judges who, on appointment were by convention, were members of the Lords 
4 Whilst some had opposed the changes, others were keen to forego the right to sit in the upper chamber; 
when the reforms were initially proposed in 2003, four were in favour of the new UKSC (Lords Bingham, 
Steyn, Saville, and Walker) and six opposed (Lords Nicholls, Hoffman, Hope, Hutton, Millet, and Rodger). 
Lady Hale, in favour of the UKSC, replaced Lord Millet on his retirement in 2004; see A Le Sueur, From the 
Appellate Committee to Supreme Court: A Narrative, in L Blom-Cooper, B Dickson and G Drewry, The Judicial 
House of Lords 1876-2009, (OUP 2009) 72. See also R Stevens, The English Judges: their role in the changing 
constitution, (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2005); A Leyland, The constitution of the United Kingdom, (2nd Ed. Oxford: 
Hart Publishing 2012) 202; R Stevens, A loss of innocence?: judicial independence and the separation of powers (2014) 19 
OJLS 365-402 
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appointments.5 But, as a result of the CRA, the Lord Chancellor is today ‘just another’ 
Cabinet minister, responsible for government policy on the administration of justice.6 The 
vital role that was traditionally said to have been played by Lord Chancellors in ensuring 
effective communication between the Cabinet and judiciary has been ‘lost’. The result of this 
loss is that there is now no judicial representative to speak in Cabinet or Parliament. Today 
the Lord Chief Justice is head of the judiciary in England and Wales, but the holder of this 
office has also been stripped of the right to participate in legislative debates in the Lords.7 
  
As Lord Judge suggested in his last evidence session before Parliament as Lord Chief Justice, 
it is arguable that ‘something has been lost’ since 2005, in terms of the opportunities for 
senior judges to communicate with politicians.8  This thesis investigates some of the more 
public ways that the political and senior judicial branches communicate with each other, and 
establishes a way to assess whether the channels of communication available today are 
sufficient. In doing so, this thesis does not directly address the many important ways that 
senior judges, politicians and government officials communicate in private: for example, the 
regular meetings and telephone conversations between the Lord Chief Justice and the Lord 
Chancellor; the routine meetings that occur day to day between officials in the Judicial Office 
and the Ministry of Justice; and the relatively recent development of regular meetings once 
                                                          
5 For a historical overview of the office of Lord Chancellor, and detailed discussion of the various functions 
and criticisms of the office pre-reform, see D Woodhouse, The office of the Lord Chancellor (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing 2001) 
6 A detailed discussion of the duties and responsibilities of the office of Lord Chancellor post-CRA 2005 can 
be found at, G Gee, What are Lord Chancellors for? [2014] PL 11, and further in Shetreet and Turenne, Judges on 
Trial: The Independence and Accountability of the English judiciary (CUP 2013), 75 
7 By convention the office holder is made a peer on appointment as the Lord Chief Justice, although under 
the CRA he or she may not participate as a peer in the business of the House: see Constitutional Reform Act 
2005 s.137 
8 J Rozenburg Lord chief justice: changes to judiciary 'eroding something important' The Guardian 30 January 2013, 
(available at http://www.theguardian.com/law/2013/jan/30/lord-chief-justice-changes-judiciary ) 
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or twice a year between the Lord Chief Justice and the Prime Minister.9 Nor does this thesis 
look at each and every public means of communication: for example, only passing reference 
is made to the new power under s.5 whereby the Lord Chief Justice can lay written 
representations before Parliament.10 Rather, this thesis focusses on what are arguably the two 
most prominent and public means of judicial-political communication: namely, the long 
historical practice of extrajudicial speechmaking as a means of communicating judicial ideas; 
and the more recent and increasingly important practice of judges being called to give 
evidence before Parliamentary committees. The premise of my thesis is that judicial 
speechmaking and appearances before Parliamentary committees have acquired an added 
significance since—and, for that matter, because of—the changes introduced by the CRA.  
 
The importance of these two modes of communication above others, and their increasing 
importance since 2005, is suggested, at least in part, by the fact that their frequency and 
content have become the subject of some debate, and, in turn, have been subject to an 
attempt to regulate them. The use of public speeches by senior judges to convey concerns to 
political actors has long been an extrajudicial activity undertaken by judges. But recently 
concern has grown in some quarters about the frequency of judicial speechmaking. In 2012 
the Master of the Rolls, Lord Neuberger, made extrajudicial speechmaking the subject of 
(perhaps ironically) a speech.11 In this speech Lord Neuberger set out informal guidance on 
how judges should approach extrajudicial speechmaking. He concluded with seven principles 
to guide judges in deciding what to comment on, and whether to comment at all. In summary 
                                                          
9 For examples, see the Lord Chief Justice’s Report 2013, Relationship with the Executive, at page 14 (available at 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Reports/lcj_report_2013.pdf ) 
10 G Gee The Lord Chief Justice and Section 5 of the Constitutional Reform Act U.K. Const. L. Blog (14th April 2014) 
(available at: http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/) 
11 Neuberger, Where Angels fear to tread, Holdsworth Club, University of Birmingham, March 2012 (available at 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Speeches/mr-speech-holdsworth-
lecture-2012.pdf ) 
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the Neuberger principles include: the suggestion that speechmaking by judges should be 
done with caution and prior consideration given to the need to speak; the effect on individual 
and institutional judicial independence; the concurrence with the position adopted by the 
LCJ; the effect on the separation of powers; and the avoidance of publicity for publicity sake. 
Lord Neuberger’s speech is an attempt to establish informal guidance regulating 
speechmaking. There has been a more formal attempt to regulate judicial appearances before 
Parliamentary committees. In July 2008 the Judicial Executive Board published official 
guidance regulating oral evidence to Parliamentary committees, which was later updated in 
2012.12 We revisit these regulations in later chapters. For now, my suggestion is simply that 
formal and informal species of regulation point to a growing awareness, at least among senior 
judges, of the increasing importance of speechmaking and appearances before Parliamentary 
committees, as tools for communicating with the political branches. 
 
The central research question in this thesis asks ‘how do judges communicate extrajudicially 
since the CRA 2005?’. To answer this question, it is necessary to investigate and analyse the 
process and content of extrajudicial speechmaking and oral evidence as well as the reception 
of such comments by politicians, other judges, and the media. This analysis is used to inform 
an in depth normative study of the existing modes of extrajudicial communication in chapter 
four, subject to newly established criteria which list the requirements of an effective and 
constitutionally proper channel of judicial political communication. This study and these 
criteria are then used as a basis to critically analyse the proposed reforms to judicial-political 
relations that are currently being discussed in Parliament.  In particular, I ask what safeguards 
or guidance exists to ensure judicial-political communication is constitutionally proper i.e. to 
                                                          
12 Parliamentary Clerks also prepared their own internal guidance, but this is not published to the public. In 
this thesis I focus solely on the JEB’s published guidance 
5 
protect the core principles of the separation of powers and judicial independence when 
speechmaking or giving evidence (and are these sufficient)? If not sufficient, then why not; 
and what would be an adequate replacement or reform? The thrust of this thesis is to 
investigate and assess these two forms of judicial-political communication and their added 
significance in light of the CRA reforms, before assessing the proposed reforms currently 
being discussed. If the methods of constitutionally acceptable interactions that currently exist 
prove inadequate, then it is reasonable to conclude that the reforms of the CRA are not yet 
complete, and a long-term process of reform must continue. 
 
In this introduction, I explain how the constitutional principles of judicial independence and 
the separation of powers underpin the CRA reforms, and in turn impact on interactions 
between the judiciary, Parliament and the executive. In chapter two I examine how attitudes 
to (and in particular attempts to regulate) extrajudicial speeches have changed over the years. 
One of the key themes in chapter two concerns the diversity of judicial speeches: a great 
many different judges at different levels of the judicial hierarchy make speeches, to different 
audiences, about different subjects, and with different (and usually) multiple purposes in 
mind. Recognising this, chapter two outlines a system for classifying speeches. In chapter 
three I sketch the practice of judges giving oral evidence before Parliamentary committees; 
examine the formal guidance given to judges on committee appearances; and investigate the 
content of committee appearances from a carefully selected sample. Finally, chapter four 
draws on the analysis conducted in chapters two and three in order to establish a set of 
criteria detailing what is required to make a ‘successful’ communication. This then provides 
a standard by which to test proposed reforms (currently being discussed in Parliament) to 
the channels of judicial-political communications in the second half of chapter four. This 
thesis concludes that these reforms are unsatisfactory in isolation. However, this thesis 
6 
proposes that a workable solution could be created by bringing together elements of each of 
the proposed reforms, thereby establishing a way for senior judges to open a direct channel 
of communication with Parliament. 
 
Judicial Independence and the Separation of Powers 
 
When the reforms discussed above were first proposed by the Blair government in 2003, the 
reasons given centred on judicial independence and the separation of powers.13 It is often 
remarked that judicial independence is a slippery notion. It can be difficult to define as an 
abstract notion in any comprehensive fashion, and it can be equally difficult to determine its 
precise content.14 
 
It is now generally acknowledged that there are two main limbs to judicial independence: 
first, an individual limb relating to the requirement that each judge is able to decide legal 
disputes impartially and free from inappropriate interference, especially any improper 
interference from political forces; and second, an institutional limb relating to the  requirement 
that the judiciary as a whole must enjoy a measure of separation from, and insulation against, 
any improper pressures from the political branches of government. As Arden LJ put it: 
 
‘… [Judicial independence] involves at least two things: 
                                                          
13 A detailed overview of the process and arguments for the drafting and implementation of the CRA can be 
found in Ryan, The House of Lords and the shaping of the Supreme Court (2005) 56 NILQ 135; Windlesham, The 
constitutional reform act 2005: Ministers, Judges and Constitutional Change Part 1, (2005) PL 806;  Windlesham The 
constitutional reform act 2005: Ministers, Judges and Constitutional Change Part 2 (2006) PL 35. A summary of the 
process can be found in Bingham, The old order changeth, (2006) 122 LQR 211 
14 See generally P Russell and D O’Brien, Judicial independence in the age of democracy: critical perspectives from around 
the world, (University of Virginia Press 2001); Dodek and Sossin, Judicial Independence in Context (Irwin Law 
2010) 
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(1) it involves the judge in any individual case being free to reach the decision which 
he or she considers to be in accordance with the law, free from any influence15 
(2) it means institutional independence, i e, it involves the notion that respect is given 
for the judiciary as an institution’16 
 
In other words, judges as individuals should be both personally and substantively 
independent; the former demanding a secure tenure and salary outside of any control or 
interference from other bodies, and the latter requiring that judges make no determinations 
or act save in accordance with the law, and the facts as presented before them.17 Structurally, 
institutional independence demands the independence of the judiciary as a whole, free from 
interference and singularly distinct from the legislature and executive. The institution of the 
judiciary, in order to be independent, must be a distinct entity, an identifiable collective, 
which can be addressed and given the respect of being free from interference. What this 
means in practice varies from country to country, and over time within any one country. 
However, it is generally acknowledged that institutional independence requires a set of rules 
on matters such as judicial deployment, judicial discipline and the funding and staffing of the 
court system as a whole. This institutional arrangement secures for the judiciary, as a 
collective, an appropriate measure of separation from, and protection against, undue pressure 
by the political branches. 
 
                                                          
15 Including over issues of pay and pensions – further discussion of the various meanings of judicial 
independence can be found in R Stevens, English Judges, Their Role in the Changing Constitution (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing 2005) 
16 M Arden, Judicial Independence and Parliaments in K Ziegler, D Baranger and AW Bradley, Constitutionalism and 
the Role of Parliaments, (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2007) 
17 S Shetreet, Creating Culture of Judicial Independence: The practical challenge and the conceptual and constitutional 
infrastructure, in S Shetreet and C Forsyth: The Culture of Judicial Independence: Conceptual Foundations and Practical 
Challenges, Ch. 2 (Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), 46 
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The concepts of judicial independence and the separation of powers are connected,18 
‘especially as regards the impact of independence on relations between the main branches of 
government. If the executive respects the judiciary as an institution, the more the executive 
is likely to respect court judgments.19,20 
 
It might be thought that the separation of powers is more of a structural concept. It requires 
that the three branches of government—the executive, legislature, and judiciary—be separate 
and individual, with no one branch holding more power and authority than the other, all the 
while having the power to check and balance each other branch.21 As a structural concept, 
the separation of powers delineates the responsibilities of the three branches of government. 
But judicial independence is sometimes described as a primarily relational concept: it is about 
shaping a particular set of relationships, especially between the judiciary and the political 
branches.22 Judicial independence also contains structural elements as set out above. In a 
way, judicial independence dictates the nature of the relationship and the duties and 
responsibilities of the government and Parliament, in matters relating to the judiciary, as well 
as the responsibility of judges to remain independent. This is only the briefest of thumbnail 
sketches of judicial independence and the separation of powers. But it is enough, for our 
purposes at least, to suggest that the concepts of separation of powers and judicial 
independence, whilst distinct, are also very much intertwined. 
                                                          
18 AW Bradley, Relations between Executive, Judiciary and Parliament: an evolving saga? (2008) PL 470 at 487 
19 M v Home Office [1992] QB 270 at 314. Per Nolan LJ: The proper constitutional relationship of the executive 
with the courts is that the courts will respect all acts of the executive within its lawful province, and that the 
executive will respect all decisions of the courts as to what its lawful province is 
20Though some commentators believe that the doctrine of judicial independence is distinct and not 
synonymous with a separation of powers: see L Kornhauser Is Judicial independence a useful concept? in Burbank 
and Friedman, Judicial Independence at the Crossroads: An interdisciplinary approach (SAGE publications 2002) 
21 For a historical overview of the importance of, and development of, the separation of powers in the UK, 
see, Shetreet and Turenne, Judges on Trial: The Independence and Accountability of the English judiciary (CUP 2013) 
and a modern statement of the implications of doctrine post 2005, at page 272 
22 P Russell and D O’Brien, Judicial independence in the age of democracy: critical perspectives from around the world, 
(University of Virginia Press 2001) 
9 
 
The separation of powers was once said to have only limited application in our constitutional 
system. Amongst the evidence to support such a claim were the multiple and overlapping 
institutional roles performed by the Lord Chancellor and the location of the top court in the 
upper chamber of Parliament. Today, the CRA is commonly cited as evidence of the 
increasing relevance of the separation of powers. The duty of the executive to respect judicial 
independence and judicial functions under the separation of powers is now set out in s.3(1) 
of the CRA 2005, the full consequences of which have yet to be seen.23 Included as a 
condition of the Concordat reached between Lord Woolf and Lord Falconer, Bradley 
observes that the possibility for greater application of the statute as a result of judicial review, 
or enforcement of the statute against interfering ministers, now exists.24 This increased 
application of the doctrine of a separation of powers must not, however, be viewed as an 
‘iron curtain’ preventing any interaction between the branches of government. 
 
There are instances when the executive may respect a court’s judgment, as per judicial 
independence, but necessarily require Parliament to legislate to undo that judgment under its 
role in the separation of powers as legislator—for example where a decision may lead to the 
undoing of large scale government action resulting in detriment to society .25 But the generally 
accepted rule is one of mutual respect between the branches of government.26 Institutional 
                                                          
23 See Masterman  A Supreme Court for the UK: Two steps forward but one step back on judicial independence [2004] PL 
48 for thoughts on judicial independence as an impetus for the CRA 
24 AWBradley (n18) 470, However, not all agree.: see G Gee Defending Judicial Independence in the British 
Constitution’ in A. Dodek and L. Sossin (eds) Judicial Independence in Context (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) 381-410. 
25 Shetreet, (n17); J Bell, Judicial Cultures and Judicial Independence, 4 (2001) CYBLS 47 
26 For thoughts of senior judges on judicial independence see: Lord Judge Evidence to House of Lords Select 
Committee on the Constitution,  Relations between the executive, judiciary and Parliament, 6th Report (2006-7 HL 
151), 1 May 2007, answer to Q 379 (available at 
http://www.publications.Parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldselect/ldconst/151/151.pdf) ; Lord Phillips of 
Worth Matravers, Judicial independence, Commonwealth law conference, Nairobi, 12 September 2007 (available 
at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
10 
independence depends on structural compliance with constitutional fundamentals that the 
executive must not interfere nor criticise judicial findings. But more importantly it also 
requires that the branches of government communicate with each other in order to keep 
each other informed of what they are doing; to educate each other as to their roles, functions, 
processes of appointment etc.; and thereby ensure mutual respect and effective government. 
 
The core concepts of the separation of powers and judicial independence are a constant 
theme in this thesis and are specifically drawn upon later when assessing the sufficiency of 
the channels of communication between judiciary and government. These are widely 
accepted to be the key constitutional principles governing interactions between the judiciary 
and politicians. The strong need to observe them will be relevant in our discussion of what 
judges actually say in practice (whether in compliance or not with these principles) and later 
when we consider whether the proposed reforms discussed in Parliament will be 
constitutionally viable. Though these notions are more usually viewed as theoretical 
concepts, this thesis might cast light on how they are understood as practical consequences 
of the day-to-day communications between judges and politicians.  
 
Judicial-Political Communications and the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 
 
Structurally, the institution of the judiciary is required to be both independent of interference 
but also dependant on the co-operation between the other branches of government.27 A 
separation of powers requires distinct branches of government. But it must necessarily follow 
                                                          
content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Speeches/lcj_kenya_clc_120907.pdf); Beatson  LJ, Judicial independence and 
accountability: pressures and Opportunities, Nottingham Trent University, 16 April, 
(http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Speeches/beatsonj040608.pdf) 
27 R Stevens, Judicial Independence in England: A loss of innocence (n22); V. Bogdanor, The New British Constitution 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009), Ch11 
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that since separation does not equate to isolation by not interacting with other branches, co-
operation requires that the individual branches must communicate with each other. This in 
turn would facilitate an effective and accountable government.  In some ways the need to 
communicate is all the more important after 2005; for example, the considerably expanded 
roles and responsibilities of the Lord Chief Justice as head of the judiciary instead of the 
Lord Chancellor, mean that s/he has to communicate with ministers and civil servants on a 
much wider range of issues (e.g. on judicial appointments, funding for the court, judicial 
deployment, judicial complaints and discipline). To a lesser, but still important, extent the 
President of the UKSC also has a wider range of leadership roles than the Senior Law Lord,28 
which requires him or her to liaise with ministers and officials. Both the Lord Chief Justice 
and the President of the UKSC have more responsibilities for the running of the courts, and 
the UKSC, respectively. Parliament, particularly the Lords Constitution Committee, 
Commons Justice Committee and Joint Committee on Human Rights, are taking a greater 
interest in their leadership functions. Parliamentary committees are also keen to understand 
the broader dynamics of judicial decision-making, the justice system, and legal theory.29 On 
the one hand, senior judges feel their new roles require them to communicate with the 
political classes, and sometimes to convey their concerns of policy affecting the 
administration of justice. And on the other, the politicians are keen to engage with judges 
over the justice system, and examine the effects of government policies. These are the key 
foundations of judicial-political communication. 
 
                                                          
28 The Senior Law Lord was the leading figure of the Judicial Appellate Committee of the House of Lords, 
before the court became the UKSC at Middlesex Guildhall, in October 2009. For more on the office, see R 
Cornes, Gains (and Dangers of Losses) in Translation—The Leadership Function in the United Kingdom’s Supreme Court, 
Parameters and Prospects [2011] PL 509, 512 
29 For examples see a detailed account of judges appearing before Parliamentary committee to give evidence 
on a variety of issues from 2006 to 2012, in A Le Sueur Parliamentary Accountability, and the judicial System in 
Leyland and Bamforth, Accountability in the contemporary constitution, (OUP 2013) Appendix 3 
12 
This thesis draws on the desires of both judges and politicians to communicate with each 
other. Yet both groups continually air concerns cautioning against overly familiar, or 
constitutionally improper (whether perceived, in appearance, or in fact), channels of 
communication. When referring to constitutional propriety of judicial-political relations, we 
see that both judges and politicians rely on, and highlight their commitment to, a separation 
of powers and judicial independence. This thesis investigates the veracity of these concerns 
by conducting a study of specific example of extrajudicial communication and  questioning 
the extent of their adherence to the principles of separation of powers, and judicial 
independence. 
 
A clear example of the importance of communication between the branches of government 
comes from the way in which some of the changes ultimately encapsulated in the CRA itself 
were first proposed in 2003. As is well known, there was a complete lack of communication 
between the executive and the judiciary about the proposed changes—prior to their 
announcements in the midst of comings and goings of a Cabinet reshuffle in 2003.30 In 
evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Lord Turnbull31 was 
repeatedly examined as to the existence and extent of any consultations on the proposed 
abolition of the office of Lord Chancellor.32 It quickly became clear that the press release 
from No.10 was a surprise to many,33 particularly then Lord Chief Justice, Lord Woolf.34 
                                                          
30 David Atkinson MP, then of the Council of Europe, asserts that there was no connection between the 
Resolution 1342 Office of the Lord Chancellor in the constitutional system of the United Kingdom, on September 8th 
2003,  and the government press release announcing reform - see Lord Windlesham, The Constitutional Reform 
Act 2005: ministers, judges and constitutional change, part 1, (2005) PL 806, 817 
31 Senior Civil Servant and from 2002 to 2005 Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Home Civil Service 
32 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, The cabinet office and the centre of government, 4th Report 
(2009-10 HL 30) Examination of Witnesses, 1 July 2009, Q138 – 159 (available at 
http://www.publications.Parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldselect/ldconst/30/30.pdf ) 
33 Press notice, Modernising Government, Lord Falconer appointed Secretary of State for Constitutional 
Affairs, 10 Downing Street, June 12, 2003 
34 Lord Woolf CJ, Judicial Review--the Tensions between the Executive and the Judiciary (1998) 114 LQR 579, 582 
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More importantly, Lord Irvine LC was told only a matter of days before the press release.35 
The move was referred to as a ‘curious’ attempt to initiate vast constitutional reform by press 
release.36 
 
The judiciary were concerned about the proposed reforms—and indeed, so much so, they 
were moved to hold a special consultation led by Lord Woolf CJ. In the ensuing months 
discussions took place between the Lord Chief Justice, the Lord Chancellor, the Judges’ 
Council,37 the Lords Committees, and the Commons, in order to agree the nature of the 
reforms and wording of the statute. This eventually led to the Concordat referred to above, 
a result of negotiations between Lord Falconer LC and Lord Woolf CJ, published in the 
libraries of both Chambers. This concordat stated that the preservation of judicial 
independence was fundamentally important, and set out other agreed and negotiated 
sentiments.38 But the concordat came with the condition that it ought to be implemented as 
a whole.39 Yet it did not deal with the proposal to create a new UKSC, nor with the question 
as to whether senior judges should continue to sit in the House of Lords. The future of the 
office of Lord Chancellor had also been excluded on the grounds that these were issues for 
Parliament to decide.40 
 
                                                          
35 Lord Irvine Memo Blames Tony Blair, The Guardian, 1 November 2009, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/nov/01/lord-irvine-sacking-tony-blair 
36 These press releases also detailed some reforms which could be foreseen. For example, the reform of the 
HL as a legislative chamber. Even the Wakeham Commission in the late 1990s early 2000s contemplated 
reforms to the upper chamber but while preserving the role of the Law Lords. For a view on this see, Lord 
Walker, The new Supreme Court and the changes in the justice system, (2006) LIM 6(4), 292-296 
37 Judges council response to the consultation papers on constitutional reform 2003, precursor of the Judicial 
College, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/judicial/pdfs/jcresp.pdf 
38 Lord Woolf CJ, The Rule of Law and a change in the Constitution (2004) 63 C.L.J. 317. 
39 Hansard, HL Vol.657, cols 12-17 (January 26, 2004). 
40 Lord Windlesham (n28) at 820 
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Some other issues which were not properly considered also directly affected the channels of 
communication between judges and politicians. As noted at the outset of this chapter, the 
reforms to the office of Lord Chancellor and to the Appellate Committee significantly altered 
the position of senior judges on the constitutional map of government. The Law Lords were 
removed from the upper chamber where they once sat as both legislators and judges able to 
sit in the Judicial Appellate Committee as the highest court in the land. On a more important 
practical aspect, the removal of the role of the Lord Chancellor as head of the judiciary and 
the traditional protector of the judges from political intervention, had not been properly 
considered and no provisions made for replacement.41 The Lord Chancellor historically made 
recommendations to the sovereign on judicial appointments. No answers had been given as 
to who, or what, would replace the mechanism of appointments. Nor, as the Judges’ Council 
paper asserts, had the Government properly considered protection of the independence of 
the judiciary from political interference.42 Since the first press releases, the Government had 
always insisted that the doctrines of a separation of powers and judicial independence were 
the focus of the reforms. But it seems that their understanding of implementing a more clear 
separation of powers equated to isolation and poor communication in a very narrow sense. 
 
The failure by the executive to properly communicate their ideas before implementing them 
led to protracted discussions, and negative media coverage. But the fact that these failures 
were followed by negotiation, and subsequent agreement, points to the importance of 
communication, albeit at a late stage. After the government’s initial failure to communicate 
                                                          
41 Lord Windlesham (n28) at 810. For views on the changes to the duties of the post 2005 office of Lord 
Chancellor see the differing views of: O’Brien P, ‘Does the Lord Chancellor really exist?’, UK Const. L. Blog (26th 
June 2013) (available at http://ukconstitutionallaw.org); G. Gee, ‘Do Lord Chancellors defend judicial independence?’ 
U.K. Const. L. Blog (18th August 2014) (available at http://ukconstitutionallaw.org) 
42 Judges Council Response (n37) at page 7 para 22. 
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the intention to pursue the reforms, the CRA was born out of an effective and detailed 
communication between the judicial and political branches.  
 
The process of reform began with little to no consultation. But after the announcement, 
there were committee appearances, speeches by the Lord Chief Justice in the Lords, and 
judicial consultation responses, as well as high level negotiations between the government, 
Lord Falconer LC, and Lord Woolf CJ. Communication was central to conveying the 
concerns of the judiciary with the effects of the CRA proposals, and more importantly 
allowed negotiations to occur, to incorporate the changes and safeguards that the judges felt 
necessary. 
 
Judicial independence requires that the institution of the judiciary be free from interference 
and the separation of powers requires the business of the branches of government to be 
separated along the lines of law making, administration and implementation, and application 
and enforcement. However, these constitutional principles are also dependant on effective 
communication between the branches of government.  More specifically, where the policies 
of one branch directly or indirectly affect the operation of the other, it is vital that 
communications take place between the two branches, whilst maintaining independence. 
Though the process of scrutinising the bill (and accompanying negotiations in private) 
showed how judicial-political communications could be effective, the result of the CRA has 
arguably removed what were formerly effective channels of communication. 
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The Constitutional Reform Act 2005: Shutting Out the Judiciary?  
 
It was earlier suggested that the Blair Government’s understanding of a clearer separation of 
powers equated to isolation, and inadvertently poor co-operation and communication 
resulted. To put this starkly: in order to establish a separate and distinct judicial branch, the 
Government thought that the judges should be moved to their own premises, and removed 
from any business relating to, or conducted by, Parliament or the government, thereby 
effectively ‘shutting out the judiciary’.  This narrow understanding of the separation of 
powers was quickly replaced as judges and politicians began negotiating the terms of the bill. 
But what evidence is there of a restriction of the channels of judicial-political communication 
post 2005?  
 
Though initial press-releases spoke of the abolition of Lord Chancellor, the fact is that the 
office remains today. Its role has been revised in the CRA 2005, with Part 2 of the Act headed 
‘Arrangements to modify the office of Lord Chancellor’. An important modification of the 
old role of Lord Chancellor however, was the abolition of the office’s responsibilities as head 
of the judiciary. The office of Lord Chancellor is now seen to be a supplementary title to that 
of the Secretary of State for Justice. That is, the Lord Chancellor is a government minister, 
no different to any other minister, and need not be of legal background but merely of 
qualified by experience.43 After the departure of Lord Irvine, Lord Falconer was made Lord 
Chancellor and made explicitly clear that, as well as not presiding as a judge in any cases, he 
felt that he was first, and foremost, a minister of government. This was of great concern to 
the Judges’ Council.44 Though there was nothing improper about such an approach, the 
                                                          
43 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s 2 
44 Judges Council (n37) p10 para30 
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Council was concerned that the government had failed to properly consider the 
consequences of removing the Lord Chancellor as head of the judiciary and the ensuing 
deficit that the removal of judicial representation from the Cabinet would create. Hazell, 
however, calls this a typically sad mourning by the judges for their old Lord Chancellor, when 
in fact the state of judicial independence and propriety has never been stronger.45 On this 
specific point, Hazell must be right; the change from requiring the Lord Chancellor’s 
patronage to independent appointments; and the breaking of a monopoly of different royal 
prerogative powers in one office holders hand; must all be seen to strengthen judicial 
independence. But the point remains that the judiciary have been stripped of a voice in the 
Cabinet. Despite what Hazell calls ‘multiple guardians’ and legal representatives in the form 
of the Attorney General, Solicitor General, and Treasury Solicitors Department, rather than 
a lone guardian in the form of the Lord Chancellor, the judiciary are now without proper 
representation in the Cabinet or Parliament. No matter how many government posts can be 
identified as legal in nature or function, all such positions are no different to any other 
government official or secretary of state—they are politicians. The old office of Lord 
Chancellor however was markedly different; as head of the judiciary and typically of legal 
background.  
 
These concerns came to the fore again more recently in January 2013 when Lord Judge gave 
his final evidence to the House of Lords Committee on the Constitution as Lord Chief 
Justice. 46 Lord Judge remarked that the individual independence of the judiciary would not 
                                                          
45 R Hazell, Statute Law Society Conference, 15 November 2013 (the speech is publicly unavailable, but the 
presentation he gave can be found at http://www.statutelawsociety.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/01/Hazell_presentation.pdf) 
46 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Annual Evidence Session of the Lord Judge, The Lord 
Chief Justice, Wednesday 30 January 2013, (http://www.Parliament.uk/documents/lords-
committees/constitution/lordchiefjustice/300113LCJtranscipt.pdf) 
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be an issue—‘we cannot perceive as possible a government official seeking to influence a 
courts judgement under threat of reduced salary or otherwise’. But the concept of the 
judiciary as an institution with a constitutional role to play has perhaps been eroded by the 
reforms of the CRA 2005. Namely, Lord Judge referred to the removal of a judicial 
personality from the Cabinet. The major concern is that there is nobody in the Cabinet who 
is responsible for representing to members of the Cabinet how a particular proposal may 
affect the judiciary. The new means by which the Lord Chief Justice as new head of the 
judiciary relays any concerns s/he may have is by way of formal indication to the Lord 
Chancellor. The Lord Chancellor may then, if they agree, raise those concerns in Parliament 
or the Cabinet. But if they disagree, they may simply discard it. The head of the judiciary is 
no longer a member of the Lords nor the Cabinet, and is therefore cut off from those 
institutions which it might necessarily be required to make representations too.  
 
The argument that the channels for judicial-political communication were being restricted 
under the CRA 2005 was resoundingly rejected by the House of Lords Committee on the 
Constitution, though without any explanation as to why it thought that.47 But if the channels 
of communication are being so restricted or eliminated, then there will be evidence of 
alternative means of extrajudicial comment becoming ‘more travelled’.48 
 
 
 
                                                          
47 House of Lords, Select Committee on the Constitution, Relations between the executive, the judiciary and 
Parliament (n26) at para 27 
http://www.publications.Parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldselect/ldconst/151/151.pdf) 
48 Lord Neuberger (n11) At paragraph 34, page 9 
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Extrajudicial Comment 
 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘extrajudicial’ as ‘[l]ying outside the proceedings in 
court’.49 Extrajudicial comment by judges then is anything done, said or undertaken, whilst 
not in the formal office of presiding as a judge. There are many interpretations as to what is 
acceptable and what is not, for judges to undertake extrajudicially. Extrajudicial activities are 
broad and varied in nature. Judges are often seen making speeches, or engaging in personal 
activity on the one hand, but also seen to be leading inquiries at the government’s behest on 
the other. This variety of extrajudicial activity was further explained by Lippman,50 who 
suggested that extrajudicial conduct can be categorised under one of two limbs.51 The first 
limb, details the involvement of a judge with formal appointments or assignments arising out 
of legislative or executive action, such as inquiries or campaigns not within a judges regular 
duty. The second is of a more personal nature, being speeches, lecturing, religious or 
charitable work, or attending conferences. Within those limbs, there is more scope for 
interpretation. For example, dependant on the jurisdiction, it may be more or less acceptable 
for judges to partake and opine on constitutional matters whether inside or outside of their 
courtroom.  
 
‘Extrajudicial comment’ as above is inclusive of any comment made outside of court by any 
judge of any court seniority. Such a definition does not restrict the subject matter in form, 
or substance, or the speaker, and therefore anything said outside of court by any figure 
otherwise exercising a formal judicial function would be included. As interesting as the 
                                                          
49 OED  (2d ed. 1989) 613 
50 J Lippman, Chief Judge of the State of New York and Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals (2009– 
present). 
51 J Lippman, The Judge And Extrajudicial Conduct: Challenges, Lessons Learned, And A Proposed  
Framework For Assessing The Propriety Of Pursuing Activities Beyond The Bench, (2012) 33 Cardozo L. Rev.1341  
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thoughts of the judiciary on otherwise more humorous or mundane matters would be, the 
definition of ‘extrajudicial comment’ here will need to be delineated to a more restricted 
scope in terms of speaker, form and substance. The substance can be restricted to those 
comments made relating to, regarding, or observing the state of the law or government, or 
the functions of the judiciary or the process of the administration of justice. That is 
extrajudicial comments which are legal in nature or pertain to legal matters, or the state of 
law or government. This should exclude comments of a non-legal or non-political nature 
which might otherwise relate to religion or charity. In choosing extrajudicial speeches and 
oral evidence to Parliamentary committees, we limit the form of extrajudicial comments to 
include in our study. This also implies that the extrajudicial comments studied will be public 
comments. Limiting the definition of extrajudicial comment in terms of the speaker is more 
appropriately done at the start of chapter two. 
 
There are a variety of options for judges to comment extrajudicially: public speeches; reports 
and consultations from the Judge’s Council; journal articles; evidence to Parliamentary 
committees; annual reports; public inquiries; press conferences; interviews; off-the-record 
briefings and blogs. Private judicial-political discussions also occur (for example between the 
Lord Chief Justice, the Attorney General, Lord Chancellor, Cabinet Secretary and annually 
with the Prime Minister),52 but this thesis focuses on more formal public comments. This is 
because where private communications falter or fail, judges will sometimes turn to public 
communication as a means of last resort.53  
                                                          
52 “These include monthly meetings with the Lord Chancellor and, in a fairly recent innovation, twice yearly 
meetings with the Prime Minister. As and when serious concerns arise, the LCJ can request an extraordinary 
meeting with the PM“ G Gee, The Lord Chief Justice and Section 5 of the Constitutional Reform Act, UK 
Constitutional Law Blog, Entry 14 April 2014 
53 Examples of this include Lord Philips speaking in 2011 on the damage to the independence of the Supreme 
Court so long as the MOJ and not the SC President appoints the Chief Executive of the Court. (the speech 
can seen at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/events/judicial-independence-events/lord-phillips-
transcript.pdf) 
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Where a judge feels private communications have been unsuccessful, a speech may do more 
to draw wider public attention to the issues at hand, and force more productive 
communication. Significantly extrajudicial speechmaking and oral evidence are not isolated 
channels of communication. For example a speech may come to the attention of a 
Parliamentary committee, which may then decide to call the judge concerned to give evidence 
to elaborate on their thoughts. These thoughts could then end up in explanatory papers or 
committee reports to members of Parliament and quoted in Parliamentary debate. These 
communications are also sometimes a trigger for further discussion or debate in Parliament, 
or a continuation of a debate over current issues. This close relationship between oral 
evidence and speechmaking is another reason why they are the focus of this thesis. 
 
This investigation involves a comprehensive study of extrajudicial speeches and oral evidence 
to Parliament. The reasons for singling out these means of extrajudicial comment will 
become clear. Briefly these are; that guidance has been issued to judges whether historically, 
formally, informally or currently in effect on how judges should approach extrajudicial 
speeches and oral evidence; secondly, today extrajudicial speeches and oral evidence are the 
most prominent, public and well known means of communication; thirdly they also represent 
a means by which, in the case of speeches, indirectly and one-sidedly allows for an interaction 
between judges, Parliament, and the government, allowing an investigation into concerns 
over the separation of powers and judicial independence.   
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CHAPTER TWO: EXTRAJUDICIAL SPEECHES AND LECTURES 
 
Chapter one showed how the CRA reforms have made judicial-political communication 
more important, but that the avenues for such extrajudicial interactions are now fewer. This 
and the next chapter looks at why extrajudicial speeches and oral evidence to Parliament can 
be considered the most significant means of extrajudicial comment, respectively. This 
chapter focuses on the evolution of speechmaking from educational purposes, to a method 
for judges to communicate with Parliament and the government. To do this the chapter is in 
two parts. In Part A, I begin by identifying a number of judicial speeches that will form the 
focus of my study. I then reflect on the guidance that exists to regulate extrajudicial 
speechmaking. Part A concludes by outlining criteria for analysing extrajudicial comments as 
means of communication. In Part B, I classify the selected speeches according to the criteria 
set out in Part A. Our study of the historic development of, and current guidance to, judges 
on speechmaking in Part A feeds into the process of classification and analysis in Part B. An 
important reason for this is to see whether or not the output and content of speeches follow 
the patterns and considerations envisaged by the guidance. Importantly, this will allow a study 
of the means by which judges can and have currently made extrajudicial speeches, which 
have been intended as indirect communications to Parliament and/or the government. 
 
Part A: Extrajudicial Comments from the Senior Judiciary 
 
We saw in chapter one that one effect of the CRA 2005, was to restructure the leadership 
duties and responsibilities of senior judges. Much of the administrative responsibility for the 
running of the judiciary was transferred from the Lord Chancellor to the Lord Chief Justice, 
who was also made the new head of the judiciary in the Lord Chancellor’s place. The Law 
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Lords are also a focus of the CRA, being removed from the House of Lords and installed in 
a new UKSC building with a President and Deputy President, with a final say over that court’s 
administration.54 Without an elected representative body or figurehead, the office of the Lord 
Chief Justice remains one of esteem and respect and is statutorily the head of the judiciary.55 
As head of the judiciary, the Lord Chief Justice also has new responsibilities for the 
administration of the courts, formerly held by the Lord Chancellor. Given the increased 
responsibilities and duties, the Lord Chief Justice has felt it necessary to delegate some of 
these responsibilities to heads of divisions.56  Heads of divisions too, responsible for the 
budgets and administration of their divisions, will need to communicate with ministers and 
civil servants on these issues. Likewise the Justices of the UKSC are considered to be senior 
members of the judicial hierarchy, as members of the highest court in the land. With the 
creation of the UKSC, the President in particular has undertaken new responsibilities for 
directing the courts approach to budgeting and administration of the UKSC.  
 
When selecting a sample of judicial speeches to examine in this thesis, it is necessary to set 
the boundaries narrowly and to include only the most senior and leadership elements of the 
judiciary—especially those with new leadership responsibilities as discussed above. This 
ensures that this thesis focuses on what is said from those at the top of the hierarchy who 
have arguably been affected most of all by the CRA 2005. These senior judicial leaders are, 
                                                          
54 For a detailed account of the responsibilities of the JSCs, and the SC Chief Executive, see K Mallesson, The 
Evolving Role of the UK Supreme Court [2011] PL 754. See also, a study of the responsibilities of the leadership 
figures across the UK judiciary, and discussion of their relative importance to, and over, each other in R 
Cornes, Gains (and Dangers of Losses) in Translation—The Leadership Function in the United Kingdom’s Supreme Court, 
Parameters and Prospects [2011] PL 509, 517. 
55 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, S.7(1) 
56 A move anticipated in the CRA 2005 in schedule 5 of the Act, granting power to the LCJ to delegate in this 
way. Delegation has also been discussed in oral evidence before Parliamentary committees – see House of 
Lords Constitution Committee, Annual Oral Evidence of Lord Thomas CJ, May 2014, available at 
http://www.Parliament.uk/documents/lords-
committees/constitution/annual%20oral%20evidence%20sessions%202013-
2014/ucCONST070514Ev1LordThomas.pdf 
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after all, charged with a special responsibility for the maintenance and advancement of the 
judiciary. Because of these new responsibilities for administration and budgeting we can 
expect to find, as discussed in chapter one, an increase in judicial-political communication in 
a way not seen before. In summary, for these purposes ‘extrajudicial comments’ will be taken 
from the senior judiciary which includes the Lord Chief Justice, justices of the UKSC and 
formerly the House of Lords and Heads of Divisions of the Court of Appeal  
 
There are possible shortcomings from setting the parameters so narrowly. In restricting the 
study of extrajudicial comment to the political and legal comments made in oral evidence 
and extrajudicial speeches, there is a strong chance that comments of neither type, but still 
relevant to the judicial institution and its administration, will be discounted. For example, 
there is comment on the issue of court and MoJ funding from the senior judiciary in 
responses to consultations and annual reports, which discuss the consequences of these 
policies on access to justice etc. These are significant forms of communication, but as they 
cannot be attributed to a single identifiable judge and analysed critically using the system that 
will be suggested later in this chapter, these are also discounted. In excluding these wider 
consultations and reports, the collective discussion on the issue of funding and court access 
which has only come about as a result of the CRA 2005 will not be included. However this 
thesis will not look at all the effects of the CRA on the judicial institution.  
 
By limiting the scope to the senior judiciary as defined in this way also omits comments from 
Chief Magistrates, Resident Judges and Honorary Recorders. Their thoughts are no less 
valuable and they still occupy leadership roles, albeit of a lesser significance for shaping the 
overall tenor of judicial-political communications. Including these groups in the study would 
be to include ‘the middle level’ of the judiciary, responsible for the day-to-day conduct inside 
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their own local court buildings, not nationally representative of the judiciary as with senior 
judges. It is on this national scale that the importance of communication between the 
branches of government can be discovered. 
 
To summarise then, the focus of this thesis is on the senior judiciary, and the particular 
definition as set out above. Secondly, only comments relating to the law or government or 
of a legal or political nature are included as explained at the end of chapter one. Working 
according to these parameters should draw the sample in to a suitable and workable size to 
allow for an investigation into the extrajudicial comments made by nationally representative 
judges, with leadership responsibilities, which require communication with the political 
classes. 
 
A Brief History of Regulating Extrajudicial Comment 
 
The rules surrounding extrajudicial comment-making may frame the content of extrajudicial 
comments because of the way the rules limit what judges can and cannot comment on. It is 
therefore necessary to analyse the development of rules regulating extrajudicial comment, 
before identifying our sample of speeches in Part B.  
 
The Kilmuir Rules, introduced in 1955 by then Lord Chancellor Lord Kilmuir, were based 
on the idea that ‘so long as a judge keeps silent his reputation for wisdom and impartiality 
remains unassailable’. These measures were not introduced as a reaction to a scandal or 
serious matter. The trigger was in fact brought about by the British Broadcasting Corporation 
(BBC). When making a documentary about great judges of the past, the BBC asked the then 
26 
Lord Chancellor for permission to interview judges. In a written response Lord Kilmuir 
stated: 
 
‘…every utterance which [a judge] makes in public, except in the course of the actual 
performance of his judicial duties, must necessarily bring him within the scope of 
criticism. It would moreover, be inappropriate for the Judiciary to be associated with 
any series of talks or anything which could be fairly interpreted as entertainment. My 
colleagues and I, therefore, are agreed that as a general rule it is undesirable for 
members of the Judiciary to broadcast on the wireless or appear on television.’ 
 
The rules were essentially a blanket ban on judges making extrajudicial comment to the 
media, and more generally ensured that the Lord Chancellor alone would speak for the 
institution.  
 
In setting aside the Kilmuir Rules in 1987, Lord Mackay stated ‘[j]udges should be free to 
speak to the press, or television, subject to being able to do so without in any way prejudicing 
their performing of their judicial work. …It is not the business of the Government to tell 
the judges what to do.’ 57 This was more forcefully restated by Mason.58 The essence of 
Mason’s argument was that on taking the judicial oath, a judge does not lose the right to 
freedom of speech. But it is the very nature of the office that demands that limits be observed 
in order to maintain the reputation and proper functioning of the judicial officer holder, and 
the institution as a whole. The freedom for the judiciary to make extrajudicial comment 
                                                          
57 Lord Mackay of Clashfern November 1987 as referred to in G Rubin, Judicial Free Speech versus Judicial 
Neutrality in Mid-Twentieth Century England, (2009) LHR 27(2), para 64. 
58 Former President of the Court of Appeal of New South Wales Mason, Should Judges Speak Out, JCA 
Colloquium, Uluru, 9 April 2001, (available at http://jca.asn.au/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/mason2.pdf) 
27 
exists, but it is caveated. In practice balancing the oath with the rights to freedom of speech 
requires judges to question firstly the scope and limits of when a judge should speak; and 
secondly, consider the necessary caution to consider properly whether one should choose to 
speak, and if so, how so. 59 These considerations are looked at more closely in chapter four. 
 
In a recent speech on the subject of extrajudicial comment, Lord Neuberger revisited the 
same subject.60 During the course of his speech, Lord Neuberger was reported in the media 
as having reprimanded a member of the judiciary for making comments on MasterChef. 61 
Yet on reading the speech itself, the context is clear; Lord Neuberger sought to show the 
absolute strict nature of the thinking of Lord Kilmuir in preventing any public comment at 
all.62 The efforts of the media to ‘spin’ should certainly serve to caution any attempt to 
humanise the judges. Lord Neuberger used his speech to address the subject of whether or 
not the Kilmuir Rules ought to be introduced. He concluded that whilst this was not 
necessary, and while acknowledging that extrajudicial comment should be viewed positively, 
vigilance was nevertheless essential. Such vigilance in making extrajudicial speeches is 
essential for the preservation of core principles such as judicial independence and the 
separation of powers.  
 
The Kilmuir Rules, used these principles to argue for the restriction of judicial comment 
almost altogether. The separation of powers forbade judges from engaging in political 
matters, and it is widely believed that judicial independence was better served by silent judges, 
who would therefore always be perceived as impartial. Yet when justifying the abolition of 
                                                          
59 L McNamara, Judicial Perspectives on open justice and security, Justice Wide Open (Ed. Judith Townend), (20 June 
2012) 
60 Neuberger (n11)  
61 “Lord Neuberger criticises fellow judge for appearing on MasterChef“ Telegraph 12 March 2012 
62 Neuberger (n11) para 8 
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the Kilmuir Rules, Lord Mackay argued that it was precisely because of judicial independence 
that judges should decide for themselves whether to speak. What has remained constant 
throughout the period from Lord Kilmuir to Lord Neuberger’s speech in 2012, is the 
absolute prohibition on comment by judges on matters of policy (or at least, matters of policy 
not pertaining to the administration of justice, as Lord Neuberger asserted in his defence of 
Lady Hale’s speech on the legal aid cuts). These changes in rules, suggest that the 
understanding of judicial independence has also changed within the judiciary.63 From the 
more formal concepts, judicial independence is increasingly accepted as having an 
institutional as well as an individual limb. This is relevant in as much as a comment by one 
judge might damage the independence of the judiciary as a collective which, as we discussed 
in chapter one, must be free from interference, above reproach, and impartial. Changes such 
as these, in the understanding of judicial independence (and by extension the separation of 
powers as well), could be taken to suggest that the judiciary’s understanding of effective 
channels of communication might also be changing. 
 
Changing Guidance to Judges on Extrajudicial Speechmaking 
 
In order to justify selecting extrajudicial speeches for study, over other forms of public 
communication, it is necessary to look at the historical approaches taken to extrajudicial 
speeches in this chapter—from the Kilmuir Rules and their restrictive effect, to their eventual 
dismissal, and Lord Neuberger’s more recent suggested guidance.  
 
                                                          
63 See the explanation given by M Arden LJ, a senior court of appeal judge (n16) 
29 
Neuberger singled out modern examples which flagrantly contravene the Kilmuir Rules, such 
as the appearance and comments of judges on MasterChef.64 However, having already 
delineated the relevant extrajudicial comment for the purposes of this thesis as those relating 
to the clash between politics and the law (which may or may not threaten the independence 
of the judiciary), any comments of ‘entertainment value’ should not be of concern. Whilst 
limiting judges, the Kilmuir Rules did not go so far as to include the senior judiciary who 
then also sat in the lords. As members of the upper chamber the Law Lords had a means by 
which to make their voices heard in the chamber and in government. The Kilmuir Rules did 
not limit their right to speak in the Lords. Even so, by convention few presiding judges took 
part in controversial debate in the chamber.65 
 
Similarly, in restricting judges from partaking in events with entertainment value, it seemed 
that extrajudicial speeches were overlooked by the Kilmuir Rules (though that does not 
necessarily mean that the judge speaking cannot be entertaining). Lord Neuberger gives a 
brief attempt to classify these speeches as typically ‘safe’ subjects, on matters such as the rule 
of nuisance in Rylands v Fletcher66 i.e. educational speeches of educational value, on points of 
law and legal theory.67 In this classification, Lord Neuberger identifies exceptions to the ‘safe’ 
subjects of educational value. An example comes from Lord Scarman and his comments at 
the Hamlyn lecture, A New Dimension 1974.68 In 1974 the ECHR and its possible 
incorporation into English law was a salient topic for discussion. But as Lord Neuberger 
                                                          
64 Neuberger (n11) para 7  
65 While Lord Neuberger acknowledges this, he also gives some significant examples of the few instances 
where that was not observed, see Neuberger (n11) para 22  
66 (1868) LR 3 HL 330 
67 Neuberger (n11) para 14. The Neuberger Principles are fully set out at 46 to 54 
68  See Scarman LJ, English Law – A New Dimension, Hamlyn Lectures, 26th Series, (Stevens & Sons Publishing 
1975) 
http://socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityofexeter/schoolofhumanitiesandsocialsciences/law/pdfs/
English_Law_the_New_Dimension.pdf 
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notes, Lord Scarman did not just discuss the issue. Instead ‘he offered his conclusion on how 
that debate should be resolved’. Lord Neuberger perhaps feels that this was too far.69 Here, 
the significance of extrajudicial speeches and their evolution for new purposes comes to light. 
 
Lord Neuberger acknowledges the reasoning of Lord Mackay in setting the rules aside, but 
appears to differ in his approach to extrajudicial comment in the form of speeches. As with 
Lord Kilmuir, Lord Neuberger was concerned with judicial independence, both individual 
and institutional, as discussed in chapter one. But these concerns were in two parts for Lord 
Neuberger. He observed that independence ‘can be compromised through the judiciary 
being drawn into discussions with the executive and legislature, which, for instance, call on 
the judiciary to offer legal advice, to comment on the lawfulness or constitutionality of policy 
or proposed legislation’. It can also be compromised where a judge may speak out of turn, 
on an issue of controversy which s/he will later need to rule upon in court. In such instances, 
the independence and impartiality of the judge concerned is compromised and they must 
recuse themselves. It is clear that either compromising action envisaged by Lord Neuberger 
may take place in direct oral evidence to a Parliamentary committee, or through an indirect 
public lecture. This is a further reason why these two modes of extrajudicial comment are so 
important, and worthy of study. 
 
More specifically on extrajudicial speeches, we saw how even during the Kilmuir years 
extrajudicial speeches were seen as exceptions to stringent restrictions of what senior judges 
could say. Now with those rules set aside, and the effect of the CRA 2005 on removing 
judges from the lords, Neuberger seems credible when he asserts that ‘the remaining avenues 
                                                          
69 Neuberger (n11) para 15 
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are almost inevitably likely to be more travelled’. Neuberger acknowledges this, and surmises 
that extrajudicial speech ‘carries with it more benefits than drawbacks’. This leads him to 
conclude that ‘at their best, extra-judicial comments in speeches and lectures help to maintain 
that independence; at their worst they risk undermining it. That is why vigilance is needed’. 
 
The Neuberger Principles: Suggested Guidance 
Lord Neuberger concluded by setting out seven principles to guide judges in that vigilance. 
In summary these state: 
 First, perhaps the most valuable contribution from judges speaking extrajudicially is 
on matters drawing upon their own experiences and knowledge in an educative role 
on matters of the law, as an academic subject as well as a career and profession. 
 Second, any comment should be made following careful consideration of the impact 
which it might have on both aspects of judicial independence—the individual, who 
may later need to rule on the issue in court, or the institution. 
 Third, a judge should consider the effect of speechmaking on the judiciary generally. 
That is, judges should consider that their opinions may be disagreed with, and not 
held by the judiciary as a whole. Where such views may inflame relations within the 
judiciary, they should perhaps not be made. Where disagreements occur, they should 
be conducted in a ‘seemly manner’. 
 Fourth, a judge should consider whether the subject matter is inconsistent with the 
separation of powers and goes too far into matters of public policy. Where these 
‘trespasses’ cannot be defended as necessary and relating to the administration of 
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justice they should not be made. The same considerations arise when members of 
the executive or legislature seek comments from serving judges. ‘Comity and the 
separation of powers may well call for reticence’. 
 Fifth, judges should think carefully of their audience, and the impact their comments 
might have upon it, and upon any wider audience, including the media. Might such 
comment compromise the judge’s independence, or be a matter upon which the 
judge may later be called upon to rule? Where such comments are made, ‘care should 
normally be taken to make it clear that the judicial mind is not closed’. 
 Sixth, judges should ensure that they do not seek publicity for its own sake, or use 
their ‘office as a springboard for causes (however worthy)’. 
 Seventh, Lord Neuberger expressed concern at the number of speeches being made 
and wondered if it devalued the importance of extrajudicial comment.  
 
These seven principles are not only ironic—advising caution to judges when speechmaking, 
by making a speech—but are also a significant indication of another possible change in 
judicial attitude to judicial communications. We noted earlier that judicial-political 
communication will inevitably have increased as a result of the CRA reforms (because, for 
example, of the heightened administrative responsibilities of senior judicial leaders). Whilst 
acknowledging that an increase will occur, Neuberger is however cautious that this should 
not be viewed as an opportunity for judges to depart from convention and constitutional 
principles, by making comments on issues which remain inappropriate to comment upon. 
The Neuberger principles therefore restate compendiously the existing principles and 
conventions that Neuberger believes should be uppermost in a judges mind before speaking. 
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For these reasons, the Neuberger principles are a helpful way to better understand a judges 
mind set when speechmaking and for the purposes of this thesis are given normative weight. 
This also allows an investigation into whether or not speeches really do fall within these 
principles, that we reasonably expect judges to consider and follow albeit by convention, 
during the classification process. 
 
Part B: Classification Process 
 
In order to assess the value of this guidance, speeches will need to be selected for our sample, 
and then organised according to a classification model. This classification is done 
substantially in three parts—the speaker (the judge doing the talking), form (in terms of the 
mode, venue, and context of the comments) and substance (the purpose and content of the 
comments). Looking at the speaker or the maker of the extrajudicial comment identifies who 
is speaking, the frequency with which that judge makes comments extrajudicially, and 
whether a certain ‘type of speech’ might be expected from them as regards topic or substance. 
This is important to the classification process in drawing out trends and projections of 
extrajudicial comments since the CRA 2005—and more specifically whether patterns have 
changed and judges are speaking out more often. 
 
The form of the extrajudicial comment, looks at more than whether it is a speech, lecture, or 
comes in oral evidence. This also sets out the venue where the communication took place, 
and what can be drawn from that. It also looks at who is in the audience (intended and actual) 
to receive the opinion or words of the judge and why the judge and the audience might be 
there. This is not a simple exercise where a judge need only decide whether to blog about a 
topic, or make a speech or write an article. The chosen method will allow a judge to target a 
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particular audience. Judges may also be ‘invited’ to give a lecture. These are very much a 
mode or method for extrajudicial comment, and therefore allow for extrajudicial comment 
to be easily classified by the form in which the contribution appears. However, the form of 
an extrajudicial contribution says little, if anything, about the substance of the extrajudicial 
comment. How the judge makes their opinions heard and presents their thoughts will set the 
premise for deeper analysis in terms of substance. For the purposes of this thesis the selected 
speeches will be drawn from those given before non-political audiences. As will be made 
clear through the analysis later in this chapter, the main reason for this is because my research 
suggests that (whether intentionally or not) speeches before academic institutions, and more 
so legal professionals, attach greater significance to the views and opinions of judges and an 
increased likelihood to lead to press reporting. Since my central research question requires 
evidence of judges using alternative and indirect means to communicate their views, this 
limitation is essential. 
 
The final category looks at the substance of the extrajudicial comments. This studies the 
actual content of the comments; what is the judge saying and, more so, why is the judge 
saying it?  It may also be that the intended audience differs from the actual audience, when 
we look at substance.  
 
Speeches 
 
In order to explain and reason this process of classification it is necessary to draw on actual 
examples of extrajudicial speeches. Lord Judge took office as Lord Chief Justice in October 
2008 and retired in September of 2013. He made at least twenty documented speeches during 
that time. Since the opening of the UKSC in October 2009, the justices of the UKSC have 
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collectively made at least eighty one extrajudicial speeches.70 Of the speeches by Lord Judge 
and JSCs, five have been selected for classification in line with the approach outlined above. 
The sixth speech comes from Potter LJ, who served as President of the Family Division at a 
time when government policy was very much concerned with reforming the family justice 
system. The detail of this is discussed later.  
 
The speeches in the sample are: 
 
1. Lord Judge CJ, Judicial Independence and Responsibilities, 16th Commonwealth Law 
Conference, Hong Kong, 9th April 2009;71  
 
2. Lord Phillips, Judicial Independence, UCL Launch of ‘The Politics of Judicial 
Independence’ research project, 8 February 2011;72 
 
3. Lord Neuberger, Judges and Policy: A Delicate Balance, Institute for Government, 18 
June 2013;73 
 
4. Lord Hope, Lord Taylor CJ Memorial Lecture, Inner Temple, 23 April 2013;74 
 
5. Lady Hale, Equal Access to Justice in the Big Society, Law Society, June 2011;75 and 
                                                          
70  For the speeches by Lord Judge, with links to the content, see 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/media/speeches/speakers/lord-judge  
Further as of February 2013, the list of the JSCs speeches, with links to the content, can be found at 
http://supremecourt.uk/news/speeches.html 
71 Lord Judge CJ, http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Speeches/lcj-jud-
independence-resps-hong-kong.pdf 
72Lord Phillips,  http://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech_110208.pdf 
73 Lord Neuberger, http://supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-130618.pdf 
74 Lord Hope, http://supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-130423.pdf 
75 Lady Hale, http://supremecourt.uk/docs/speech_110627.pdf 
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6. Sir Mark Potter LJ, President of the Family Division, Hershman/Levy Memorial 
Lecture, the Association of Lawyers for Children, London, June 2009.76 
 
The speeches were chosen because they are from some of the most senior judges, who are 
in order: the recently retired LCJ; former SC President and current President; former Deputy 
President, and current Deputy President of the UKSC; and, until retirement in 2010, 
President of the Family Division.77 
 
Speakers 
 
The first speech was given by Lord Judge, during his time as LCJ. Although Lord Phillips 
was the first post-CRA LCJ, Lord Judge was, in many ways, the key actor in developing the 
post-2005 office of LCJ and, more generally, working to make sense of the new constitutional 
landscape.78 We might surmise that the new responsibilities, and any problems or issues faced 
by Lord Judge with them, are likely to come across in his extrajudicial comments. In this 
speech, Lord Judge sets out the meaning of judicial independence and its importance not just 
for judges but also its great significance to a democratic society and the rule of law. Lord 
Judge does this with a catalogue of examples where judicial independence has been 
                                                          
76 M. Potter LJ http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Speeches/pfd-hershman-levy-
lecture.pdf 
77 A list of all speeches by JSCs can be found at http://www.supremecourt.uk/news/speeches.html 
78 Lord Woolf CJ was the first LCJ to become head of the judiciary by virtue of s.7(1) of the CRA. He was 
succeeded by Lord Phillips in the same year. But, arguably, the full extent of the transfer of administrative 
responsibilities had not been completed until the MoJ reforms of 2007. For more on those reforms see: 
House of Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee, The creation of the Ministry of Justice, Sixth Report of 
Session 2006-07, HC 466 available at 
http://www.publications.Parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmconst/466/466.pdf ; AW Bradley, 
Relations between Executive, Judiciary and Parliament: an evolving saga?, (2008) PL 470, 481 
37 
subverted, and outlines the responsibilities for judges that come with independence, and the 
duty of non-interference from the executive. 
 
The second speech is taken from Lord Phillips as President of the UKSC in 2011 where he 
addressed the UCL School of Political Sciences on the launch of a research project on judicial 
independence. The UKSC website lists three speeches made by Lord Phillips as President 
from 2009 to 2011.79 Lord Phillips was the first President of the UKSC, and we can therefore 
expect some of his comments to reflect the work of, and challenges confronting, the UKSC 
in its first few years. In this speech Phillips sets out his own views on the development of 
the doctrine of judicial independence through history into its current form.  He also studies 
and reflects on CRA reforms and their consequences for judicial independence. In particular, 
Lord Phillips refers to the proposed funding arrangements of the UKSC when the CRA was 
being drafted, the actual funding arrangement, and his concerns about the disparity between 
the two. 
 
The third speech in the sample is by Lord Neuberger.  As current President of the UKSC, 
he is considered one of the most senior judges in the land, as the most senior figure of the 
Supreme Court. As President of the UKSC he is responsible for directing, and is authoritative 
on, matters relating to the UKSC. Since taking office in October 2012, he has made ten 
extrajudicial speeches. Of those, two took place at think-tanks,80 four before bodies 
representing branches of the legal profession in practice,81 and one at annual conferences of 
                                                          
79 The three speeches by Lord Phillips can be found at http://supremecourt.uk/news/speeches.html 
80 The speeches by Lord Neuberger are: Lord Neuberger at Justice – Tom Sargant Memorial Lecture 2013 
,Justice in an Age of Austerity and Lord Neuberger at the Institute for Government , Judges and policy: a 
delicate balance 18 June 2013 
81 Lord Neuberger at the ARBRIX Annual Conference, London Address to property arbitrators 12 
November. Lord Neuberger gives The Annual Caroline Weatherill Memorial Lecture, Isle of Man The 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the 21st Century 11 October 2013, Lord Neuberger gives the 
inaugural Harbour Lecture at Gray's Inn From barretry, maintenance and champerty to litigation funding  8 
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organisations providing a legal service or function.82 The topics of these speeches vary from 
the purely educational such as ‘fraudulent claims’ to reform of legal education, and also 
political issues such as ‘judges and policy: a delicate balance’. In the speech selected for study 
here, Lord Neuberger discusses how he has seen the relationship and state of separation of 
powers evolving, and where the right balance for good government might lie. Applications 
for judicial review, which seek to hold public bodies to account, rose from 6,692 in 2007 to 
11,359 in 2011.83 In recent years it has become increasingly common for parts of the media 
and political class to suggest that that the judiciary has overstepped their judicial function 
into the political arena, by creating for itself a much greater policy role. With the growth of 
judicial review, the advent of human rights, and the UK’s membership of the European 
Union being cast into doubt, the subject of Lord Neuberger’s speech is very relevant, but 
also somewhat political. Lord Neuberger begins by acknowledging the growth of the courts 
judicial review work, but adds: ‘[t]he growth of judicial review, since the 1960s, reflects the 
significant expansion of the power of the executive’. The debate in the media and Parliament 
has also recently discussed reform of the judicial review process in light of the increasing 
number of claims, and discussed the increase of legal costs for the claimant requesting judicial 
review..  
 
The fourth speech is by Lord Hope, who served as Deputy President of the Supreme Court, 
and who, since taking office in October 2009, has made thirteen extrajudicial speeches. 
Having been in the UKSC for three years longer than Lord Neuberger the difference 
                                                          
May 2013 and Lord Neuberger at the '80 Club', Association of Liberal Lawyers Tomorrow's Lawyers Today - 
Today's Lawyer's Tomorrow 19 February 2013 and Lord Neuberger at the UK Association of Jewish Lawyers 
and Jurists' Lecture Privacy in the 21st Century 28 November 2012 
82 Lord Neuberger gives the first annual BAILII Lecture, No Judgment – No Justice, 20 November 2012 
83 BBC article covering the rise in applications for judicial review: Ministers line up curbs on 'frivolous' judicial 
reviews, BBC 23 April 2013 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-22260063 
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between Lord Hope’s thirteen speeches in four years and Lord Neuberger’s ten in one year 
is significant. The difference is most likely a reflection of the importance of the office of 
President of the UKSC—whether the authority of the President’s comments, or simply an 
indication of the high demand to have Lord Neuberger present at a venue we shall see. Of 
those speeches by Lord Hope almost all took place at places of education or research 
including law schools and law centres. The topics vary from the need and functions of the 
UKSC, to issues in Scots law, and contract law. The selected speech here is based on the 
legal theory and discussion of the Supreme Court judgment given by Lord Phillips in the 
recent case of Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society.84 This case and Lord Hope’s 
speech addressed the issue of child sex abuse cases as claims brought before the civil courts, 
and not the issue as seen in the criminal courts. Cases of this sort relate to child sex abuses 
where at the time of the commission of the offence the victim was in the care of a school, 
orphanage or institution, where the offence took place, by a member or employee of the 
institution concerned. The victim then brings a claim for damages in the civil courts against 
the institution where the offence was carried out. The question for the court is whether the 
institution is vicariously liable for the commission of the offence by the offender. The usual 
requirements for vicarious liability were whether what the offenders did was within the scope 
of their authority, whether there was a close connection between wrongful acts and the type 
of work being performed, and whether it would be fair and just to hold the offender’s 
institution liable for the offender’s wrongful acts. However the test in the UKSC case was 
not so straightforward since, in very basic terms, the offenders in that case were priests of a 
brotherhood, committing these offences whilst working at a child welfare organisation, 
which did not employ them. Lord Hope sets out the recent high profile cases on similar facts 
                                                          
84 [2012] UKSC 56, [2012] 3 WLR 1319 
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and the judgments in those cases, and then explains how the precedents on vicarious liability 
were ‘tailored’ by the court led by Lord Philips to find the child welfare organisation in that 
case liable. 
 
The fifth speech in sample is taken from Lady Hale, who recently replaced Lord Hope as 
Deputy President, but has otherwise been a member of the UKSC for the same time period 
as Lord Hope, since its opening in October 2009. Lady Hale has in that time made twenty 
one extrajudicial speeches. The majority relate to family law and diversity in the judiciary. At 
the time of the chosen speech, the Legal Aid, Sentencing, and Punishment of Offenders Bill 
had just been published and was due for debate in Parliament.  Among its provisions it 
included reforms to legal aid and cuts to the provision of legal aid. Lady Hale’s speech is an 
examination of these reforms and the impact and effect of them on ‘access to justice’. She 
explains that article 6 of the ECHR protects the right of access to the courts, and this is ‘one 
of the most precious’ of our constitutional rights. The speech goes on to suggest that reform 
is not forbidden, and that different possibilities for saving money in the court system can be 
found.  
 
The final speech was given by Potter LJ as President of the Family Division; a division which 
has faced not only stringent cuts, but also the proposed privatisation of many of the social 
and child care services which it uses. Potter LJ has made thirteen speeches on the subject 
during his time in office.85 At the time of this speech in 2009, the government proposed 
specific cuts to legal aid in family proceedings and proposed the award of contracts for social 
                                                          
85The list of speeches can be viewed at: http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/media/speeches/speakers/sir-mark-
potter 
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and family child care work to private companies.86 Following serious criticism of the 
government’s proposal by legal professionals, and negative media coverage, the government 
showed no sign of relenting. As head of the family division, Potter LJ states that he has a 
duty to speak out in defence of the family justice system. During the selected speech, he gave 
his view of the detrimental effects of the proposed cuts, and the possible consequences 
thereof, making clear his opposition to the proposals. 
 
These judges are plainly very senior and respected members of the judiciary. Yet, it is clear 
that Lady Hale is the most likely to speak out, having done so on markedly many more 
occasions , several of which have been widely reported as we will see. One view would be 
that we can expect Lady Hale to express her right to speak publicly and to do so on matters 
she views to be important more often than Lord Hope or Lord Neuberger. But it would also 
be prudent to consider that a judge is not solely responsible for where they speak or how 
many times they do so. On many occasions it is undoubtedly the organisation hosting the 
lecture that will select and invite a judge to speak. This explains more clearly how Lord Hope 
attends and speaks at more events in Scotland on Scottish issues than the other two JSCs. 
And perhaps it can also be asserted that the greater frequency of Lady Hale’s speechmaking 
could be due to the fact that she is popular among hosts, professionals and students.  
 
It seems then that the first step of identifying the speaker, and looking into their background 
and history of extrajudicial speeches is relatively straightforward compared to the next two 
classification stages. But doing so provides a good basis from which to see which of our 
                                                          
86 For media coverage of the privatisation see: Families 'hit by legal aid cuts', Law Society warns, 7 August 2010 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10900573 
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speakers are more ‘outspoken’ than the others, speak more often, and speak on different 
topics. 
 
Form  
 
The form of the extrajudicial comment is already known; the sample is of six speeches. We 
should also be aware of the guidance from Lord Neuberger above. Specifically at point five 
where attention is drawn to the potential concerns over the audience before which 
extrajudicial comments are made. Here we should be aware of what the audience, or those 
who issued the invitation to the relevant judge to deliver a speech, might also hope to achieve 
by having a senior judge attend to speak. 
 
The first speech in our sample by Lord Judge CJ, took place at a Commonwealth law 
Conference held in the non-commonwealth jurisdiction of Hong Kong. The over 1000 
anticipated attendees of the conference were members of the Commonwealth Lawyers 
Association which draws its membership from across the commonwealth nations.87 Fellow 
speakers alongside Lord Judge included ministers for justice and senior judges from other 
commonwealth nations.88 This is therefore the only speech to an international audience, and 
to a sizeable audience, in our sample, though other judges have addressed international 
audiences (for more examples, Lord Mance delivered speeches in Monaco89 and the 
                                                          
87 The composition of the association can be viewed at 
http://www.chinalawandpractice.com/Event/818/16th-Commonwealth-Law-Conference.html 
88 The event can be viewed athttp://www.commonwealthlawyers.com/conferences.aspx#TOC 
89 Lord Mance in Monaco, Destruction or Metamorphosis of the Legal Order? 14 December 2013  - 
http://supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-131214.pdf 
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Netherlands90 in 2013, and Lord Sumption in Kuala Lumpur also in 2013).91 With such an 
international audience and particularly comprising the commonwealth legal professionals, we 
might expect Lord Judge to be less specific to the state of British law and affairs, and speak 
a little more generally so as to be relevant to all commonwealth nations. The most obvious 
way we might expect Lord Judge to do this is by taking a fundamental legal principle and 
speaking about it in relatively abstract terms, as indeed he does in this selected speech. 
 
Lord Phillips speaking at the University College London for the launch of the Judicial 
Independence Research Project, 8 February 2011, and in a speech entitled ‘Judicial 
Independence’ can be expected to give his own views on judicial independence, and as it is 
the opening speech, possibly give direction or suggest and agenda for the project to 
investigate. The research project being an academic research branch of UCL would no doubt 
have been keen to secure a prestigious speaker for the launch event, as well as hope to discern 
some words of guidance from the chosen speaker.  
 
The lecture by Lord Neuberger took place at a policy think-tank, the Institute for 
Government. The Institute considers its role to be to provide advice, research and direction 
to help promote effective government. Among its members are policy researchers, students 
and graduates, but among the hierarchy are senior politicians and civil servants. As well as 
his own principle number five, we will look at the considerations of principles two, three and 
four, and what conclusions or effects Lord Neuberger might have considered; for example 
the concerns over speaking to a political audience on impending law reform. By accepting to 
                                                          
90 Lord Mance in the Netherlands, The Rule of Law - Common Traditions and Common Issues, 1 October 
2013 - http://supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-131001.pdf 
91 Lord Sumption speaking in Kuala Lumpur, The Limits of Law, 20 November 2013  - 
http://supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-131120.pdf 
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speak at the Institute for Government, Lord Neuberger knows that his words will be 
expected to relate to the functions and objectives of the think-tank; namely promoting 
effective government. But Lord Neuberger also knows that his audience will not only be 
made up of policy researchers and students waiting to receive his wisdom, but also of 
politicians, civil servants and members of Parliament. This of course is a class of people 
which he could very well seek to address, directly or indirectly, or influence in the same way. 
But that is, for now, conjecture until we look to substance. 
 
Lord Hope was hosted by the Inner Temple, one of the four Inns of Court. As an inn, the 
membership is varied, drawing on all stages of a legal career in advocacy. Lord Hope is 
perhaps here demonstrating the importance Lord Neuberger attaches to extrajudicial 
comment his first principle. Members include students wishing to be called to the bar, 
barristers who are qualified and practicing, academics, and also senior judges and politicians 
who were previously barristers. The Inner Temple is not only representative of the 
profession of barristers but is better known as a place of education. It can therefore be 
expected that Lord Hope will be speaking on a legal educational matter, seeking to address 
the students gathered for a qualifying session. However when we look to the substance of 
Lord Hope’s lecture, it may become more relevant that senior judges and one or two senior 
politicians may have been present in the audience.  
 
Finally, Lady Hale attended a conference hosted by the Law Society and Potter LJ addressed 
the Association of Lawyers for Children. As the Law Society is a body representative not 
only of practicing solicitors but the legal profession as a whole it can be expected that Lady 
Hale will seek to address the legal profession generally as her audience. The topic can also 
therefore be expected to be one that will be important to the profession and their work. 
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Whilst also addressing a representative body of legal professionals, the Association of 
Lawyers for Children will more likely be made up of family law specialists. As President of 
the Family Division, we might expect Potter LJ to speak on a matter of common interest or 
concern to the family law practitioners and judges. Again in inviting senior judges to address 
gatherings of practitioners, it is likely that the organisers were not only looking for prestigious 
figures to draw in audience members, but also seeking to solicit support for their opposition 
to policy reforms. 
 
In many of these, particularly event launches such as at UCL and the lectures to legal 
professionals, we also need to be aware of the importance of principle six—not seeking 
publicity for publicity sake and using high office as a springboard for causes. 
 
Having looked at the speaker and form of these extrajudicial speeches we can see that they 
come from senior judges with a slightly varied record, and are going to take place at markedly 
different locations. The speaker at a lecture is easily identifiable. But it is not so simple to 
identify the capacity in which they are speaking. Is the judge speaking as a judge, that is a 
member of the judiciary, the third branch of government? Or are they speaking personally 
on a matter which is important to them. Or is it both? To discern this we need to look to the 
substance of the speeches. 
 
Substance 
 
Judicial speech making has been a common method for extrajudicial comment throughout 
history. The judiciary have been giving speeches since the dawn of the Inns of Court—the 
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earliest known recording being by Fyneux CJ at Gray’s Inn 1449.92 Even in the fifteenth 
century, the topic of judicial speeches were the legal matters of the day. In 1449 Fyneux CJ 
discussed the niceties of assumpsit for nonfeasance, and many judicial speeches today focus 
on recent judgments and legal developments. To speak on a purely legal topic for academic 
and educational value usually avoids constitutional difficulty or a compromising of judicial 
independence. Significantly, in the first of his seven principles for judges to consider before 
speaking extrajudicially, Lord Neuberger acknowledges the great importance of speeches 
made for academic and educative purposes. He makes specific reference to those speeches 
drawing on a judge’s experience and knowledge. However the purpose of extrajudicial 
comment has evolved significantly, so that comments are no longer solely educative.  
 
It is instructive to contrast the speech of Lord Hope on vicarious liability to the thoughts 
and opinions on legal aid cuts by Lady Hale, or even Lord Neuberger’s own speech on 
striking a balance between law and policy as a judge. Lord Hope, speaking on vicarious 
liability, adopts the historical approach typical of the Inns of Court as places of education. 
Opining on the future and development of a specific area of law for the benefit of students 
and the legal profession was very much the substance of the speech. Occasionally such 
speeches were also a subtle signal to the government of the day to encourage law reform by 
statute. These speeches served not only as education and development of the common law, 
but also as a contribution to the programme of Parliament and the executive. So even in a 
speech where the content appears to be for educational value, there may be subtle 
suggestions calling for law reform to be placed on the Parliamentary timetable. But the 
speeches of Lady Hale and Lord Neuberger appear to have adopted a wholly distinct 
                                                          
92 Sir Henry Brooke (former Lord Justice of Appeal and Vice – President of the Court of Appeal (Civil 
Division) Judicial Independence – Its History in England and Wales, available at 
http://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/education-monographs-1/monograph1/fbbrook.htm 
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approach, attempting to solely contribute and present views to the government. To 
understand the spectrum of substance of extrajudicial comment these three speeches are 
considered in turn.  
 
The title of Lord Hope’s speech was ‘Tailoring the law on vicarious liability’ and was given 
at the Inner Temple. Prima facie, it seems that the substance of the speech is legal in the 
historical educational sense—of the kind valued by the first of Lord Neuberger’s principles. 
In introducing the topic, Lord Hope cites a judgment delivered the previous year, Various 
Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society93 and poses a legal question for the audience: 
 
‘Whether the institute could be held vicariously liable for the abuse that was committed 
in the school by its members while employed as teachers there as well as the bodies 
that were responsible for the school’s management.’ 94  
 
 In setting out the case law and resources to be used to answer that question from the view 
of a student of the law, Lord Hope refers to and elucidates upon court judgments95 and draws 
upon his own wealth of knowledge. So far, there is no hint of the speech being political in 
nature. In answering the question posed Lord Hope stated that the approach adopted by the 
courts was to ‘tailor’ a solution from the commonly accepted legal principle that there were 
only three relationships that would satisfy the requirement for liability: master and servant, 
principal and agent and employer and independent contractor.96 Exercising common law 
powers of judicial creation, the courts answered the question posed and succeeded in 
                                                          
93 [2012] UKSC 56, [2012] 3 WLR 1319.  
94 Lord Hope (n74) page 2 
95 Ibid, page 13,   
96 Ibid Page 15 
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tailoring an answer. But Lord Hope concludes that such activity by the courts will doubtless 
require ‘refinement’, but omitted whether that would be the duty of the courts, or Parliament, 
or both. Lord Hope also included this: 
 
Lord Pearson said that what Lord Denning had done amounted to a departure from 
the agency principle qui facit per alium facit per se. It amounted to the introduction of 
a new basis for liability, which ought to be left to Parliament. It is with those words 
ringing in one’s ears, as it were, that one turns to the Supreme Court’s unanimous 
judgment.97  
 
Some commentators argue that the case law and incremental expansion of vicarious liability 
in this way is in need of a rethinking and reform by new statute.98 In this light, it can be 
considered that Lord Hope has made a subtle suggestion that this is an issue which ought to 
be considered on the Parliamentary programme—a position echoed by the Law 
Commission.99 Therefore despite the value accorded to the speech by the first of Lord 
Neuberger’s principles, this shift to hint for Parliamentary reform may require Lord Hope to 
have considered some of the other of Lord Neuberger’s principles. 
 
In considering the terms for classification of extrajudicial comment, attention will need to be 
drawn to the fact that a label such as ‘educational’ in substance, will not necessarily be 
absolute. An educational speech can still contain elements that are related to government 
policy. The extent to which these elements appear will vary from speech to speech, thereby 
suggesting that a spectrum of speeches exists, rather than absolute labels. Some speeches will 
                                                          
97 Ibid page 16 
98 Phillip Morgan, Recasting vicarious liability, (2012) CLJ 71(3) 615 at 616  
99 Law Reform Commission, Ireland, Civil Liability of Good Samaritans and Volunteers, LRC 93 -2009 
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be more educative than others, and some will be more focussed on government policy than 
others. This will become more important as our study of the sample progresses. For now we 
need only note that in terms of this spectrum, the speech by Lord Hope is educative, with 
subtle hints for law reform. It is clear that Lord Hope is opining from a personal view point 
on the need for law reform.  The remarks that come from his own experiences and 
encounters, and the conclusions drawn do not suggest that Lord Hope is speaking on behalf 
of the judiciary as an institution, which is seeking change to the law on vicarious liability. 
Further examples of educative speeches, such as Lord Judge’s ‘Summary justice in and out 
of court’100 follow a similar pattern. But instead of an analysis of developing case law and 
legal theory,101 they set out the development of legal procedure and practice. In this particular 
speech Lord Judge spoke of the history and development of summary justice according to 
his own experience as a young practitioner and the situation now.102 
 
Some educative speeches are neither on legal procedures, or legal developments, but concern 
the role and office of judges. In these speeches, judges give an account of what being a judge 
is like, the responsibilities and duties attached, and sometimes an account of their own 
experiences in becoming a judge.103 These speeches still fall into Lord Neuberger’s first 
principle, as they draw on the judges own knowledge and experience.  
 
                                                          
100 Lord Judge, Summary Justice In And Out Of Court. The Police Foundation's John Harris Memorial Lecture, 
Drapers Hall, London, 7 July 2011  
101 Further educative speeches on the development of legal theory and case law include: Lord Clarke, What 
shall we do about fraudulent claims?, 8 November 2013; Lord Sumption, Reflexions on the Law of Illegality, 23 April 
2012; Lord Hope, Corroboration and Distress, 12 June 2009 
102 Further educative speeches on legal procedure include: Lord Neuberger, Lord Erskine and Trial by Jury, 17 
October 2012; Lord Hope, In law, is procedure really that important? 17 Mar 2010; Lord Hope,  
Taking the case to London - maybe it's not over after all, 12 Mar 2010 
103 For more examples see: Lord Clarke, The Supreme Court: One Year On, 11 Nov 2010; Lord Kerr, Dissenting 
judgments - self indulgence or self sacrifice? 8 October 2012; Lady Hale, Judgment writing in The Supreme Court, 30 Sep 
2010 
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 The second speech is by Lord Judge speaking at the Commonwealth Conference on Judicial 
Independence and Responsibilities. We expect this speech to be educative; drawing on the 
experiences of Lord Judge to discuss the doctrines of judicial independence and his views on 
judicial responsibilities. We see this in the start of the speech.104 Lord Judge gives a brief 
overview of the importance of judicial independence and the experiences of the 
commonwealth delegates, before drawing on an anecdotal experience he had at a meeting of 
European judges. This all serves to demonstrate judicial independence and its perception as 
seen and experienced by Lord Judge. The educative feature continues with a factual account 
of the ‘Fortisgate’ incident in Belgium.105 Here, the Prime Minister had publicly admitted that 
a Minister’s officials had repeatedly contacted the husband of one of the appeal judges in the 
course of a high-profile and controversial case. The case concerned financial irregularity. In 
Lord Judge’s own analysis of the Fortisgate incident it is still educative in substance—Lord 
Judge opines as to the point at which vigilance and caution to prevent interference with 
judges should begin. The content then turns towards the history of the development of the 
common law, and the responsibilities that judges have and must observe in ensuring that 
their decisions are made free from influence or interference. Though there are repeated 
references to judges having a duty to resist any attempt at interference by the press, public 
or the executive, the views of Lord Judge are still educative. 
 
However, the factual discussion then touches on a specific example in the UK; the use of 
control orders for terrorism suspects.106 It could be argued here that Lord Judge leaves the 
educative and moves into a slightly more politically sensitive discussion. However, on reading 
the relevant passages it is significant that the Home Secretary concerned is not named; the 
                                                          
104 Lord Judge, (n71) page 1 
105 Ibid, page 2 
106 Ibid, page 4 
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strong words used at the time in criticism of the Law Lords refusal to enforce control orders 
are avoided;107 and Lord Judge cannot be said to have gone too far into matters of public 
policy having only given a historical account of what happened. Lord Judge remains in 
indirect retrospective compliance with the informal guidance from Lord Neuberger (if ever 
he read it). This point serves to note that Lord Neuberger did not create his suggested 
principles anew, but drew them from established and accepted practices and conventions 
within the judiciary and sough to formalise and elucidate them. 
 
For a greater example of pushing along the spectrum from educational in substance to 
political, Lord Neuberger presents a good example, speaking in 18 June 2013.108 The method 
of commenting, again, is clearly identifiable; Lord Neuberger gave a speech. But more telling 
was the location—not an inn of court or law school, but the Institute for Government. So 
sometimes, the form of a speech can also suggest what might be the substance; here, a 
political point. The speech was titled ‘Judges and policy: a delicate balance’. It is generally 
assumed that policy is a matter for Parliament and government and not for judges, so by 
choosing this as a title we can expect a political point in the course of the speech. Lord 
Neuberger asserts: 
 
This does not mean that the Judiciary should have no policy role. ...Nor does our 
history support the notion that the courts should be a policy-free zone. The common 
law is the continuous product of judicial policy-making through decided cases since 
                                                          
107 Terror control orders breach human rights, law lords rule, Guardian 10 June 2009, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/jun/10/control-orders-breach-terror-suspects-rights 
108 Neuberger (n73) 
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1066, but it is policy-making subject to the Legislature.... And the Judiciary has a limited 
right, indeed an obligation, to speak out on matters concerning the rule of law.109  
 
In the course of a speech we expect to be about judges and policy, Lord Neuberger states, 
‘We should take great care in any approach to reduce access to judicial review. It is a small 
price to pay for a democratic and just society.’110 This is a warning, however subtle, to a 
government in the process of entertaining restrictions and reform of the judicial review 
process. Lord Neuberger falls short of stating his outright opinion on reform; caution 
stemming from the principle of judicial independence perhaps. But there is a clear message 
to the government and its officers present in the audience at the Institute that ‘great care’ be 
taken with any attempt to reduce access to judicial review. Whilst repeatedly highlighting the 
importance of the judiciary refraining from commenting upon government policy,111 Lord 
Neuberger sets out his thoughts as to what constitutes the duty of a ‘civilised government’. 
112 Indeed, Lord Neuberger goes further to explicitly set out two ‘specific warnings’ aimed 
directly for government attention.113 Firstly, Neuberger warns against reductions to the legal 
aid scheme which would drive out ‘the best lawyers’, and suggests that such changes would 
result in more appeals, and miscarriages of justice, requiring more money that would be saved 
by the proposed cuts. Secondly, Neuberger comments on the implications these cuts will 
have on delaying the business of the courts. Prima facie, Lord Neuberger has overstepped 
the separation of powers and has allowed himself to criticise government policy. On closer 
inspection however, we see that Neuberger has followed each criticism with a valid link to 
                                                          
109 Ibid page 3 para 7 
110 Ibid page 4 paragraph 9  
111 Ibid page 4 paragraph 11  
112 Ibid page 9 paragraph 22  
113 Ibid page 9 paragraph 25  
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how the proposals would adversely affect the administration of justice. We have already seen 
how important this exception to the rule prohibiting judges from commenting on policy is.  
 
In essence, Lord Neuberger warns against overly restricting access to judicial review, since 
‘the three branches of government share a common aim’ in preserving the good of the nation. 
This attempt to caution restrictions to judicial review, and highlighting of the damage to the 
rule of law that will result, means that this is no longer a slight suggestion for reform. Though 
it is arguably to educate an informed debate about legal development, here the cost of legal 
aid, there are explicit attempts to influence the Parliamentary programme. In terms of 
classification, this pushes Lord Neuberger’s speech further towards being political in 
substance. This substance also assists us with finding out who is speaking; Lord Neuberger 
personally, or Lord Neuberger as a representative of the judiciary (and the UKSC in 
particular). The attempts to limit access to judicial review were heavily criticised by Lord 
Neuberger. Not because judicial review interests him, thought it may well, but because such 
cuts are of concern to the administration of justice by the judiciary, and the issue is therefore 
one which requires a unified objection from the judiciary.  Though not explicitly stated, Lord 
Neuberger’s views, as expressed, are likely shared. To voice concerns in this way does suggest 
that Lord Neuberger was speaking on behalf of the judiciary.  
 
Similarly Lord Philips in his speech at the UCL appears to adopt an educative approach, 
setting out a summary of the judicial appointments process, its history, changes, and reforms, 
and the creation of the UKSC over the first 12 pages of the speech. Lord Phillips also focuses 
on a proposed scheme of administration and funding for the Supreme Court by Lord 
Falconer then Lord Chancellor. But then Lord Philips’ own personality comes through where 
he states; ‘Now let us see what the Act in its final form had to say about our funding’ and 
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sets out the provision of the Act.114 He concluded ‘I cannot recognise in those provisions 
the scheme that Lord Falconer had described to the House of Lords.’ Lord Philips has 
avoided any of the ‘trespasses’ into policy debate envisaged in the caution of Neuberger’s 
fourth principle on the separation of powers. Instead he has set out the facts of what were 
proposed, what actually happened, and the differences (i.e. shortcomings). Lord Philips then 
sets out the struggle of negotiations that he has been involved with to secure funding for the 
UKSC and concludes with damning remarks:  
 
‘My conclusion is that our present funding arrangements do not satisfactorily guarantee 
our institutional independence. We are, in reality, dependant each year upon what we 
can persuade the Ministry of Justice of England and Wales to give us by way of 
‘contribution’. This is not a satisfactory situation for the Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom. It is already leading to a tendency on the part of the Ministry of Justice to 
try to gain the Supreme Court as an outlying part of its empire.’115 
 
Chapter one noted that private judicial-political meetings take place, but that public 
extrajudicial comments were important because they could be a means of last resort i.e. when 
private negotiations and communications are unsuccessful, a judge can make their concerns 
known publicly to draw attention to the issues faced. On this point, a point of friction had 
arisen between the Ministry of Justice and Lord Phillips over differences in how the Chief 
Executive of the Supreme Court should be viewed, prior to the making of this speech. The 
office of the Chief Executive of the Supreme Court is responsible for many important 
aspects of the running of the Supreme Court. These include securing the funding for the 
                                                          
114 Phillips (n72) page 13 
115 Ibid pages 13 to 15 
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court, internal management of staff and functions, preparing reports on the courts functions 
and administration, establishing good relations with judges and politicians, and setting out 
the strategy and development of the court.116 During private discussions it transpired that the 
MoJ viewed the Chief Executive as a bureaucratic office, essentially a civil servant answerable 
to the ministry. But the UKSC, felt that the role was constitutionally important, in ensuring 
the independence of the court from government interference.117 It is thought that these 
negotiations were deadlocked, and so Lord Phillips decided to voice his concerns publicly. 
Importantly Lord Philips set out how the administrative team of the UKSC were essentially 
civil servants, answerable to Ministers and not the President of the Court—a matter which 
he perceived as detrimental to the institutional independence of the Court.118 So even though 
Lord Phillips does not, in substance cross the line into policy discussion, and remains 
focussed on matters pertaining to the administration of justice, this public speech is a clear 
public communication not only to the government, but also to the wider judiciary, legal 
professions, and media, that there are important issues facing the independence of the 
judiciary, and they need to be dealt with in the way envisaged by Lord Phillips. This is very 
important for our purposes as it not only criticises the government for its unwillingness to 
constructively discuss this matter in private communications, but also shows how Lord 
Phillips almost forces the government to listen, by ‘going public’. 
 
Pushing even further along the spectrum, Lady Hale gave a speech in June 2011 to the Law 
Society. As members of a representative body of legal professionals, the audience may again 
                                                          
116 For a detailed discussion of these 5 main duties of the Chief Executive, see G Gee, Guarding the guardians: 
the Chief Executive of the UK Supreme Court [2013] PL 538 
117 A detailed discussion of the differing views of the MoJ and SC President, over the Chief Executives 
responsibilities, and the prevailing argument can also be found at G Gee, Guarding the guardians: the Chief 
Executive of the UK Supreme Court, ibid 
118 Phillips (n72) page 16 
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allow for some speculation that the topic may be about the profession or its working 
conditions. The speech was titled ‘Equal Access to Justice in the Big Society’. Those words 
alone are indicative that the substance of the speech will be a ‘study’ of the Prime Minister’s 
sound bite concept of ‘the big society’. Lady Hale poses the question, in an apparently 
academic and education fashion, what is the legality of restricting access to justice? Lady Hale 
then sets out, as is typical of academic extrajudicial speeches and articles, the possible statutes, 
European jurisprudence, and common law cases that would help to answer and initiate 
debate on the subject.119 But despite complying with these academic conventions, and its 
seemingly educative theme, The Guardian reported that the position adopted by Lady Hale 
was ‘likely to be received as a direct challenge to one of the government's major cost-cutting 
measures’.120 Yet the text of the speech at no point discloses criticism directly from Lady 
Hale, who instead refers to the Government’s own Equality Impact Assessment observations 
in order to highlight concerns—concerns she may, or may not share. Lady Hale states: 
 
‘[T]hey say that this is justifiable because they are disproportionate users of the 
service in these areas. This is an interesting argument about which I had better not 
say anything more, as it is bound to come before us in one shape or form in future.’ 
 
As Lord Neuberger did above, Lady Hale fell short of explicitly stating a view, so as to avoid 
compromising judicial independence and presumably to prevent an application to remove 
Lady Hale from any subsequent appeal to the UKSC on legal aid cuts, on the grounds that 
she had arguably prejudged the issue. Looking back to the spectrum, these are comments 
made on proposed legislation from the government, with a clear intention that the words of 
                                                          
119 Hale (n75) Pages 4 through 12 
120 Supreme court judge warns legal aid cuts will hit poorest,  Guardian 28 June 2011, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/law/2011/jun/28/supreme-court-judge-legal-aid 
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warning and caution be received and considered. This is a speech which can be classified not 
as a hybrid, but as political in substance. Lady Hale is sending a message to the legal 
profession that they are not alone in their concerns about legal aid cuts; that the judiciary are 
also concerned. In pointing out the flaws to those cuts, Lady Hale is attempting to address 
the government directly, not on her own behalf, but on behalf of a concerned judiciary and 
a profession to which she and many judges once belonged. 
 
Another example of this can be seen in the final sample speech by Potter LJ. As then 
President of the Family Division, Potter LJ holds the highest office in the family courts and 
the leadership role responsible for the administration and procedure of the family courts. 
Like Lady Hale, we can expect a show of support and leadership from Potter LJ for the legal 
professionals facing government cuts to legal aid. We might even see more leadership from 
Potter LJ than from Lady Hale, since he is the President of the Family Division, and is here 
addressing an audience of family lawyers.  
 
Potter LJ makes some very important observations about the role of the judiciary and the 
reforms of the CRA. Early in the speech121 Potter LJ sets out, as most judges do before 
making what might be perceived to be outspoken remarks about the family law reforms 
proposed by the government of the day, how he believes it is not appropriate for judges to 
attack government policy. 122  Like Lady Hale, Potter LJ uses third party reports, here the 
Laming Report, to point at the shortcomings of the government policy. Further Potter LJ 
identifies a significant effect of the CRA; Judges are now responsible for the administrative 
policy of their division and courts including budgets and funding. Organisations charged 
                                                          
121 Potter LJ (n76) page 2 
122 See Lady Hale opening in a similar way above, (n75) “It is not the proper role of any judge to attack 
government policy” 
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with caring for children in legal proceedings are now subject to government department 
budgets and targets, which as Potter LJ suggests makes cross purposes and aims more likely 
and problematic.   
 
Here Potter LJ shows the same restraint as Lady Hale. Lady Hale we saw utilised statistics 
and reports from other third parties and relayed them to discredit the governments proposed 
legal cuts, but never actually adopted any of them as her own position. The speech was more 
of a report of reports and reasons why the government proposals were ill thought out. Potter 
LJ appears to take a similar approach. 
The expansion of extrajudicial speeches into presenting arguments to the government is a 
result of what has been referred to as a significant need for the senior judiciary to comment 
on matters which profoundly affect the proper administration of justice. In both their 
speeches, Lord Neuberger and Lady Hale were sure to state this. Whilst the courts 
acknowledge that Parliament may limit a court’s jurisdiction without comment, the judiciary 
insist rightly that comment must be made where actions are taken to limit or unhinge the 
court’s ability to fulfil, as Lord Diplock said, its constitutional function of doing justice.123 It 
is on that basis that Lady Hale sought to argue that ill-considered cuts to legal aid would not 
only preclude the courts’ ability to do justice where there are too many unprepared litigants 
in person, but also that only the rich and able would be willing and able to use the courts.  
 
Potter LJ also explicitly identifies, unlikely the very subtle hints of Lord Hope above, that he 
is at times speaking directly to government; even if they will not listen: ‘it emphatically is my 
                                                          
123 Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau v South India Shipping [1981] AC 909 
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concern as Head of Family Justice to bring forcibly to the attention of the government the 
threat to the efficient working of the system in terms of both efficiency and delay’.124 
 
Proliferation of extrajudicial comment from speeches into further discussion 
 
In chapter one, it was suggested that extrajudicial speeches should not be considered in 
isolation, and that speechmaking could be used as a way to trigger further discussion and 
communication between judges and the political class. This section uses the speeches we 
have just analysed to examine the way in which extrajudicial comments from speeches might 
progress in this way.  
The speech by Potter LJ was picked up on by his soon successor Sir Nicholas Wall LJ in a 
speech given a few months later that year, also before the Association of Lawyers for 
Children.125 Wall LJ comments ‘nobody listening to this year’s ALC Hershman Levy 
Memorial Lecture, delivered by the President in the summer, could have been left in any 
doubt that the President was coming off the Bench and speaking his mind.’ In the transcript 
of Wall LJ’s speech we see a reference to a letter sent by the then Secretary of State for the 
Home Department to Potter LJ as President.126 Though the letter does not arise out of Potter 
LJ’s speech, it does state that it is in response to comments and findings made by Potter LJ 
in an extrajudicial capacity as chairman of the Family Justice Council. Though three years 
prior to Neuberger’s fifth principle, the point made there about how judges should consider 
the impact, effect, and possible development or interpretation of their comments appears to 
                                                          
124 Potter LJ (n76) at page 16 
125 At paragraph 12, of the Speech by Wall LJ, Justice For Children: Welfare Or Farewell?, 21 November 2009 
available at - http://www.alc.org.uk/uploads/Keynote_2009.pdf 
126 The letter referenced between paragraphs 34 and 35 of the speech by Wall LJ, ibid, can be seen in full at 
http://data.Parliament.uk/DepositedPapers/Files/DEP2009-2832/DEP2009-2832.pdf 
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be necessary. There are some better examples of proliferation of comments made by judges 
extrajudicially into further debate. 
 
From our sample the first speech by Lord Judge to the Commonwealth association was 
reported in academic circles appearing in academic texts, international reports, and law 
commission reports.127 Addressing a sizeable gathering in Hong Kong on the core 
constitutional notion of judicial independence, unsurprisingly, failed to capture the 
imagination of the press. But no doubt Lord Judge felt that the lecture gone well, as publicity 
for publicity sake is frowned upon. Lord Neuberger addressing the Institute for Government 
was later cited in academic circle as well; most notably by the Chief Justice of New South 
Wales.128 Significantly the clerks of the Lords, cited Neuberger’s speech in an explanatory 
note for a debate in the chamber on cuts to legal aid funding.129 This is a good example of 
how speeches might be brought to the attention of MPs and peers, for consideration in 
Parliamentary debate. Whether any of Neuberger’s comments were heeded, I cannot say. 
What is significant then, is that Neuberger’s words spread beyond the ‘theatre’ in which he 
spoke them, and were communicated to peers. Thus far in my research I have not found any 
citations of Lord Hope’s speech on vicarious liability. Lady Hale however appears to have 
captured the imagination of the press more so than any other speech in the sample. Reported 
in two major newspapers (Guardian130 and Express131, and even the local Halesowen 
                                                          
127 Documented in S Shetreet and C Forsyth, The Culture of Judicial Independence: Conceptual Foundations and 
Practical Challenges, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012) at page 150 
128 The reference to Neuberger in the speech of the Chief Justice of New South Wales can be viewed at: 
http://www.supremecourt.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/agdbasev7wr/_assets/supremecourt/m670001l771004/bathu
rst_2013.10.11(2).pdf 
129 House of Lords Library Note, 5 July 2013, LLN 2013/019, on page 4 available at 
http://www.Parliament.uk/briefing-papers/LLN-2013-019.pdf 
130 Supreme court judge warns legal aid cuts will hit poorest , Guardian (n120) 
131Judge warns over legal aid cuts, Express, 28 June 2011- http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/255576/Judge-
warns-over-legal-aid-cuts 
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News132), on a well-known law blog (UK Human Rights Blog)133 and the Law Society Gazette 
for law practitioners.134 There is, at least within this small sample, a correlation suggesting 
that the less educational a speech on our spectrum, and the more political in substance, then 
the greater the chance for reporting and proliferation into further debate. 
 
However the sample also showed a more subtle proliferation of comments, specifically on 
the part of Lord Philips. We saw how in his speech on judicial independence to the UCL, he 
raised concerns that the administrative Chief Executive of the Supreme Court was 
answerable to the Lord Chancellor and not himself, the President of the Supreme Court. The 
following day Ken Clarke, then Lord Chancellor, was quick to criticise and rebut Lord 
Phillips remarks, stating that this was simply a ‘storm in a teapot’ and ‘of course’ the judiciary 
was independent.135  That seemed to be the end of that. Yet in his retirement Lord Phillips 
used his position as a peer to introduce an amendment addressing his concerns raised in 
February 2011. This was by amendment to the Crime and Courts Bill, now as s.29(1) Crime 
and Courts Act 2013. S.29(1) explicitly amended the CRA to make the Chief Executive solely 
appointed by and accountable to the President of the Court.  On the one hand, this is perhaps 
a subtle means of communication: Lord Neuberger as his successor as President of the 
UKSC was said to have liaised with Lord Phillips to encourage him to move an amendment. 
Such a move could be interpreted as an example of indirect interaction with the legislature 
by the UKSC via a former retired Justice, during a much larger debate and discussion over 
                                                          
132 Judge warns over legal aid cuts, Halesowen news, 28 June 2011- 
http://www.halesowennews.co.uk/uk_national_news/9110230.Judge_warns_over_legal_aid_cuts/ 
133 Lady Hale on access to justice, legal aid and staying at The Ritz, UK Human Rights Blog, 28 June 2011 
http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2011/06/28/lady-hale-on-access-to-justice-legal-aid-and-staying-at-the-ritz/ 
134 We must make our voices heard in the campaign to maintain equal access to justice, Law Society Gazette, 30 June 
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135 Kenneth Clarke rejects claim of threat to supreme court independence, Guardian 9 February 2011 
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whether the Chief Executive was bureaucratic and answerable to the MoJ or constitutionally 
important and answerable to the Supreme Court. On the other hand, the reliance on a retired 
justice to use his position as a peer to raise an issue of concern to the UKSC might underline 
the basic starting point of my project: i.e. there might be insufficient direct channels of 
communication, or those that exist are ineffective. 
 
The importance of this sometimes strategic proliferation of extrajudicial comments from 
speeches into the press, academic journals or Parliamentary debate, cannot be 
underestimated. Neuberger set out the caution to be observed over making comments which 
might attract too much attention in the fifth (consider the impact on the audience and 
beyond) and sixth (avoid publicity for publicity sake) principles. It is clear from looking at 
our sample of six, that sometimes a press storm may well be triggered by well-meant 
comments defending the administration of justice, but may either ultimately be less 
successful as a subtle strategy like Lord Philips, or may draw unwanted criticism of the 
judiciary as speaking out of turn.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In making an extrajudicial comment there are many more things to consider than simply the, 
admittedly still very important, concepts of the independence and integrity of the judiciary. 
Judges often engage in scholarly pursuits in an extrajudicial capacity, seeking to share and 
discuss knowledge about the law, legal procedure and judicial system. However we have also 
found a deeper thinking to the three stages of classification. As speakers, judges are becoming 
more and more aware of each other and their own track records of speaking out 
extrajudicially—such awareness and information formed the background for Lord 
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Neuberger’s speech to the Holdsworth Club. This awareness is allowing judges not only to 
support each other and bring together the judiciary as an institution but also allow discussion 
and debate should judges disagree.  
 
For form, it is clear that speeches as means of extrajudicial comment have expanded since 
the Kilmuir Rules, and markedly since the CRA 2005. Speeches are now more commonplace, 
and senior judges are being invited to speak before a more diverse range of audiences, at 
different locations. But even here there is consideration to be had. Specific venues and events 
allow judges to interact with specific audiences, either directly before them, or indirectly 
depending on where or who their words are reported to. Careful choices have been made in 
the speeches we have studied, to ensure that where a judge wishes to express concern, for 
example on proposed government cuts to access to justice, then to do so with the best 
possible effect is to speak before a gathering of angry professionals, or encourage 
Parliamentary committees to publish the concerns based on evidence to properly inform the 
government programme.  
 
The substance of extrajudicial comment shows the biggest changes over the years. The 
evolution into new purposes from the historic educative role of judges in an extrajudicial 
capacity has opened up a new speechmaking as a means of indirect communication with 
politicians. Whether by a subtle suggestion calling for law reform, or a critical account of 
government policy, speeches are being increasingly recognised as a tool for communication. 
Where judges make speeches on pertinent or seemingly controversial issues, there is good 
chance that the speech will trigger further debate. This is a theme that we further develop in 
chapter three. Though admittedly somewhat speculative, there is some evidence above that 
speeches are becoming a tool of last resort, where private communications fail. Pre-2005, the 
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means of last resort would have been for the Lord Chief Justice or one of the Law Lords to 
make a speech in the House of Lords.136 Now that this option has gone, it is arguable that 
speechmaking by judges has, in part, taken its place. Whether meriting a quick response from 
government ministers, or an invitation to appear before a Parliamentary committee; 
extrajudicial speeches can play a crucial part in the overall scheme of judicial-political 
communications. 
 
Having categorised specific examples of extrajudicial speeches in the three stage test, it is 
now possible to move on to assess the adequacy of those methods for extrajudicial comment, 
since the CRA 2005 in chapter four. Before this, we also analyse and classify examples of 
oral evidence before Parliamentary committees in chapter three. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
136 A key example of this, was when Lord Woolf spoke on the negotiation between himself and Lord 
Falconer in drawing up the concordat for the Constitutional Reform Bill, HL Deb 08 March 2004 vol 658 
cc979-1006 
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CHAPTER THREE EVIDENCE TO PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES: 
 
This chapter examines judicial evidence in oral hearings before Parliamentary Committees. 
It does so in two parts. The information studied in Part A, setting out the practicalities of 
oral evidence, informs the analysis in Part B, which explores specific examples of oral 
evidence as a means of judicial-political communication. Part A focuses on the process and 
reasons for arranging committee appearances, changing judicial attitudes to such 
appearances, and the current guidance to judges on such appearances. Part B then embarks 
upon a classification and analysis of a sample of oral evidence sessions. As with extrajudicial 
speeches in the previous chapter, this is important in order to investigate the effects the CRA 
has had on the practice in both the manner of judges appearing before Parliamentary 
committees, and the way judges and politicians approach an appearance. For example, we 
may see particular senior judges appear more frequently, or judges becoming more 
outspoken, or that judges are given flexibility to bring their own concerns to the committee’s 
attention. We may also see differences as to how senior judges, and committee members 
approach the practice; perhaps with more or less reluctance to appear on the part of judges, 
or more or less reluctance to be too outspoken.  
 
Extrajudicial speeches are public comments, sometimes made indirectly to politicians. Oral 
evidence is a direct means of communication between judges with at least some MPs and 
peers. It is therefore arguably of greater value and importance. Together, the two arguably 
become even more important, since extrajudicial comments made in a speech, can 
subsequently inform a Parliamentary committee’s inquiry, leading to further discussion. With 
some sixty five speeches from Justices of the Supreme Court alone, since 2009, there are 
more speeches made by judges than committee appearances (which according to one study 
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average around one a month).137 But this chapter will show that, with formal guidance and 
preparatory private communication, oral evidence is a more targeted form of careful judicial-
political communicating.  
 
The constitutional changes introduced by the CRA have also been accompanied by an 
increasing demand by Parliamentary select committees to have judges giving evidence on a 
wide number of issues. Historically, the Judicial Executive Board states that judges were 
‘virtually never’ called to appear before Parliamentary committees.138 However given the dual 
personalities of the most senior judges sitting as both judge and peer of the House of Lords 
prior to the CRA 2005, and the presence of judicial figures in the Cabinet and the Lords, that 
does not mean that there were no interactions between judges and Parliament.139 But post 
2005, judicial appearances before committees have increased from ‘virtually never’. 
According to Beatson LJ, senior judges were called to give oral evidence on twenty occasions 
in the eighteen months from April 2006 (when the Lord Chief Justice became Head of the 
Judiciary) to December 2007.140 Furthermore, a total of thirty-eight judges from all levels of 
the judiciary have been called to give oral evidence to a variety of Parliamentary committees, 
between 2006 and August 2012, with many of those appearances before the Commons 
Justice Committee and Lords Constitution Committee. The LCJ and Heads of Divisions 
appeared most frequently.141 This suggests that the CRA 2005 has so restricted judicial access 
                                                          
137 G Gee, R Hazell, K Malleson, P O’Brien, The Politics of Judicial Independence in the UKs Changing Constitution, 
(Cambridge: CUP, forthcoming) Chapter 6 
138 JEB Guidance to Judges appearing before select Committees at page 1 para 1. Available at 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Guidance/select_committee_guidance.pdf 
139 For an important examples of Judges speaking on the floor of the House of Lords, see Lord Woolf as 
Lord Chief Justice, stating the importance of how he sees it as his responsibility “because of the office that I 
hold, to communicate to your Lordships directly the views of the judiciary”, HL Deb 08 March 2004 vol 658 
cc979-1006 at 1003 
140 Beatson LJ, Judicial independence and accountability: pressures and Opportunities, (n26) 
141 Le Sueur Parliamentary Accountability, and the judicial System in Leyland and Bamforth, Accountability in the 
contemporary constitution, (OUP 2013) 208 
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to government and Parliament, that the one remaining constitutionally acceptable method of 
direct communication via committee evidence is bound to become more prevalent. It will be 
interesting to see if we can discover whether the judges or the committees sought these 
annual appearances; if the senior judges made a greater push for them, then it suggests that 
this desire for regular interactions with Parliament is seen as valuable and useful for the 
judges. On the other hand, if the committee was the driving force, we may discover that the 
meetings are viewed as Parliament holding judges to account regularly, as a part of the wider 
Parliamentary discussion for greater accountability of judges. Perhaps most obviously, here 
accountability relates to the increasing administrative, management, and leadership roles 
exercised by senior judges. The importance of oral evidence cannot be underestimated and 
is demonstrated, unlike with extrajudicial speeches, by specific, formalised and targeted 
guidance by the Judicial Executive Board’s, Guidance to Judges appearing before Select Committees. 
That formal guidance was deemed necessary could be taken to suggest that oral evidence is 
becoming more prevalent. As will become clear, the judiciary is concerned that appearances 
have the potential to undermine judicial independence, particularly since the publicly 
broadcasted sessions show judges and MPs and peers meeting to discuss matters in an 
intimate, yet formal, setting. 
 
Part A: The Process of Arranging an Appearance 
 
Whilst some appearances are now a matter of routine (e.g. the now annual appearance of the 
Lord Chief Justice, President of the Supreme Court and Deputy President of the Supreme 
Court), the process for arranging or preparing for an appearance before a Parliamentary 
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committee generally follows the four main stages set out in the JEB Guidance.142 First, the 
Parliamentary committee’s clerks make a request to the particular judge to attend a committee 
hearing. Today, such requests are made via the Private Office of the Lord Chief Justice. 
Second, the judge is required to consider various principles as set out in the JEB Guidance 
which provide advice on when it is appropriate to accept an invitation to appear. 143 (We will 
look at this guidance shortly). Third, the Parliamentary clerks and the judge negotiate the line 
of questioning to be taken in the committee hearing, ensuring questions focus on the 
committee’s subject of inquiry and do not breach any constitutional principles or 
Parliamentary rules. (These various rules are discussed below). Finally, the judge conducts 
the necessary research to answer the agreed questions in preparation for the hearing. 
 
 At stage one, the process provides for a centralised system144 anticipating that, as a result of 
discussions between the senior judiciary and Parliament,145 requests for judges to provide 
oral or written evidence to a committee will be first sent to the Private Office of the LCJ. 
This is followed by a comment that this is to aid centralised record keeping and in no way 
‘intended to compromise the independence of individual judges’. The measure recalls the 
strict regime under Lord Kilmuir, that the head of the judiciary should be contacted in the 
first instance. But given the arguments for setting aside those rules in order to advance 
individual judicial independence and the need for record keeping to charter changes in 
practice since the CRA, this seems reasonable here. Only if it transpired that the office of 
                                                          
142 JEB Guidance (n138) 
143 Ibid, at paragraph 23  
144 Ibid, at para 6  
145 Perhaps of the kind suggested by Mr Graham Gee: “The previous LCJ, Lord Judge, and the current Clerk 
of the House of Commons, Sir Robert Rogers… have developed more frequent informal contacts. To aid a 
better mutual understanding, the Clerk of the House has begun holding regular informal meetings with the 
LCJ and President of the UK Supreme Court, … The new guidance from the Judicial Executive Board in 
2012 on judicial appearances before select committees is in part a product of these contacts.” G Gee,The Lord 
Chief Justice and Section 5 of the Constitutional Reform Act, (n52)  
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the LCJ sought to prevent the appearance of a judge before a committee without that judge’s 
consent, or that the LCJ was pressuring individual judges to relay a uniform opinion shared 
by all judges but dictated by the LCJ, then there would be serious concerns for this procedure. 
Indeed it is important to note that there are no public reports or records in recent years of 
the Lord Chief Justice having ever prohibited the attendance of a judge before a select 
committee.146 Instead the figures collated by the office of the LCJ as to the number of 
committee appearances, and by which individual judges, has allowed for reporting of the 
numbers of sessions of oral evidence in the LCJ’s periodic reports.147 This is important for 
addressing the concern held by some, that judges and politicians should not interact too 
frequently in order to maintain judicial independence in both fact and appearance. However, 
this concern can be overcome by the first consideration made by the LCJs office and the 
judge concerned, as to whether or not written evidence would be more appropriate than an 
appearance.148  
 
By choosing to submit written evidence, judicial concerns over inappropriate questions from 
the committee are addressed. Furthermore, the associated risk of unwittingly compromising 
answers is also avoided. In publishing a ‘call for written evidence’ a committee will set out 
the subject and scope of their current inquiry and list a series of pertinent sub-questions that 
they will investigate. Responses are then invited which may deal with some, or all, of the 
questions posited.149 It should also be noted here that as well as committees approaching 
                                                          
146 Despite my enquiries and research, particularly into the interviews and empirical data of other research 
projects, I have been unable to find any accounts of this happening. It is possible, though I suggest unlikely, 
that any refusal by the LCJ would be private and not the subject of any media coverage or reporting 
147 See the report of Lord Judge 2010 to 2012, which set out the information on judicial appearances before 
committees at page 4 Relationship with Parliament: available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Reports/lcjreport10-12.pdf 
148 See paragraph 24 of the JEB Guidance (n138) 
149 For a clear example of a call for evidence, see the Lords Select Committee On The Constitution: The 
Judicial Appointments Process: Call For Evidence  http://www.Parliament.uk/documents/lords-
committees/constitution/JAP/FinalCFE130511.pdf 
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judges, judges may ‘volunteer’ to assist by submitting written evidence during these calls for 
evidence. Judges may also request an appearance for oral evidence before a committee.150  
From 2006 to 2012, fifteen judges submitted written evidence to five different Parliamentary 
inquiries, while thirty eight judges gave oral evidence to twelve different Parliamentary 
inquiries.151  The difference between the numbers of judges giving written and oral evidence 
suggests a preference of judges for direct personal interaction with politicians in order to 
communicate. Though written evidence may trigger an invitation for an appearance (in order 
to question the written views further),152 the absence of a two-way dialogue in the form of 
written evidence is one of the important reasons this chapter focuses on oral evidence and 
not written evidence, before Parliamentary committees.  
 
At the second stage described above, the JEB Guidance provides a list of matters for 
individual judges to consider before accepting a committee’s invitation to appear. Of 
particular importance is the risk of lines of questioning into areas that lie outside an individual 
judge’s expertise.153 Even in these preliminary stages of negotiating an appearance, it is clear 
how much work needs to be done by the prospective judge. But it also points to the 
importance of good communication between judges, politicians, and Parliamentary clerks. 
The third stage involves the committee clerks, committee members and the judge and/or 
the Judicial Office negotiating what questions are appropriate to be asked, or which questions 
the judge would or would not be willing to answer. Therefore in order to communicate by 
                                                          
150 For example Lord Woolf as LCJ volunteered to appear before the Parliamentary enquiry into the use of 
public inquiries - House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, Government by Inquiry, 
First Report (2004–05) 
151 A record of written and oral evidence from 2006 to 2012 is helpfully set at out in A Le Sueur Parliamentary 
Accountability, and the judicial System in Leyland and Bamforth, Accountability in the contemporary constitution, (OUP 
2013) Appendix 3 
152 For example, see Lord Phillips written evidence and subsequent appearance to be questioned over it 
regarding the creation of the Ministry of Justice before the Commons Justice Committee in 2007: available at 
http://www.publications.Parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmconst/466/46602.htm#evidence 
153 JEB Guidance (n138) at paragraph 23  
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appearing before a Parliamentary committee in public, private communications are essential 
to ensure the smooth running of the session. 
 
The final stage requires the judge to prepare to answer questions to assist the committee in 
its inquiry. Examples of committee inquiries include the diversity of the judiciary, the judicial 
appointments process, family court procedure, or the use of comparative law. In answer to 
questions on these topics judges will have needed to research a variety of topics. Some of 
these include judges having to: sometimes collate empirical data on the composition and 
personal qualities of the judiciary; report on the details of the judicial appointments process 
and experiences of it; and, reading and summarising case law and procedural guidance. The 
preparation required by the prospective judge will need to be sufficient to deal with the 
committee questions and can therefore vary from inquiry to inquiry. As we will see, this leads 
to concerns among the senior judges about the amount of court time that is lost when judges 
accept, prepare for and ultimately appear before a Parliamentary committee. 
 
Should a judge refuse to attend the guidance states that ‘It is extremely unusual and very 
unlikely to be the case that a Parliamentary committee will order a judge to attend’.154 
Remarkably, this falls short of stating that committees have no power to order a judge to 
attend. Whilst in theory a committee could order a judge to attend, as with any other witness, 
it would be constitutionally improper to do so.155 The Scottish Parliament and Northern Irish 
Assemblies are explicitly precluded by statute from ordering judges to give evidence.156 A 
                                                          
154 Ibid, at paragraph 26  
155 R Kelly, Select Committees: Powers and Functions in A Horne, G Drewry and D Oliver, Parliament and the Law 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing 2013) 161, 186-187 
156 Scotland Act 1998 Section 23(7) and Northern Ireland Act 1998 section 44(5) 
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scenario which saw the provision invoked by the Lord President of Scotland, which intiated 
negotiations and an eventual closed door, private meeting with MSPs.157 
 
As stated earlier, the need for intense preparation is essential in order to ensure judges are 
comfortable and satisfied that the line of questioning will not put them in compromising 
positions or solicit answers that they simply cannot give. To that end, Parliamentary clerks 
of the committees will draft questions and agree the content of those questions with the 
judge concerned, and the office of the LCJ. This therefore gives rise to another judicial 
concern that committee appearances demand much time and preparation despite limited 
resources. A judge may be required to use the day before a hearing to prepare for the evidence 
session, for example with research and collation of data or case law, and then half a day 
actually giving the evidence before the committee. That is at least two days of the judges time 
occupied by the committee, where he or she would otherwise have been dealing with and 
disposing of cases. This has very real implications for the judiciary as a whole (especially 
senior judges with additional administrative and leadership responsibilities post 2005) in 
managing their workload.158  
 
However this process of liaison and agreement has proved to be welcome by both Parliament 
—willing to negotiate the line of questioning—and the JEB and LCJ—willing to allow judges 
to appear.  
 
                                                          
157 Scotland's top judge offers tiny concession as calls grow for judicial transparency, Scotland Herald, 2 February 2014 - 
http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/home-news/scotlands-top-judge-offers-tiny-concession-as-calls-
grow-for-judicial-transparency.23323523 
158 These concerns were aired by Lord Phillips as early as 2007; Lord Phillips , Judicial independence, 
Commonwealth law conference, Nairobi, 12 September 2007 (available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Speeches/lcj_kenya_clc_120907.pdf) page 14;  
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Reasons Why Committees Seek Evidence from Judicial Witnesses 
 
There a number of reasons that help to explain why committees might invite judges to appear 
before them. One relates to a change in Parliamentary culture. In recent years committees 
have been reformed to have elected chairs. The effects of this perhaps include an increased 
sense of independence and impartiality, increased resources, increased media coverage and 
reporting, and an increased sense of duty in scrutiny and accountability.159 This might suggest 
a shift from the power of Parliament in the chamber to the committee rooms, with 
committees able to question witnesses from all walks of life while questions in the chamber 
must typically be addressed to ministers. Committees also prepare reports, consultations, and 
responses to government proposals.  
 
To aid in this, the appearance of a judge can be valuable as has been acknowledged by 
Parliament and judges alike. Judges offer an insight into their extensive knowledge and 
experience of matters which they engage with in court.160 As well as the educative role of 
judges giving evidence, so too committees may scrutinise the new leadership role of the LCJ 
or other senior judges in administration of the judiciary. Furthermore, committees may try 
                                                          
159 Many of these changes resulted from the ‘Wright reforms’. For further discussion of the work of the 
Wright Committee, the process of reform, and a detailed account of the changes, see: M Russell, ‘Never Allow 
A Crisis Go To Waste’: The Wright Committee Reforms to Strengthen the House of Commons, Parliamentary Affairs 
(2011) 64, 612–633; D Howarth, The House of Commons Backbench Business Committee, (2011) PL 490. The 
recommendations were made by, and named after the chairman of, the Select Committee on the Reform of 
the House of Commons chaired by Tony Wright MP. For the reports of the committees work see: House of 
Commons Reform Committee, Rebuilding the House, 1st Report (2008-2009 HC117); House of Commons 
Reform Committee, Rebuilding the House: Implementation 1st report (2009-2010 HC 372); The House of 
Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee Revisiting ‘Rebuilding the House’: the impact of the 
Wright reforms, 3rd Report (2013-14 Vols.1 to 3) available at 
http://www.Parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/political-and-
constitutional-reform-committee/inquiries/Parliament-2010/revisiting-rebuilding-the-house-the-impact-of-
the-wright-reforms/ 
160 HLCC, Relations between the executive, the judiciary and Parliament (n26) at para 126 
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to elicit information to inform either specific inquiries into the justice system, or to help 
scrutinise the performance of the Lord Chancellor. 
 
The purpose of inviting a judge to give evidence is also dependant on the remit and 
membership of the committee itself. Membership of committees are either solely drawn from 
the Commons, or the Lords, or jointly in equal numbers (as with the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights). It seems that the Lords Committees—and particularly the Constitution 
Committee—are perceived by judges to be more respectful of the judiciary and constitutional 
norms than those of the Commons.161 Yet judges have appeared most frequently before the 
House of Commons Justice Committee (HCJC) with sixty five appearances between 2003 
and 2013 and just twenty two before the House of Lords Constitution Committee (HLCC).162 
This becomes more important later in this chapter when we look at politicians, particularly 
MPs as members of committees, and their understanding of how they should hold judges to 
account. For now, it is only necessary to observe that an explanation for this difference is 
that the HCJC has a more focussed remit into the justice system than the broader 
constitutional issues investigated by the HLCC. This focus on the courts and judiciary are 
matters on which judicial expertise are more likely to be required.163 
 
                                                          
161 One of the reasons suggested for Wall LJs refusal to appear before the Commons public accounts 
committee was the reputation of the committee and its chair- the ‘fierce’ Margaret Hodge MP- for being 
heavily critical of witnesses. Peers, compared to MPs, are well known for a more respectful and formal 
attitude 
162 G Gee, R Hazell, K Malleson, P O’Brien, The Politics of Judicial Independence in the UKs Changing Constitution, 
(Cambridge: CUP, forthcoming) Chapter 6 
163 This is shown by comparing the subject inquires of the two committees. The HCJC inquiries requiring 
judicial insight, where judges did appear to give evidence, have included: Scrutiny of operation of family 
courts  2006-2011; The creation of the MOJ 2007 to 2008; Scrutiny of legal aid reforms 2007-2011; Scrutiny 
of sentencing 2007-2011; scrutiny of coroner’s reforms 2006; tribunals 2006. HLCC inquiries requiring 
judicial insight, where judges appeared to give evidence, include: scrutiny of constitutional relationships 2006; 
scrutiny of judicial appointments process 2011 
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Most appearances taking place on an ad hoc basis to solicit advice or explanation on an 
educational basis. But as was hinted at above, some meetings have become more routine, 
such as the annual appearances before the HLCC of the LCJ, and the President of the 
Supreme Court. Routine meetings are not only needed to encourage regular communication, 
but also to allow Parliament to scrutinise judicial activity—particularly the leadership 
responsibilities of senior judges post 2005—and hold judges to account. The HLCC explored 
in depth, with evidence from Professors A.W.Bradley and V.Bogdanor, the details of how 
Parliament may hold judges to account.164 In chapter one we explored how judicial 
independence requires that judges be free to preside over cases without pressure or influence 
placed upon them. Therefore judges cannot be directly accountable either to the executive 
or Parliament for their decisions in court. Instead, the justice system ensures the 
accountability and scrutiny of court judgments through: public court hearings; adversarial 
counsel; judicial rulings after submissions from counsel; and the appeals process to higher 
courts. Therefore Parliament has no business questioning the merits of an individual judge 
or their decisions. 
 
So Parliament, as generally accepted, may not question judges on their decision making, 
judgments pending or prior, or of other judicial colleagues—and that is not of concern 
because a system of review and scrutiny exists by way of the appeals process. But speaking 
in a lecture which was picked up on and referred to by the select committee, Professor 
Bogdanor referred to how judges were accountable to Parliament in a way distinct to 
ministerial accountability.165 The doctrine of the independence of the judiciary demands that 
judges not be held accountable or ‘blamed’ for decisions reached in court, whereas ministers 
                                                          
164 HLCC, Relations between the executive, the judiciary and Parliament (n26) at paras 121 to 123 at page 40,  
165 V Bogdanor, Accountability and the Media: Parliament and the Judiciary: The Problem of Accountability, (2006) UK 
Public administration Consortium, available at http://ukpac.wordpress.com/bogdanor-speech/ 
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are responsible and can be and are blamed for their departmental actions. This, the 
Professors suggested, is a form of sacrificial accountability to which government ministers 
must be held. On the other hand, judges can be questioned in order to invite an explanation 
of ‘their lectures and articles in law journals, on their judicial philosophy, by a select 
committee’. This, being very different to sacrificial accountability, was labelled explanatory 
accountability. 
 
The duty of Parliament to hold the judiciary to account in the explanatory sense has been 
accepted by the senior judiciary. The LCJ, SC President, and Divisional Presidents produce 
reports of their activities, administrative decisions and policies, budgets etc. and lay these 
reports before Parliament for scrutiny.166 However, that is not to say that all judges share the 
same view as to the value and merit of committee appearances, or the levels of caution to be 
exercised when answering questions. 
 
The Effect of New Administrative Responsibilities on Communication by Senior 
Judges 
 
It is useful to note that the judiciary has commented both that judicial appearances before 
committees should not become too prevalent, but also that such appearances are useful and 
mutually beneficial.167 At first sight it seems this judicial concern is for the preservation of 
                                                          
166 Sometimes these reports may be annual, depending on the office holder. Lord Judge was known to 
produce reports annually. Lord Thomas purportedly stated he would do so “periodically”. N.B. In the 
Supreme Court, the Annual Reports are primarily the responsibility of the Chief Executive and not the 
President. For the fifth, and most recent report of 2013-2014, see: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/319093/supreme-court-
annual-report-2014.PDF 
167 See Lord Judge, The Lord Chief justice’s Report 2010-2012, judicial Office 2012, paras 23-4, available at 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Reports/lcjreport10-12.pdf 
and Lord Neuberger, Where Angels fear to tread (n11) 
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the fundamental principle of judicial independence. The dangers associated with calling 
judges too frequently were highlighted by Lord Judge CJ in his report 2010-2012 (which we 
should note in passing is another means of extrajudicial communication with the political 
class as well as the wider public).168 Lord Judge advised that committees should exercise care 
and caution when calling for evidence from judges so as not to damage the impartiality and 
reputation of the judges. This echoes the concerns aired by Lord Neuberger, set out at the 
start of chapter two, over the frequency and subject matter of extrajudicial comment. These 
concerns centre on the great significance attached to judicial independence and the 
separation of powers—that judges should not be seen to be colluding with politicians 
whether in fact or appearance. It seems that similar concerns led to the creation of the formal 
guidance relating to judicial appearances before Parliamentary committees from the JEB. 
Beatson LJ has suggested that: the comments of a judge giving oral evidence to a 
Parliamentary committee may, on occasion, damage their impartiality or the public 
perception of their impartiality. In addition, the ‘question and answer’ process is perceived 
by some judges as making it possible for politicians to press judges to comment on 
inappropriate matters.169 An appearance before a committee also involves questions from 
MPs and peers that invite comment on a matter the judge or courts may later be required to 
decide while sitting in court. These judicial concerns all stem from procedural matters, 
relating to the format of committee appearances.  
 
But Beatson LJ goes further than procedural matters, and suggests that judges should also 
be cautious over the substance of their comments. Parliament is made up of political parties, 
                                                          
168 Lord Judge, The Lord Chief justice’s Report 2010-2012, Judicial Office 2012, (n167) paras 23-4 
169 Lord Phillips , Judicial independence, Commonwealth law conference, Nairobi, 12 September 2007 (n26) 
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so too, the issue of funding and budget cuts has become one of dispute between parties.170 
Specifically, the funding of the courts and justice system are the subject of political debate. 
Though this is not a new development,171 he states: 
 
‘The increase in the separation of powers and in the partisan nature of debates 
about the administration of justice tends to suggest that it may not be appropriate 
for judges to comment on certain matters upon which they have done so in the 
past.’172 
 
With judges no longer sitting as peers in Parliament, and administration of justice becoming 
a partisan issue and the subject of Parliamentary debate, there are things which judges can 
no longer be free to comment on extrajudicially. An example of this can be seen in the 
discussion of the next round of cuts to legal aid proposed by the coalition government earlier 
this year. These were publicly opposed by some opposition MPs in the chamber and the 
media.173 In order to bolster the credibility of their criticisms of the government, MPs cited 
the concerns and opposition of senior judges as if they were in mutual support. For example 
David Lammy MP, writing in the independent dealt a blow to the government plans, and 
heavily criticised the proposed cuts. In the opening parts of his article he writes:  
                                                          
170 For specific news coverage of disagreement between the main parties over legal aid, see: Simon Hughes calls 
for review into children’s access to legal aid, The Guardian 24 September 2014 available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/sep/24/simon-hughes-review-children-access-legal-aid  
171 More generally see R Abel, English Lawyers Between Market and State: The Politics of Professionalism, (Oxford 
OUP 2003); A Geary, W Morrison and R Jago, Chapter 10: The politics of the judiciary revisited: rights, democracy, law 
in The Politics of the Common Law: Perspectives, rights, processes, institutions, (2nd Ed, Routledge Cavendish, 2014) 
172 Beatson LJ, Judicial independence and accountability: pressures and Opportunities, Nottingham Trent University, 16 
April (n26) page 18 
173 Shadow Justice Secretary J Khan, referred to in Legal aid cuts criticised after underspend, Guardian 26 
November 2013, - http://www.theguardian.com/law/2013/nov/26/legal-aid-cuts-underspend 
And David Lammy MP, Labour Backbencher, Grayling's cuts to legal aid are both unnecessary and calamitous. Labour 
should reverse them, The Independent 3 March 2014 -
http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/graylings-cuts-to-legal-aid-are-both-unnecessary-and-
calamitous-labour-should-reverse-them-9166504.html 
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‘I was adding my voice of opposition to that of the chair of the Supreme Court, 
the Law Society, the Bar Council, the Council of Her Majesty’s Circuit Judges, 
… The Government’s response to its subsequent second consultation was, sadly 
but unsurprisingly, to ignore us all.’ 
 
This statement gives the appearance that the judiciary and the Labour Party are agreed in 
their opposition to the government. This sort of comment is inappropriate, and suggests 
collusion between the judges and David Lammy MP. Whilst some matters may be ‘too 
political’, as defined by Beatson LJ above, and thus prevent judges from commenting 
extrajudicially, other matters have undeniably been brought under the responsibility and 
leadership of senior judges. For example, though funding and administration may have 
become a partisan political issue, so too have they been brought under the duties of the LCJ. 
It is necessary then for Beatson LJ to qualify his above statement. He observes that:  
 
‘matters upon which comment by the Lord Chief Justice or his delegates would 
have been inappropriate in the past, are now appropriate, in part because of the 
legitimate interest in explanatory accountability for the judiciary’s part in the 
new partnership.’ 
 
So as a result of the CRA and recent political proposals for cuts, some matters must be 
avoided by judges to maintain their impartiality. However, other matters have been 
undeniably placed under the responsibility of the LCJ and his officials upon which he must 
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comment.174 On proper scrutiny of both the government proposals and judicial comments, 
the qualification as explained by Beatson LJ becomes clear. The government cuts to legal aid 
and funding will impact on several things, including the pay of barristers and counsel. This 
is a concern for the legal professionals, who want a tenable salary, but also for judges for 
entirely different reasons. Modern judges are now more involved with case preparation and 
management. A judge is expected to ensure that cases are ‘trial ready’, that all documents, 
notices, evidence bundles and procedures, are prepared and submitted by counsel, and if they 
are not done, then judges must set deadlines or impose penalties until they are. These case 
management duties are intended to ensure the justice system is efficient in processing and 
hearing cases and trials.175 Furthermore, the LCJ as head of the judiciary is charged with 
responsibility for court business, management and administration.176 If the standard of legal 
professionals falls, or more and more lay-defendants choose to appear as litigants-in-person, 
then there is a risk that the whole judicial process will slow and become inefficient. 
Importantly, this will place a greater burden on the judiciary requiring them to be more 
proactive in case management. Given the demands already placed on a judges time, with case 
preparation, hearings, reading days, and extrajudicial activity such as outreach, these cuts are 
of concern to judges and the LCJ responsible for court management—not solely the pay of 
barristers per se. In David Lammy’s piece, his criticism of the cuts centres on the effect on 
the legal profession and the bar in terms of access and elitism—a profession only for the 
rich. So even though both he and senior judges have reservations about the government 
plans, they are in fact for different reasons. David Lammy criticising the restriction of access 
                                                          
174 But also any senior judge. We saw in Chapter One how Lady Hale spoke of the dangers of legal aid cuts, 
and how Lord Neuberger subsequently defended those comments as central to the issue of the administration 
of justice, and therefore not inappropriate 
175 For a discussion of the challenges faced by judges, and first-hand accounts from interviews, see P 
Darbyshire, Sitting in Judgment: The Working Lives of Judges, (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2011) 
176 The Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s.7 
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to the bar, and elitism of conservative ideology, and the judiciary concerned for the efficiency 
of the justice system. This will need to be an additional consideration in undertaking the 
analysis in Part B of this chapter—are any of the comments made by judges on matters of 
administration of justice inappropriate or partisan, or are they specific to the justice system?  
 
The Constitution Committee looked at the relationships and means of communications 
between the branches of government. 177 They noted that committee appearances were 
important in holding judges to account by questioning in public.178 The committee also 
indicated, again, the importance of judges speaking in an educative capacity, on broad 
academic issues such as the use of comparative law, or the interpretation of precedent case 
law.179 This is also an explicit acknowledgement by a Parliamentary committee that 
Parliament, at least, takes note of judges extrajudicial activities, and may on occasion seek to 
probe the views expressed in academic and educational lectures and articles which are already 
in the public domain.180  
 
Reasons for the Negative Judicial Attitude to Committee Appearances 
 
We saw in the above section on judicial attitude towards committee appearances that, from 
the LCJ and the SC President to judges of the High Court, the increased attendance by judges 
is a cause for concern. The reasoning adopted ranged from concerns over judicial 
independence, the public perception of judicial impartiality, and the large-scale time 
                                                          
177 HLCC, Relations between the executive, the judiciary and Parliament Report, 2006 (n26) 
178 Ibid, at para 124 
179 Ibid, at para 125 
180 Following several public speeches by Wall LJ criticising cuts to the family courts and child care provision, 
the Public Accounts Committee was keen to hear more about Wall LJs concerns. We will look at this specific 
example later in this chapter 
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commitment and preparation required to be undertaken by judges. A significant possibility 
is that some senior judges still hold outdated perceptions of the workings of Parliament.  
 
One argument against judicial appearances becoming too frequent was that judges should 
not be, either in fact or appearance, seen to be colluding with politicians. We have already 
noted a significant shift in focus of Parliamentary work from the chamber to the committee 
rooms. So too we have seen and will continue to look at the importance of the JEB Guidance 
prepared following discussions and agreement with Parliamentary officials. It should also be 
noted that committee sessions are broadcasted, recorded and published in the public domain. 
Therefore, with all these safeguards, there should be no bar to judicial appearances becoming 
frequent (as necessary) on this front. Even if there were concerns over public perception 
over impartiality of judges, the public nature of committee appearances means that these 
claims can be investigated. 
 
Committee evidence seems no longer to be an interrogation of judges by committees, as they 
were once perceived by some judges,181 but perhaps better described as a ‘dialogue’ between 
Parliament and judges. Dialogue is used here in the literal sense, referring to mutual 
communication between judges and politicians, going both ways.182 Frequently, this takes the 
forms of politicians seeking judicial expertise and judges seeking to explain their thoughts or 
concerns on the subject of the inquiry. Rather than interrogatory, these dialogues are often a 
valuable opportunity for judges to learn from politicians on how to better handle their 
                                                          
181 For example, in 2009 and 2010 Sir Nicholas Wall LJ was reluctant to appear before the Public Accounts 
Committee of the Commons, inquiring into childcare in the family courts due to its perceived fierce nature 
and past history of being critical of witnesses 
182 Dialogue is often taken by Public Lawyers to refer to “dialogue theory”. For an account of “dialogue 
theory”, to which this thesis does not refer, see TR Hickman, Constitutional Dialogue, Constitutional Theories, and 
the Human Rights Act, (2006) PL 722. This thesis uses dialogue in a literal sense instead, following the approach 
of Alan Paterson, see: A Paterson, Final Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court, (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing 2013) 
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increasingly public and administrative roles. For example, the practice of annual press 
conferences by the LCJ was, in part, a result of recommendations made by the HLCC.183 It 
was reported that at the first such conference with Lord Phillips as LCJ in 2005, ‘the media 
questioning of him [was] designed to elicit some remarks [which would] enable the story to 
be ‘Lord Chief Justice at odds with’ or ‘Fury at’ … the Government’.184 In reading through 
the press conference of 2011 we see a marked change however, as answering is more easily 
refused; though perhaps the press are no better behaved they are certainly better handled.185 
This example demonstrates just how the senior judiciary can also benefit from judicial 
appearances; here benefiting from the political class’s better understanding of, and more 
established relationship with, the press.  
 
Such dialogues can only be a positive step forward for the judiciary—working with rather 
than being interrogated by Parliament. For judges this allows them to draw on their 
experience and expertise to educate MPs and peers about the justice system and legal theory. 
More importantly, where government fails to consult relevant judges in policy making, a 
committee may highlight that fact and allow a judge to then communicate their concerns and 
subsequently include those comments in the final report.186 This would then, indirectly, relay 
the judges concerns to all MPs and peers. 
 
                                                          
183 In 2007 the committee suggested to the LCJ that he improve his public communications and relations, 
HLCC, Relations between the executive, the judiciary and Parliament (n26) paras 160, 171 
184 HLCC Ibid Para 158  
185 Lord Chief Justice, Press Conference at the RCJ, 2011, available at 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/News%20Release/lcj-press-conference-
270912.pdf 
186 For example, the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution made a strongly worded report on 
the constitutional implications of the creation of the MoJ, and the significant failure of the government to 
properly consult the judiciary: HLCC, The Process of Constitutional Change, 15th Report (2010-12 HL Paper 
177) para 43, and 122, available at 
http://www.publications.Parliament.uk/pa/ld201012/ldselect/ldconst/177/177.pdf 
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However, it seems that on occasion the partisan nature of subject matters may also affect the 
level of interest among MPs, as one study reported that clerks struggled to find enough 
members to make a committee quorate for an early appearance of the LCJ before the 
HCJC.187 
 
Guidance to Judges Appearing Before Parliamentary Committees 
 
The items for consideration in the JEB Guidance are reproduced below:188  
 
Item I. The merits of individual cases, whether or not the judge giving evidence has 
adjudicated on that case, and whether these are pending, ongoing, or have concluded 
[except where questions relate to legal theory of cases or jurisprudence];189 
 
Item II. The personalities or merits of serving judges, politicians, or other public 
figures, or more generally on the quality of appointments; 
 
Item III. The merits, meaning or likely effect of provisions in any Bill or other 
prospective legislation and the merits of government policy [except where such provisions 
may affect the administration of justice or work of the courts];190 
 
Item IV. Issues which are subject to government consultation on which the judiciary 
intend to make a formal, institutional response, but have not yet done so. 
                                                          
187 Politics of Judicial Independence, (n162) 
188 Paragraph 3 of the JEB Guidance (n138), emphasis added. 
189 This exception is set out in paragraph 7 of the JEB Guidance (n138) 
190 This exception is set out at paragraphs 12 and 13 of the JEB Guidance (n138) 
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Items I and III contain important exceptions which we must take note of, while items II and 
IV might be considered straightforward. Item II prevents any demonstration of discord or 
animosity between judges, and Item IV precludes questions which might force a judge to 
comment where a collective judicial response is being prepared. 
 
Item I prevents any discussion of judicial decisions in court, subject to an important 
exception. The exception is that evidence may be taken on issues relating to the jurisprudence 
or legal issues in cases, where the questioning is of a purely educative nature. This exception 
is not only expected, given the value of judges comments on jurisprudence with regard to 
their wealth of experience, but also identifies one of the main reasons for judicial committee 
appearances, as we will see. 
 
Reinforcing the principle of the separation of powers, Item III requires judges to avoid 
commenting on government policy. In line with the approach followed by Lord Neuberger 
on extrajudicial speechmaking, there is another exception.191 That is where government 
policy, or a proposed bill, will affect the administration of justice or the work of the courts, 
then judges should be free to comment as far as it is appropriate to do so.192 
 
                                                          
191 Lord Neuberger, Where Angels fear to tread (n11) page 12 para 44 
192 Examples of Judges commenting on bills before Parliamentary Committees include most obviously an 
array of appearances before the special House of Commons Committee for Constitutional Affairs (renamed 
to Justice Committee in 2007). Judges who chose to appear include: Lord Mackay (November 2003 HC1105-
i), Keith LJ and Lord Bingham (May 2004 HC 628-ii). More examples, see: Lord Phillips, HCJC Inquiry into 
the Administration of Justice 2007-2008,, Q23, available at 
http://www.publications.Parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmjust/913/8070203.htm; Mackay LJ, Joint 
Committee on Privacy and Injunctions inquiry, draft defamation bill, 2011-2012, Q937-987, available at 
http://www.Parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/Privacy-and-Injunctions/JCPIWrittenEvWeb.pdf 
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These guiding principles are an official way of attempting to regulate a formal, public means 
of communication with Parliament. The guidance is crafted to ensure the upholding of the 
principles of the separation of powers and judicial independence and allow for valuable 
interactions and inquiries to take place. Whilst similar in content to Neuberger’s guidance, 
Neuberger’s seven principles are an informal statement of matters he believes judges should 
consider before speech-making. We saw in chapter two how speeches may be made to target 
a particular audience, such as Parliament or the executive, and while members of either body 
may be present in the audience (such as MPs in the inns of court or university research units), 
the speeches do not directly address Parliament or the executive. Oral evidence sessions are 
a direct means of communication, recorded and used in final reports to Parliament and the 
government. Both are important means of communication in their own way, and they both 
raise similar concerns for core constitutional principles. It makes sense then that the guidance 
of the JEB and Neuberger are along similar lines. The only minor difference is the more 
procedural nature and notice of the guidance for oral evidence than the seven principles for 
speech-making. 
 
Parliamentary Rules and Conventions: Duties of Committee Members 
 
A committee appearance by a judge also places duties on the committee members 
themselves. As Parliamentarians they are subject to Parliamentary rules and conventions. 
Unlike the indirect communication of extrajudicial speeches, oral evidence is a process of 
dialogue where formal guidance exists to regulate both judges and politicians taking part. 
These Parliamentary rules and conventions are not only necessary to maintain judicial 
independence and a separation of powers, but they aid productive interactions by allaying 
any fears judges may have of inappropriate questioning by MPs and peers. The importance 
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of these rules to ensuring constitutional propriety and good communication is also indicated 
by the importance attached to them. The rules are explicitly set out in a written briefing note 
circulated to committee members prior to the hearing, either by the clerk or chairperson, and 
restated at the start of each evidence session by the chair.193  
 
An important Parliamentary rule is the sub judice rule. Elucidated by the Speaker of the 
House in a heated debate in 1976,194 the rule is now set out in the standing orders of both 
Houses.195 The rule forbids any reference, whether made in the chamber or committees (areas 
otherwise protected by Parliamentary privilege), to cases which are active in the courts. 
Active is then somewhat broadly  defined by the resolution depending on the type of hearing, 
often stretching from the point at which it is clear that court involvement will occur (such as 
the moment papers are filed or the a court date decided).196 
 
The JEB Guidance to judges highlights the importance of the sub judice rule to judges stating 
that ‘the convention promotes the dignity of the judicial office, the finality of judgments, 
and, most importantly, the independence of the judiciary’.197 The convention importantly 
imposes a temporal restriction on Parliamentary activity, allowing for questions and inquiries 
into the jurisprudence of cases that have been decided, but precluding questions into active 
legal proceedings. Therefore, some issues which are the subject of active legal proceedings 
                                                          
193 Cabinet Office Memorandum, Departmental Evidence And Response To Select Committees, July 2005 
Paragraphs 71-72 available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61192/guide-deptal-
evidence-and-response-to-select-committees.pdf 
194 HC Deb 29July 1976 vol. 916, col. 649 and again at 882, available at 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1976/jul/28/sub-judice-rules 
195 HC Deb, 15 November 2001, c1012 
196 Procedure Committee, The Sub Judice Rule of the House of Commons, (2004-05 HC 125), paragraph 28 
197 Paragraph 4 of the JEB Guidance at (n138) 
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may not be subject of the committee’s inquiry, whether or not the issue is relevant or 
important to it. 
 
The explanation of accountability given above by Professors Bogdanor and Bradley already 
reason and justify this. Judges are not accountable in the sacrificial-ministerial sense, but the 
explanatory sense. Therefore questions of the kind envisaged above are forbidden by 
Parliamentary convention. However that does not limit the power of Parliament in any way. 
In 2009, the Commons Culture, Media & Sport Committee conducted an inquiry which in 
part considered the judgments of Eady J following allegations that his judgments departed 
from precedent in privacy law.  Here the committee was able to perform its function and 
conduct its enquiry without calling judges to give evidence. This meant that any lines of 
questioning relating to the merits of the cases and the merits of Eady J as a serving judge 
were avoided. 
 
In 2004 the Commons Procedure Committee looked at the need for the sub judice rule and 
its perceived effect in limiting the power and discretion of Parliament. The report also 
pointed out that the rule itself provided that the sub judice rule could be disapplied by the 
discretion of the Speaker in certain instances—though it also pointed out this had never been 
exercised. The report was at times strongly worded suggesting that the rule does not prevent 
Parliamentary activity, rather it ‘delays’ it, and that ‘delay can run for several years’. Indeed 
the report encourages Parliamentarians to apply for the Speaker to use his discretion to 
disapply the rule where whenever they feel the rule is ‘unreasonably impeding the work of 
Parliament’. Despite all this, the report concluded that no changes be made, but reserved the 
right to return to the subject matter if occasion required it. This was fortunate since any 
attempt to subvert the sub judice rule, particularly when a case is ongoing and regardless of 
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the length of time, will have serious implications. A damaging implication would be to open 
up the possibility of politicians interfering with the impartiality of the presiding judge (and 
in some cases and/or the jury) thus preventing the chance of a fair trial or hearing. 
 
Part B: Classification of Judicial Oral Evidence 
 
Chapter two offered a tripartite approach to classifying extrajudicial lectures. We will now 
take the same approach with oral evidence before Parliamentary committees.  
 
Using the three-limb classification process we will see that judges may be called by a variety 
of committees. But the judge can always refuse to attend. The judge will typically be one of 
the senior judiciary as set out earlier in this paper, but sometimes others may be called. The 
form of the evidence normally takes the form of oral evidence to questions. Though written 
evidence may sometimes be tendered in addition to, or instead of, oral evidence. The 
substance of that evidence varies significantly depending upon the subject matter. It is here 
that the most significant findings are expected to be made as we observe the tone and 
substance of a judge’s evidence, sending sometimes subtle and otherwise clear warnings to 
the government. Such warnings are also often reiterated in the select committees published 
reports. This helps to show that select committees have become more than a tool for the 
accountability of the judiciary, and more than a mere talking shop to make judges feel 
involved and consulted. Rather, they now serve as an intermediary, ensuring that the judiciary 
are heard in the chamber and government. 
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For the purposes of classification, the selected sample includes: 
 
1. Lady Hale and Sir Maurice Kay, Joint Committee on Human Rights inquiry into 
‘should the UK have a bill of rights?’, Examination of witnesses Questions 191 to 
235, Tuesday 4 March 2008198 
 
2. Lord Judge, The Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Annual Evidence 
Session, Evidence Session No. 1 Heard in Public Questions 1 to 32, Wednesday 30 
January 2013199 
 
3. Lord Neuberger and Lord Hope, The Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, 
Evidence Session No. 1. Heard in Public. Questions 1 to 28, Wednesday 13 February 
2013200 
 
4. Sir Nicholas Wall, House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, CAFCASS 
inquiry, Examination of Witnesses, Questions 96 to 127, Tuesday 12 October 
2010.201 
 
 
 
                                                          
198 An uncorrected transcript (neither Committee Members nor witnesses have had the opportunity to correct 
the record) can be viewed at: HC 150-iv, 
http://www.publications.Parliament.uk/pa/jt200708/jtselect/jtrights/uc150-iv/uc15002.htm 
199 An uncorrected transcript (neither Committee Members nor witnesses have had the opportunity to correct 
the record) can be viewed at: http://www.Parliament.uk/documents/lords-
committees/constitution/lordchiefjustice/300113LCJtranscipt.pdf 
200 Available at: http://www.Parliament.uk/documents/lords-
committees/constitution/President%20Supreme%20Court/130213sctranscript.pdf 
201Available at: 
http://www.publications.Parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmpubacc/439/10101201.htm 
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Speakers 
 
Of these speakers Lady Hale, Lord Hope and Lord Neuberger are also mentioned in chapter 
two on speeches. But something must also be said specifically about their appearances before 
Parliamentary committees. Lord Neuberger is currently the President of the Supreme Court, 
and Lord Hope was formerly, and is now succeeded by Lady Hale as, the Deputy President 
of the Supreme Court. The particular session with Lord Hope and Lord Neuberger is now 
an annual affair, one of regular contact between the UKSC and the HLCC. 
 
Lord Judge has, as the head of the judiciary in England and Wales since the CRA 2005, been 
called to give evidence more times than any other judge. Lord Judge, as mentioned above, 
has also repeatedly advised caution when it comes to extrajudicial comment and the impact 
that might be had on individual and institutional judicial independence. However, the LCJ 
appearing on an annual basis to give evidence has been stated by the HLCC as a useful means 
of holding the judiciary to account by asking questions publicly, and allowing scrutiny as to 
the extent or nature of their work. The session may also allow committee members to hear 
updates from the LCJ and make inquiries into the constitutional issues faced by the 
judiciary.202 
 
Sir Maurice Kay LJ is the Vice-President of the Court of Appeal Civil Division, and on this 
occasion appeared alongside Lady Hale to discuss whether the United Kingdom required a 
bill of rights. 
 
                                                          
202 HLCC, Relations between the executive, the judiciary and Parliament (n26) para 124 
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Finally, Sir Nicholas Wall LJ, as President of the Family Division, though also referred to in 
the second chapter, has also been included here speaking on family law matters and the 
funding of CAFCASS. Wall LJ has also made three speeches on the subject during his time 
in office,203 but has made more efforts over family court funding in private correspondence 
and letters to the government and Legal Services Commission.204  
  
Form 
 
The form of these extrajudicial comments come as oral evidence to a Parliamentary 
committee; three to the HLCC; two to the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR); and 
one to the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee (PAC). We earlier noted that 
most judicial appearances are before the HCJC, and it may seem odd that the HCJC does 
not then appear in the sample. However, we also noted that the remit of the HCJC differs 
from that of the HLCC since the HCJC narrowly inquires into the particulars of the justice 
system, whereas the HLCC broadly investigates the constitutional issues, and here, the 
constitutional arrangement of the judiciary. It is those constitutional issues, affecting the 
administration of justice and communication between the branches of government, which 
are more important to this thesis, than jurisprudential discussion over things such as 
Sentencing Guidelines before the HCJC. 
 
                                                          
203 Wall LJ, Is The Family Justice System In Need Of Review?, Coventry 2010, available at 
http://www.familylaw.co.uk/system/uploads/attachments/0001/1218/President_of_the_Family_Division_
speech_-_19th_September_2010.pdf 
204  Family Court System Could Implode, warns its top Judge, Telegraph 7 August 2010 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/7931918/Family-court-system-could-implode-
warns-its-top-judge.html 
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The HLCC was first created in 2001 and is charged with reviewing the constitutional 
implications of all public bills, and keeping under review the state of the constitution.205 The 
composition of the committee draws on members of all parties and cross benchers in the 
Lords, and is chaired by a senior Conservative member, Lord Lang of Monkton. Its members 
include prominent politicians and lawyers, such as former Attorney General Lord Goldsmith. 
Such figures are not only estimable but also well respected in Parliament and perhaps also in 
government. Despite the caution earlier expressed by Lord Judge, for the senior judges to 
accept to attend their annual sessions should be considered a mark of judicial approval for 
the system. This is perhaps the only chance each year for the LCJ, UKSC President, and 
Deputy President, to appear in Parliament and make representations, not on a detailed 
subject upon which they have been ‘invited’, but with a chance to bring their own agenda. 
These appearances are unique in that there is not one specific line of inquiry here. Instead, 
the senior judges are expected to discuss a variety of things, such as update the committee 
on the work of the courts, their own administrative tasks, and any issues they may wish to 
discuss. It is also a chance to do so before senior figures that produce influential reports; the 
Constitution Committee cannot be ignored lightly (the actual success and reality of this is 
studied in the next chapter).206 
 
The JCHR, also set up in 2001, is made up of twelve members drawn from the Commons 
and Lords and is tasked with considering human rights issues in the UK.207 The inquiry by 
the JCHR in our sample concerned the need for, and suitability of, a bill of rights in the 
                                                          
205 As stated on their homepage, http://www.Parliament.uk/hlconstitution 
206 A detailed discussion of the role, work, history and changing composition of the HLCC can be found at J 
S Caird, Parliamentary constitutional review: ten years of the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, (2012) PL 
4 
207 More information, and a comparison with work of similar bodies to the JCHR in other countries, can be 
found at C Evans and S Evans, Legislative scrutiny committees and Parliamentary conceptions of human rights, (2006) PL 
785. See also: F Klug and H Wildbore, Breaking new ground: the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the role of 
Parliament in human rights compliance, (2007) EHRLR 231 
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UK.208 Its members included the influential late Earl of Onslow who had served with 
distinction on the committee, criticising then Home Secretary Jacqui Smith’s attempts to 
extended detention periods.209 In the selected session, the committee sought the views of 
Kay LJ and Lady Hale in their inquiry into a Bill of Rights for the UK. 
 
Finally, the PAC was, according to their website, ‘appointed by the House of Commons to 
examine ‘the accounts showing the appropriation of the sums granted to Parliament to meet 
the public expenditure, and of such other accounts laid before Parliament as the committee 
may think fit’ (Standing Order No 148)’.210 The PAC is known to be one of the most rigorous 
of committees, famed for closely probing its witnesses.211 This particular inquiry involving 
Wall LJ related to the government cuts and reforms of groups supporting the work of the 
family courts such as the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service 
(CAFCASS). CAFCASS is concerned with the interests of children involved in proceedings 
before the family courts. It works with, and prepares reports on, children and their families 
and then advises the courts on what it considers to be in the childs best interests.  
 
So here we have examples of senior judges before powerful and influential committees. We 
expect the judges will use this opportunity to make themselves heard and not just be 
                                                          
208 For more on this, see; J Stratford, Joint Committee on Human Rights report, A Bill of Rights for the UK? Proposed 
approach to social and economic right. (2009) JR 35 
209 The hearing where the JCHR took then Home Secretary Jacqui Smith to task over 42 day detention 
periods, can be found in an uncorrected transcript (NB neither witnesses nor Committee Members have had 
the opportunity to correct the record. The transcript is not yet an approved formal record of these 
proceeding) at JCHR, Human Rights Issues Relating to the Home Office, October (2008-2009 HC 1142-i) available 
at http://www.publications.Parliament.uk/pa/jt200708/jtselect/jtrights/uc1142-i/uc114202.htm; Press 
coverage of the hearing can be found at, Smith attacked over 42-day speech, BBC 28 October 2008, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7695695.stm 
210 For further information on the work of the committee see: I Campbell, A tale of two committees (2013) Tax 8 
211 For a recent example see: Public accounts committee slams Department for Transport amid road user dissatisfaction, 
Construction News 25 September, 2014 
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questioned by the committee. It is here then that the substance of the inquiries is most 
revealing. 
 
Substance 
 
It has been suggested that the safest course of action when a judge is called to give evidence 
is to ask questions of an educational nature—an inquiry into the role and work of the judge 
and courts of which the judge has experience—so as to avoid political issues and matters 
upon which the judge might one day be expected to preside over.212 
 
We see from Lord Judge’s evidence that for the most part this is true - in particular on the 
issue of diversity in the judiciary213 and on cameras in courts.214 On the subject of diversity 
of the judiciary, Lord Judge sets outs statistics—ninety community judges working on 
outreach in schools and universities; two senior liaison judges for diversity; 2000 participants 
in the judicial work shadowing scheme; and the female/male percentages of the bar and 
partners in solicitors firms. He also explains the significance of those, in turn, educating and 
informing the committee of the status quo, and the steps he, and his team, have been taking 
to improve the diversity of the judiciary.  
 
On the topic of cameras in court however, Lord Judge goes further and comments on 
prospective legislation. The then Crime and Courts Bill contained a provision allowing the 
Lord Chancellor, with the approval of the Lord Chief Justice, to allow filming in the Court 
                                                          
212 Le Sueur Parliamentary Accountability, and the judicial System in Leyland and Bamforth, Accountability in the 
contemporary constitution, (OUP 2013) page 211 
213 HLCC (n199) Q10 
214 Ibid Qs15 and 16 
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of Appeal, and sentencing in the crown court. Lord Judge comments on the provision 
advising caution on allowing filming in the Court of Appeal, but takes a ‘very strong view 
about sentencing’.215 These strong views are eloquently put to the committee, advising that 
they consider the implications for the defendant, the victims and the victims’ family in the 
gallery.216 But Lord Judge goes further to advise that the committee members insist, when 
the Bill passes through the Lords, that the clause maintain the key proviso, ‘with the approval 
of the Lord Chief Justice’. Lord Judge ‘hope[s] that [the committee members] will accordingly 
troop through a lobby’ that permission from the Lord Chancellor to allow filming in court 
should require the ‘concurrence’ or ‘agreement’ of the Lord Chief Justice. Allowing filming 
in courts inevitably affects, and has the potential to disrupt, the administration of justice (as 
argued by Lord Judge). Therefore it is constitutionally acceptable for the Lord Chief Justice 
to argue for peers to ensure that their agreement should be required for any grant of 
permission to film. Influencing legislative debate in this way is not new, and is reminiscent 
of the concordat negotiations pre-2005 between Lord Woolf and Lord Falconer, and the less 
successful negotiations by Lord Phillips over the duties of the Supreme Court Chief 
Executive. Instead, this example shows how Lord Judge, deprived of the right to address the 
Lords and lobby for an amendment during any debate over the Crime and Courts Bill, must 
instead request the support of an influential Parliamentary committee to assist. The JCHR 
subsequently adopted his view to maintain the requirement for agreement from the Lord 
Chief Justice.217 But more so, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, a member of the committee during 
the inquiry, and Lord Judge’s evidence, argued and moved further amendments to the 
                                                          
215 Ibid Q15 
216 For more discussion of the issues around filming in court, with accounts of the practice in Scotland, and 
the situation in England & Wales, see: R Shiels, The Live Televising of Court Proceedings  (2013) SCOLAG 260 
217 House of Lords, House of Commons, Joint Committee on Human Rights, Legislative Scrutiny:  
Crime and Courts Bill, 5th Report (2012-2013 HL Paper 67,  HC 771) at page 17 paragraph 50, available at 
http://socialwelfare.bl.uk/subject-areas/government-issues/legislation/tso/14115767.pdf 
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clause218 attempting to add more safeguards and checks on the Lord Chancellor’s power to 
grant permission. 219 Though none of these were successful, they demonstrate the importance 
of the influence of, and good relations between, the senior judiciary and senior politicians. 
 
But there are other comments made by Lord Judge that are significant for a variety of 
reasons. Lord Judge makes clear who he is speaking to when he attends these sessions, albeit 
at a late stage. Lord Judges says, ‘so that the committee can be told, and in effect Parliament 
can be told’.220 This acknowledgement by Lord Judge that he is using the committee to tell 
Parliament what he thinks, coupled with the advice to the JCHR on what position to take in 
Parliamentary debates over allowing filming in courts, suggests that Lord Judge considers 
himself disadvantaged by not being able to make direct representations to the chamber. This 
is further suggested when in the ‘non-opening statement’ Lord Judge remarks that something 
has been ‘lost’ and the process of constitutional evolution was only begun, not completed, 
by the CRA 2005, as there is no ‘direct speech from the Lord Chief Justice to those 
responsible for producing the legislation: Parliament’.221 
 
In substance Lord Judge, on another two occasions, continues to go much further than the 
educative role. Firstly Lord Judge delivers what can only be called a hurtful truth to 
government action and misgivings about judicial review, stating that judicial review is ‘only 
an inconvenience to those who have failed to do their job lawfully’.222 In so doing Lord Judge 
cannot be said to have spoken out of turn. Judicial review is a judicial process. Its oversight 
                                                          
218 The Crime and Courts Bill Clause 22(3), now the Crime and Courts Act 2013, s.32 
219 HL Deb, 10 December 2012, c861 - 870 
220 HLCC (n199) Q12 
221 Ibid Q2 
222 Ibid Q8 
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and administration is led by the Lord Chief Justice, as head of the judiciary.223 Any constraints 
placed upon it by legislation are and should be of concern to the judiciary as an institution. 
Therefore, despite the fact that Lord Judge’s extrajudicial comments on judicial review and 
relevant reforms are more critical and policy-orientated than educative, they are nonetheless 
appropriate observations from the head of the judiciary.  
 
Secondly Lord Judge goes so far as to set the agenda for the Constitution Committee. Lord 
Judge sets out his concerns that there is still some way to go on constitutional reform and 
invites the committee to consider very specific issues which are of concern to him.224 The 
Chairman, Lord Goodlad, goes so far as to say ‘You have certainly provided a wide agenda 
for us to look at in subsequent sessions’. Arguably the Lord Chief Justice should be able to 
lay his concerns before Parliament, and request and inquiry and/or debate over the issues 
raised. After the CRA, there is no power to directly enable the Lord Chief Justice to do that. 
Instead, by adapting, Lord Judge is able to use Parliamentary committees to help to fill the 
gaps left by the CRA. 
 
Contrast this with the evidence given by the President and then Deputy President of the 
Supreme Court two weeks later. At the educative end of the spectrum, the two judges provide 
a comprehensive outlook on the devolution issue and the potential for a Scottish supreme 
court and Welsh justices.225 The judges also give their views on full and part-time work by 
judges in the courts and the implications of that,226 and also on the use of cameras in courts.227 
But they do not go so far as to advise the peers how to behave in subsequent Parliamentary 
                                                          
223 The Lead Judge of the Administrative Court, answerable to the LCJ, is Mr Justice Andrew Collins 
224 HLCC (n199) Q2 
225 HLCC (n199) Qs10-12 
226 Ibid Q16 
227 Ibid Q20 
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debate, nor do they deliver a ‘hurtful truth’ on judicial review as Lord Judge did. The same 
issue of constraints and reform of judicial review was raised in this session of evidence.228 
Lord Hope invites caution on any legislative action and states that as a matter for the 
administration of justice, judges should be allowed to do all that they can to improve the 
situation, before legislation is considered.229 Lord Neuberger then seems to echo the word 
of caution. As Lord Neuberger rightly points out, judicial review is for the most part 
conducted in the Administrative Division at the Royal Courts of Justice, and so the Lord 
Chief Justice is better placed to comment.230 Perhaps, because of the important leadership 
role of the Lord Chief Justice, that is why Lord Judge was more outspoken and critical of the 
proposed reforms than Lords Hope or Neuberger.  
 
We see from these two examples a shared approach of caution among the judges in 
answering questions, and mutual understanding and respect between the committee 
members and the judges appearing as witnesses. However, not all judges will agree on what 
is appropriate when it comes to making extrajudicial comment. For the large part, the 
evidence of Lady Hale and Sir Maurice Kay LJ was informative and educative of the law as 
it applies to grounds of judicial review, and the history of British civil liberties dating back to 
before the days of Sir Edward Coke CJ. Further, the joint committee drew on their expertise 
to inquire about foreign jurisdictions and how declarations of incompatibility, or their 
equivalent operated elsewhere. The Earl of Onslow asks of Lady Hale:231  
 
                                                          
228 Ibid Qs 13 to 15 
229 Ibid Q13 
230 Ibid Q14 and 15 
231 JCHR (n201) Q201 
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Do you think there are rights which are missed out by the Human Rights Act which 
should be protected by a Bill of Rights? 
 
To which Lady Hale replies: 
 
A sort of shopping list of things that one could expand into?... I could give you two 
things from my shopping list, but it is a purely personal opinion… 
 
Lady Hale proceeds to elaborate on the two rights that she would see enshrined in law.232 
However when the same question is put to Kay LJ, he responded: 
 
I do not have a shopping list and if I had it is one that I might not find it comfortable 
to disclose. You are really asking how the Human Rights Act should be amended or 
what a Bill of Rights should include. With respect, they are political questions for 
others to answer.233 
 
From the viewpoint of Kay LJ, the evidence before this committee departed from the 
educative purpose and Lady Hale went so far as to express opinions on political and 
legislative questions whish he found he could not do. Lady Hale is a senior judge, and works 
in a higher court than Kay LJ, and as we noted in the previous chapter we see that Lady Hale 
has extensive experience of commenting extrajudicially.234 But why the difference of opinion, 
and was it significant that the approaches were not the same? The question invited 
                                                          
232 Ibid Qs201-205 
233 Ibid Q205 
234 Lady Hale also submitted written evidence to, and appeared before, the HLCC, in their inquiry into the 
judicial appointments process. Further, in speechmaking, Lady Hale has given 21 speeches since 2009 (n70) 
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suggestions as to whether or not the Human Rights Act had any omissions. This is an open 
question which can be interpreted as legal or political. Is this statute complete, and workable? 
—that is the legal question. Or if you had the power to legislate, how would you change the 
HRA 1998?—that is the political question. The second question raised issues of judicial 
independence, but perhaps it is safe to say that it did so only on an individual level. Lady 
Hale clearly thought that her own independence was not, nor that of the judiciary, was at 
stake. But Kay LJ did feel that this was a matter for ‘others to answer’ as essentially inviting 
his thoughts on the omissions of legislation passed by Parliament, and going further to 
suggest future considerations for the Parliamentary programme to address those omissions.  
These differing personalities and attitudes of judges were also investigated by a study into 
the Politics of Judicial Independence.235 The authors describe the experience of one of their 
interviewees when dealing with two different judges due to attend the same evidence 
session:236 
 
‘judge A ‘fell over themselves’ to come and give evidence, while judge B was ‘far less 
happy’ and the committee clerk had to ‘talk to judge B on the phone to go through in 
painstaking detail’ what the committee was going to ask.’ 
 
These differences in attitude of course depend on the judge, but also perhaps reflect the 
perceptions of individual judges on the role and importance of engaging with Parliamentary 
committees. Of course fundamental principles such as the sub judice rule and judicial 
independence should not be compromised. But since the setting aside of the Kilmuir Rules 
by Lord Mackay, individual judges have been free to determine when they should comment 
                                                          
235 Politics of Judicial Independence (n162) 
236 Ibid, (forthcoming) 
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and what they should say. Some disparity is then to be expected, and this spectrum of the 
willing to the unwilling demonstrates that.  
 
That individual judges might have different views about committee appearances is also 
shown with the last session in our sample. As noted above the PAC is renowned for its fierce 
reputation, particularly the intense level of scrutiny led by its chair, Margaret Hodge MP. Her 
reputation recently made headlines when senior Conservative figures warned her that her 
criticism of repugnant business practices could put off corporations.237 Shortly after his 
appointment as successor to Potter LJ as President of the Family Division, in 2010 Wall LJ 
continued to speak out about government reforms and cuts to family legal services and 
organisation such as CAFCASS. When the Commons Public Accounts Committee launched 
an inquiry into CAFCASS, the committee at least, felt the President’s attendance warranted. 
 
As early as 2009 Wall LJ, had taken a key role in the discussion over the funding of 
CAFCASS. In 2009 he gave a speech entitled ‘Justice for Children: Welfare or Farewell?’, at 
the National Conference of the Association of Lawyers for Children Manchester, November 
2009.238 Here Wall LJ expressed a great desire for himself and fellow judges to speak out on 
the cuts and be heard, calling for the ‘historical and indeed instinctive judicial reluctance to 
go public’ over such matters to ‘come to an end’. Speaking three years before Neuberger’s 
principles Wall LJ has been sure not to simply engage in a discussion about government 
policy, but has sought first to properly reason why he feels he must be outspoken. 
Furthermore, Wall LJ sets out what is later Neuberger’s first principle: that judges should 
                                                          
237 Mark Leftly: Margaret Hodge, feared basher of bosses, may be ready to step up to a bigger stage, 7 February 2014, 
available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/comment/mark-leftly-margaret-hodge-feared-
basher-of-bosses-may-be-ready-to-step-up-to-a-bigger-stage-9113483.html 
238 Wall LJ, Justice For Children: Welfare Or Farewell?, 21 November 2009 available at 
http://www.alc.org.uk/uploads/Keynote_2009.pdf 
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‘speak out in public on issues in relation to which they have knowledge and expertise’.239 
Spanning forty years, as a family judge, President of the Family Division, and a career as a 
practising family barrister in the courts, Wall LJ can rightly be perceived to have some 
valuable observations to make. 
 
Wall LJ also explicitly identifies, unlikely the very subtle hints we saw in some speeches in 
the last chapter such as Lord Hope, that he is at times speaking directly to government; even 
if they will not listen: ‘there have, as you know, been a number of governmental U-turns, and 
a patent inadequacy of what passes for consultation. Government appears to be driven by a 
powerful political agenda, which has no clear rationale, but which ignores the views of those 
who know most about the subject—that is, of course, the practitioners and the judges’.240 
 
Wall LJ then not only expresses a desire to speak out and be heard, but also deals critical 
comments to the government proposals as well as engage closely with the subject of a 
committee inquiry; CAFCASS. It is surprising then to find that when the Commons Public 
Accounts Committee first wrote to Wall LJ seeking his attendance at the inquiry to give 
evidence he refused. In the opening comments to the eventual evidence session which is the 
subject of our sample we see Chair Margaret Hodge MP stating: ‘I welcome you both, Sir 
Nicholas and Sir Mark, and thank you very much for attending our hearing this morning. I 
know you felt some reluctance to do so’.241 It was later revealed that in the face of Wall LJs 
initial reluctance, Margaret Hodge MP in fact wrote to him ‘repeatedly’ requesting his 
attendance.242  We saw earlier that committees in practice are advised that is constitutionally 
                                                          
239 Wall LJ, ibid, at paragraph 14 
240 Ibid at paragraph 51 
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242 Politics of Judicial Independence (n162) Chapter 6 
104 
improper to compel a judge’s attendance, so it is far more likely that negotiations took place 
between the Parliamentary clerks and Wall LJ as to the line of questioning that would be 
taken. It is also clear from the opening remarks that Wall LJs reluctance to appear and discuss 
CAFCASS’s value for money (the usual approach of Commons Public Account Committee 
sessions), Margaret Hodge MP stated that ‘it would be helpful, in coming to some helpful 
conclusions, if we heard a little from you as the customer of CAFCASS’ and not on the value 
of CAFCASS. After all the courts are ‘customers’ of CAFCASS, requiring their services, 
reports and participation in proceedings.  
 
During the evidence session itself we see a marked change in the tone of Wall LJ compared 
with his speech of 2009. In answer to question 99 about whether he regarded CAFCASS as 
a world class service, Wall LJ in his response stated: 
 
 ‘I am very anxious not to get into a political debate about CAFCASS because, as you 
will appreciate, the Government funds and organises CAFCASS, and the judges have 
to make do with what they're given. I think both Mark and I would be unanimous, and 
all judges would be unanimous, in saying that what we want is children properly and 
independently represented in care proceedings. Any organisation that does not deliver 
that for whatever reason--and that is a matter for you--is not world class.’ 
 
Of course, given what we have read from Neuberger’s principles and the JEB 
Guidance, there is a common reluctance by Judges to enter political debate. But 
speaking in 2009, Wall LJ called for the ‘historical and indeed instinctive judicial 
reluctance to go public’ over such matters to ‘come to an end’. Wall LJ went on to state: 
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An inadequately funded CAFCASS, which is unable to work with parents and 
children outside the courtroom, is a bitter disappointment to those who believed 
that they were being promised change of the better when CAFCASS was 
brought into being.  
 
Why the sudden change? Though the JEB Guidance was perhaps not explicitly in the 
back of his mind, it is likely that Wall LJ appreciated the fact that an extrajudicial speech 
grants far more scope and liberty than comments made in oral evidence before a 
Parliamentary committee. But also, it is possible that Wall LJ was reluctant to engage 
with politicians given the circumstances of his appointment as President of the Family 
Division.243  
 
Furthermore, as President, Wall LJ also took to working closely with CAFCASS to help clear 
the backlog and continue working under the pressure created by the sizeable increase in care 
proceedings after the Baby P tragedy. So much so that on 30 September 2010, a join 
agreement between CAFCASS and Wall LJ was issued to that end.244 During this time he 
was also refusing to attend the committee hearing. Reference to the agreement by an inquiry 
into the workings of CAFCASS was inevitable and that is evidenced by the committee 
members questioning of it.245 
 
                                                          
243 Then Lord Chancellor, Jack Straw, had exercised his veto to prevent the appointment of Wall LJ, instead 
preferring Hallett LJ.  This was subsequently leaked to the press, and Jack Straw MP subsequently confirmed 
the appointment of Wall LJ as President of the Family Division. For further detail see, J Straw, Aspects of Law 
Reform: An Insider's Perspective (The Hamlyn Lectures), (Cambridge: CUP 2013) 
244 http://www.cafcass.gov.uk/pdf/Joint%20Agreement%20October%202010.pdf 
245 PAC (n201) Q100 
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As a whole the session was later reported to have been a productive session246, and even 
featured some strange Parliamentary humour:247  
 
Sir Nicholas Wall:  If the Government want to avoid delay, they must make  
 resources available to ensure that delay does not occur.  
Austin Mitchell MP: Amen to that. 
 
Though the session touched on some policy elements as above, the main focus was on Wall 
LJ’s experience of CAFCASS with the courts as a ‘customer’, and the educative and insightful 
evidence of Wall LJ was valuable and gratefully received. Wall LJ went on to set out for the 
committee how the role of the judge has changed over the years from arbiter to leading case 
management and the consequences of this for judges and the length and delays of legal 
proceedings.248  
 
This example of proliferation of extrajudicial activity and comment from lectures to oral 
evidence, to committee reports is not isolated. Extrajudicial speeches often appear in lines 
of questioning either asking a judge about a speech that they themselves had recently given, 
or asking about a speech a fellow judge had recently given. A good example of this comes 
from Lady Hale. Lady Hale gave two speeches, one in October and the other in November 
of 2013, on human rights and the proposed government reforms to the judicial review 
process.249 Later, in June of 2014, the Lords Constitution Committee inquired into her 
                                                          
246 Politics of Judicial Independence (n162) Chapter 6 
247 PAC (n201) Q125 
248 Ibid, Q125 
249 Lady Hale, at the Public Law Project Conference 2013, Who Guards the Guardians? 14 October 2013  
http://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-131014.pdf and Lady Hale at the Warwick Law Lecture 2013  
What’s the point of human rights? 28 November 2013 http://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-131128.pdf  
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thoughts about these reforms during an oral session with her. Here comments were later 
picked up on in the press.250  
 
What is clear here, is that as with extrajudicial lectures and speeches, evidence to committees 
is in substance less clearly defined; neither purely educative not purely political. The dangers 
of overly political evidence compromising the independence of individuals and the judicial 
institutions go some way to explaining part of that. But also, as seen in the sessions of oral 
evidence to the Constitution Committee, this mode of extrajudicial comment is considered 
the only remaining mode to convey thoughts and ideas from the judiciary into the 
Parliamentary sphere.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The JEB Guidance asserts the importance of the principles of a separation of powers and 
judicial independence by delineating what should and should not form the basis of a 
committee inquiry or specific question. These aims are supported by long established 
conventions and Parliamentary rules. But at the opening of this section on evidence to 
committees we noted that the number of instances where judges were called to give evidence 
is increasing. We can reasonably conclude then, that far from discouraging communication 
between the judiciary and Parliament, the regulation attempted by the JEB and the 
constitutional principles relied upon have in fact set out clear parameters for both branches 
of government to consider and adhere to. This formality, and the set procedures and 
negotiations for arranging appearances, might over time help to change the rather negative 
                                                          
250 Top judges raise concern over plan to restrict judicial review challenges, The Guardian 25 June 2014. 
http://www.theguardian.com/law/2014/jun/25/judges-restrictions-judicial-review-challenges 
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judicial attitudes to committee appearances. It might also better inform MPs as to the proper 
conduct of a hearing. These effects are positive and encourage the use of oral evidence 
sessions as a means of interaction between Parliament and the judiciary. 
 
 From the committee appearances studied above, there are also significant examples of those 
judges making critical observations of government policy proposals.251 With the removal of 
a judicial representative in the Cabinet, making direct representations from the judiciary to 
the executive, Parliamentary committees are the only remaining public channel allowing for 
dialogue with (and the chance to air grievances to) Parliament. This direct approach could 
help to encourage Parliamentary debate about the matters raised during those committee 
sessions, and thereby provide valuable feedback to the executive. But we also see a common 
link between speechmaking and oral evidence sessions. In chapter two we saw how, when 
private judicial-political communications and negotiations fail, judges will make extrajudicial 
speeches on the matter and ‘go public’. We now see that following such speeches, judges 
may volunteer to explain the views expressed in those extrajudicial speeches. Of equal 
importance, a committee may want to probe the views expressed in those extrajudicial 
speeches with the relevant judge. Though our evidence sample is small in size, it is possible 
to speculate that post-2005 a new chain of public communicative processes exists between 
the judiciary and politicians, where private interactions are unsuccessful. Prior to the CRA, 
senior judges could address the upper chamber directly, or the Lord Chancellor could convey 
concerns to the Cabinet and Prime Minister. Without these platforms, judges have been able 
to adapt the remaining practices of judicial speech making, and committee appearances to 
ensure their views are heard by Parliament, and the government via MPs and peers alike. 
                                                          
251 For some carefully selected examples see Leyland and Bamforth (n151) at page 211 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CRITERIA FOR ASSESSMENT, AND POSSIBLE 
REFORMS 
 
So far we have mapped the impact of the CRA on the practice of extrajudicial comment. In 
chapter two we traced the evolution of extrajudicial lectures, pointing to a trend away from 
the predominantly educative lectures to more policy-orientated lectures, especially where 
private judicial-political communications on those policy issues had failed. In chapter three 
we reflected on the growing practice of judicial oral evidence before Parliamentary 
committees, noting the different attitudes and approaches adopted by different judges, but 
also the connection between speechmaking and oral evidence as a part of a larger process of 
communication. Underlying much of the discussion in chapters two and three have been 
fundamental doctrines such as the separation of powers and judicial independence. In 
particular, we noted that there is a common concern to regulate extrajudicial comment—in 
the sense, that is, of ensuring that comments remain within constitutionally acceptable 
bounds—that applies in the different contexts of extra-judicial lectures and evidence before 
Parliamentary committees. In chapters two and three we saw attempts through informal 
guidance—by Lord Neuberger vis-à-vis extrajudicial lectures and the JEB Guidance on oral 
evidence—to delineate extrajudicial comment. Driving much of the discussion in these 
chapters is the recognition that, judicial interactions with Parliament and the government 
have changed over the last ten years from direct judicial representation in the Lords and the 
Cabinet, to more indirect communication exemplified by evidence sessions in Parliamentary 
committee rooms, or even more remotely, judicial speechmaking.  
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This chapter is in two parts. Part A examines how to assess these means of extrajudicial 
communication that are becoming ‘more travelled’.252 This focuses on their sufficiency as a 
means of communication between Parliament and the government with the judiciary, which 
will allow us to establish criteria by which to test existing methods of judicial-political 
communication as well as possible reforms. To do this, Part A draws together the main 
conclusions and comparisons of the analysis of both extrajudicial speeches and oral evidence. 
It defines what constitutes ‘successful’ communication and delineates the criteria for 
conducting such an assessment. It then summarises the key considerations to include in any 
attempt to regulate extrajudicial comment-making. Finally, Part A sets out the significance 
of the similarities underpinning both the JEB Guidance and the Neuberger principles. This 
will then set the foundations for Part B which, firstly, draws on the analysis of the regulations 
in order to inform a new uniform set of principles, designed to govern all forms of 
extrajudicial comment. Part B then examines the possible reforms currently being discussed 
between Parliament and judges, to improve judicial-political communications. Here the 
assessment criteria from Part A are key, and are used to investigate the merits of the 
proposals for reform set out in Part B. This chapter is important to the central research 
question of studying and assessing how judges comment extrajudicially since the reforms of 
the CRA 2005. A good method of communication will satisfy the above criteria which are 
informed by our earlier study of the two most popular present practices.  Further, judges 
using a particular method to make extrajudicial comments, should have clear principles to 
consider and, ultimately, to guide them to ensure that their words are not constitutionally 
improper. This is more important given that speechmaking may sometimes serve as a trigger 
for a committee appearance, as a part of a larger debate. So it should follow that these 
                                                          
252 Lord Neuberger, Where Angels fear to tread (n11) suggests that post CRA 2005 speechmaking and 
extrajudicial comment inevitably became ‘more travelled”, and popular. See page 4 of the speech 
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extrajudicial communications be regulated by uniform principles. The need to identify and 
reflect upon these overarching principles is important to compliment the criteria for 
assessing and ensuring effective means of extrajudicial communication. 
 
Part A: Evolution in the Substance of Judicial Communications 
 
In oral evidence before Parliamentary committees, we saw how judges readily agree to help 
MPs and peers to understand legal principles, legal procedures, judicial appointment 
practices, and judicial workloads. These have always been identified as judges appearing in 
an explanatory capacity to clarify things which the committee would otherwise not 
understand—not for judges to explain themselves or their decisions. But some judges have 
been more pro-active.253 So here the spectrum also appears, with educational appearances at 
one end and the, albeit rare, policy orientated appearance at the other.  
 
This is sometimes a small step from the educative to comments on policy. Indeed the subtlety 
of the suggestions made in speeches like that of Lord Hope likely escape the notice of the 
students being addressed. Speeches to the other end of the spectrum are often picked up on 
by legal correspondents, but very rarely by the mainstream media. 254 These are very different 
in purpose—on the one hand bemused students grappling with legal studies, and on the 
other pertinent issues affecting a dissatisfied profession. Scholarly lectures are not considered 
                                                          
253 For examples, see how Lady Hale and Sir Maurice Kay LJ differed in their approaches, attitudes and 
answers when asked the same questions as each other in chapter 3 above (n201) and The Select Committee 
on the Constitution Inquiry on The Office Of Lord Chancellor Evidence Session No. 3 Heard in Public 
Questions 30 – 42, showing the differing approaches of Lords Hope, Judge, and Woolf. In particular note the 
reticence of Lord Hope to speak on issues he feels to be more suitably asked of Woolf and Judge, available at 
http://www.Parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/constitution/lord-chancellor-
inquiry/ucCC230714ev2.pdf 
254 See reports of Lord Phillip’s comments in the BBC about the funding of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court 
Independence, threatened by funding, BBC 9 February 2011,  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12400913 
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so newsworthy or entertaining for the masses. A judge’s comment on policy, however 
carefully phrased, is much more likely to lead to discussion in the media. However, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the approach of the media differs greatly to that of Parliamentary 
committees.255 We have seen from both the JEB and the sample of oral evidence discussed 
in the previous chapter that Parliament is sometimes keen to hear from judges on 
jurisprudence and procedure and their scholarly understanding of the law. But committees 
are also willing to broach policy matters, knowing that contentious questions may be opposed 
by the judge while negotiating the line of questioning with Parliamentary clerks in preparation 
for the session, or the judge may refuse to answer a given question during the session. A 
scholarly extrajudicial comment then may not be so ‘popular’ in the press or widely reported, 
but that is not to say that is has been ignored or not heard by Parliament. This is an important 
consideration when setting out our criteria for assessment of these modes of comment as 
means of communication.  
 
Adapting and evolving the practice of giving extrajudicial lectures, demonstrates the 
unconventional way in which senior judges sometimes communicate with the other branches 
of government. In order to ensure an effective government, the three branches of state must 
communicate with each other, in order to hold each other to account and keep each other 
informed of their work.256 As argued in previous chapters, this has become more important, 
given the new responsibilities of the LCJ, SC President, and senior judges as administrators 
of their courts and divisions. Senior judges need to communicate with government figures 
over various issues, from funding to administration. We know that such communications 
occur routinely and in private. But public extrajudicial comments are also increasing, as a 
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256 See earlier in Chapter 3 above, on the academic discussion of how Committees hold judges to account 
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means of communication with the government.257 We have seen some of the issues discussed 
relate to government policies over cuts to legal aid, restrictions on applications for judicial 
review, and reform of child care services and family court procedures. All of these are issues 
where the government has already made up its mind, and is ready to legislate over the issues. 
By speaking out publicly, the judiciary could be viewed as trying to draw public attention to, 
or support for, their concerns as a means of last resort. From the analysis in chapters two 
and three this is likely to target the legal profession more than the public in general. The 
clearest example of public extrajudicial comment being used as a means of last resort, 
following unsuccessful private discussions with politicians, came from Lord Phillips over 
whether the Chief Executive should be answerable to the UKSC or the MoJ. On that 
occasion Ken Clarke (then Lord Chancellor) was forced to make a public statement the 
following day, playing down Lord Phillips’ concerns, and trying to save face. But the publicity 
failed to change the MoJ’s position. The wider debate over the issue continued until Lord 
Phillips returned to the Lords on retirement and moved the necessary amendments. So how 
do we assess the judges success in achieving that purpose? To do this, we must first establish 
some criteria to apply more closely to the modes of extrajudicial comment. 
 
Criteria for Assessment of Extrajudicial Communication 
 
Given the spectrum of extrajudicial communication, in both form (where they take place 
etc.) and substance, and the differences in topic of the oral evidence sessions, it is essential 
to draw on common features of these extrajudicial comments in order to assess how 
successful they are and then compare them. 
                                                          
257 Some 38 Judges have given evidence to Parliamentary Committees from 2006 to 2012, while over a 
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An extrajudicial comment is successful if it achieves, or exceeds, its intended purpose in a 
positive way.  Particular speeches will no doubt have different intended purposes to others. 
But drawing on a more generic basis, a few similarities become clear. When judges speak, 
they prefer their audience to heed their words and to pay attention. But more than that, as 
well as heed the judges words, the audience may be comforted—for example, to know that 
senior judicial figures share their outlook and opinions on government reforms. Or the 
audience may be inspired to continue the debate and discussion further, proliferating into a 
debate, and push for reform. But most significant, and rare of all, the audience may be moved 
to publish the extrajudicial comments in the mainstream press. Judges do not always 
deliberately aim for this to happen. Sometimes when a judge gives a lecture they are often 
invited to do so by their hosts, for the prestige of having a judge attend. Though of course 
that should not detract from the importance of their valuable experience and knowledge, it 
does allow for a more realistic view to be taken of how and why judges might speak on 
particular topics. The universities and inns that invite judges in this way, would perhaps 
understand a successful speech to be one which drew a strong turnout of students, 
academics, and perhaps practitioners. But we are assessing the speech as a means of 
communication with Parliament and the government, so one aspect we need to look at is 
how successfully public extrajudicial comments engage political figures.  
 
So a successful speech in its most basic terms is one which engages the audience in some 
way and makes them listen. Simple perhaps; any good speech does this. But in oral evidence 
before Parliament there is little need for engaging or inspirational speech making. The 
sessions come in the form of a series of questions and answers. So how can we define a 
successful committee appearance? Also, unlike speeches, the turnout and attraction of 
attention is not always as popular as we earlier saw how Parliamentary clerks struggled to 
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make a committee quorate for the appearance of the LCJ himself! So what similarities exist 
between oral evidence and lectures that could be argued to make them successful.  
 
A communication, and the method used to make it, can be said to succeed if it achieves, or 
exceeds, its intended purpose in a positive way. We can perhaps discern a plausible intention 
from the surrounding facts. An example of this can be seen with the speech by Potter LJ as 
head of the family division. The audience was a conference of family law barristers, solicitors, 
and care workers. The timing was crucial: not only did the Government plan further reforms 
and cuts to family law legal aid, but a parliamentary committee was leading an inquiry into 
the care service provider CAFCASS. From this background information we can expect that 
Potter LJ will use his position as the leadership entity of the family courts to express an 
opinion on the then recent government actions relating to family court funding. In particular 
we can expect Potter LJ to address or refer to the concerns of the practitioners gathered 
before him. This is then further evidenced when we look at the speech. In the first chapter 
we saw how Potter LJ set out a reasoned argument against the uncertainty of the proposals, 
and a staunch defence of family justice, whilst simultaneously acknowledging that some 
change would be needed to make the system sustainable. But the purpose? We might suggest 
that Potter LJ was coming forward to show leadership and support for the profession, and 
show that the senior judiciary share their concerns and will do what they can, within the 
scope available to them as independent judges. This sort of intended purpose is entirely 
specific to this particular speech by this judge, Potter LJ.  In order to assess the success of a 
speech in terms of it achieving the purpose intended by the speech giver, in lieu of an 
interview, requires a detailed study of the maker, the form, and the substance of the 
comment, as done in chapter one. The shortcomings of this mean that the findings will 
essentially be assumptions, made on a plausible but subjective basis. This would make any 
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conclusion susceptible to failing to uncover any subtleties in the intention of the judge, which 
are not otherwise obvious from the speaker, form, or substance of the comment. 
Furthermore, whilst a judge’s answer to a Parliamentary committee question is most often in 
their own words, judicial lectures are sometimes drafted, or contributed to, by judicial 
assistants.258 Of the speeches in the sample in chapter two, two give thanks to the judicial 
assistant for ‘supporting research’.259 Therefore there is a possibility that the intended 
purpose of the comment is not solely envisaged by the judge, but may carry with it a 
secondary purpose held by the judicial assistant. The impact of this, and any possible skew, 
is difficult to discover without interviews. Despite this, the final comment or speech comes 
from the judge and is a comment of the judge, not the assistant, whether after editing, 
approving, and adopting any drafts from assistants or not. 
 
Judges may also share speeches. Just how much of this goes on is unclear during my yearlong 
research. But we can see that judges sometimes refer to earlier speeches of their colleagues. 
Whether this is because they have privately passed a copy, or because the previous speech 
caused a stir it is not always easy to infer. But such private sharing could be for added effect, 
or a common and shared intended purpose. For example, Lord Neuberger in the Holdsworth 
speech260 cited, Lady Hale 261 making a speech describing the legal aid cuts as ‘fundamentally 
misconceived’ and a ‘false economy’. In citing Lady Hale’s words, Neuberger went on to 
defend Hale’s right to say these things, and highlighted that it was the proper function of the 
judiciary to draw attention to policies that detrimentally affect the administration of justice. 
                                                          
258  Tetyana Nesterchuk, The view from behind the bench: The role of judicial assistants in the supreme court, in A 
Burrows , D Johnston QC, and R Zimmermann, Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger (OUP 2013) at 
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Hope thanks his judicial assistant for research into vicarious liability.  
260 Neuberger (n11) at 43 
261  B Hale, Law Centres Federation Annual Conference Opening Address, (2011) -  
(http://supremecourt.uk/docs/speech_111125.pdf) at page 5 and Neuberger (n11) at page 3.  
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Here, if the two judges shared their speeches or opinions, Lord Neuberger’s decision to come 
to the defence of Lady Hale would indicate a much more collegiate UKSC when it comes to 
communicating to external bodies.  
 
At the Royal Courts of Justice things are not as straightforward for conducting research 
compared to the UKSC. During my research it was problematic that the Judicial 
Communications Office (JCO) do not hold a complete database of the speeches given by 
serving judges. Of the speeches used in our sample, the speeches by the Supreme Court 
Justices can all be found on the Supreme Court website. However, on the judiciary website, 
Wall LJ’s speech to the Association of Family Lawyers, was not recorded nor available on 
the MOJ website, whilst only a few others he gave were recorded there. I attempted to 
discover how the JCO determines which speeches make it onto the online record, and which 
do not. I have not yet received a response. I have also noticed that at some point between 
the end of May and start of June the MOJ website was ‘re-launched’, and the JCOs database 
of speeches, entirely removed. I have again raised this with the JCO, and await a response. 
This stark contrast in record keeping, and public accountability, suggests a great deal about 
the greater autonomy and administrative authority of the justices of the Supreme Court, 
compared with that of the judges of the RCJ.262 One possible reason for the difference could 
be that the Judicial Office is responsible for both the High Court and the Court of Appeal.263 
That includes some one hundred and eight High Court judges264 and thirty eight Court of 
Appeal judges.265 Documenting the speeches of one hundred and forty six judges could be 
                                                          
262 para 1.5 of HMCts Service Framework document Cm. 7350 (2008), details the responsibilities of the civil 
servants working in the higher courts to the MoJ, whereas the Crime and Courts Act 2013 separates the 
Supreme Court entirely, with the Chief Exec of that court answerable to the justices; not the MOJ. 
263 Royal Courts of Justice: https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/rcj-rolls-building/rcj 
264 The Maximum Number of Judges Order 2003 No. 775 Article 2, states that there may be no more than 
108 
265 Senior Courts Act 1981 
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more demanding than for the twelve SCJs, despite an official JCO dedicated to serve the 
RCJ. But, provided that a judge of the RCJ who gives a speech, makes a copy available to the 
JCO, then it should not be so difficult a task. 
 
Asking if a comment achieves its intended purpose raises a need for more in depth analysis. 
How effectively was the method used to convey the message and achieve that purpose? How 
comfortable was the comment-maker in making the comment, hoping to achieve that 
outcome? These questions link the analysis of the methods of making extrajudicial comment: 
oral evidence and speech making; as well as the success of achieving the intended purpose. 
In summary then, the first, but also overarching criterion looks at the success of the intended 
purpose of making such comments.  
 
1. Intended Purpose. The success of the intended purpose of making such comments would 
depend upon the intended consequence of the comments as envisaged by the judge. These 
intentions might be discerned from the substance or content of the speech—a political 
speech may have a hope to influence government policy, while an educational speech may 
be for academic note.  
 
2. Efficiency. This analysis is dependent upon the classification exercise in chapter one—
here we are analysing the efficiency of firstly, on form, how efficiently the extrajudicial 
comments are directed, taken on board or received as a result of the chosen method of 
communication. For example, with the speech by Lady Hale on legal aid cuts, how efficiently 
was Lady Hale able to direct her opinions and extrajudicial comments to the audience, and 
were those comments capable of being easily received by the audience? This question 
essentially examines the efficiency of the chosen method to convey the chosen message. This 
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investigation is done in isolation, without considering the alternative methods a judge may 
be exercising simultaneously. As Lady Hale gives her strongly worded speech, there is a 
possibility she may also be conveying her concerns by other means (possibly by private 
lobbying of the MoJ or Lord Chancellor). Secondly, on substance, this criterion investigates 
how efficiently the extrajudicial comments are at achieving that intended purpose. For 
example, how efficiently the chosen method of conveying the intended message was at 
influencing policy or educating the law schools. Here it may be necessary to compare 
Parliamentary evidence with lecturing, where the speakers are seeking to make the same 
point. The success may be evidenced by investigating results or outcomes, by way of 
proliferation of the extrajudicial comments into further debates whether Parliamentary or 
academic.  
 
3. Constitutional Propriety. This criterion draws on the foundational principles of judicial 
independence and separation of powers. We have seen how some judges are reticent to 
comment, and will occasionally decline to answer certain questions from Parliamentary 
committees, because the judge feels it would be constitutionally improper to do so. But so 
too, we have seen that when speech making, judges will avoid giving an explicit 
denouncement of political policy, instead reporting on findings of consultations which 
themselves cast the policies in a negative light (for example in the speech by Lady Hale on 
cuts). These refusals, and indirect criticisms are a compromise between maintaining the 
independence and impartiality of the judiciary—should any of these matters ever come 
before them for judgment—and the separation of powers (keeping judges out of party 
politics and government policy). The need to maintain these principles can make a judge 
uncomfortable when being pressed for answers which might damage these principles. This 
question therefore requires an analysis of the form, substance and speakers attitude to the 
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method. The investigation into the form raises the question: are speeches more under the 
control of the speaker and thus more comfortable than a politically driven question posed 
by a Parliamentary committee? Looking into constitutional propriety draws on the substance 
of the comment and any risks that the comments made may raise concerns over judicial 
independence and the separation of powers. And looking into the attitude of the speaker 
indicates their base reticence and caution when it comes to constitutional propriety. Finally, 
the question about the speaker’s attitude to the methods of making an extrajudicial comment 
is especially important. This is because, within some broadly drawn boundaries, the approach 
taken by judges to a specific method is subjective and specific to the attitudes, expectations, 
and conceptions held by the judge. We saw this most clearly with the Parliamentary session 
with Lady Hale and Kay LJ. Some judges are more open, and others reserved. But does being 
more open increase the possibility of concerns over judicial independence, or are these judges 
prepared, controlled, and careful in their choice of words? The overall purpose here is to see 
how easy it is for judges to make use of the methods available to them, and how comfortable 
are they doing so. 
 
Bringing these criteria together, it may be seen that evidence to committees for example may 
be considered more efficient—evidence direct to Parliament—but also the least comfortable, 
since judges may be required to refuse to answer questions considered outside of their remit 
or that may compromise judicial independence. Whilst public speeches may be the most 
comfortable and easy, the efficiency of delivery lies with the make-up of the audience, news 
coverage, and the reach of the published words. The success may be assessed from the view 
of the judiciary on an individual and institutional level in terms of how worthwhile the 
institution and individual consider each method, and also the actual impact—did the decision 
to speak out have the desired effect, in fact, in the view of the individual judge, as compared 
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to the view of the institution. The judiciary as a whole, may find that oral evidence to 
Parliament is a more worthwhile means of communication than an extrajudicial speech. 
Individually, more senior judges like the LCJ and those in leadership roles that need to 
communicate regularly would agree. Parliamentary committees are made up of influential 
MPs or peers, or sometimes both. Engaging with them directly, and in a forum of mutual 
respect must be conducive to successful and worthwhile communications. We have seen in 
chapter two how sessions prove valuable whether on questions of jurisprudence, or policies 
affecting the legal system and administration of justice. We also saw, how the public nature 
of committee hearings also allows for issues identified by judges to be reported in the press. 
Though realistically, reports are rare unless the issue hints at friction or discord between the 
judiciary and government. However, puisne judges may find that speechmaking is more 
worthwhile, as they are free to speak on their own initiative, on matters they choose and not 
at a committee’s behest. Yet we have seen that senior judges also regularly make speeches, 
sometimes using speeches to draw public attention to issues, in the same way that committee 
hearings do. But speechmaking does not ensure MPs and peers will be in the audience to 
listen, and it can perhaps be seen to be unhelpful for establishing good judicial-political 
relations, and engagement.  
 
The three criteria that are critical in assessing the success of extrajudicial comment are: 
constitutional propriety, efficiency, and success vis-à-vis the intended purpose. We revisit 
these criteria later to see if the reforms proposed to improve or supplement the current 
situation, satisfy these criteria. 
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Regulating Extrajudicial Comment: Key Considerations 
 
In the introduction we stated the need to focus on extrajudicial speeches and Parliamentary 
oral evidence, out of an array of types of extrajudicial comments. This was because out of 
the non-statutory measures these are the only two to attract high profile guidance and be the 
most frequent means of public comment by the senior judiciary and leadership figures. The 
concern is that by speaking more frequently, and with more judges speaking, judges risk 
compromising judicial independence both individually (by discussing matters they may later 
need to decide in court)—or institutionally (by damaging the reputation of the judiciary as 
an impartial and independent body). That is why guidance is needed to regulate the practice, 
and ensure extrajudicial comments do not fall outside constitutionally acceptable parameters. 
Here we look at what the guidance from Neuberger and the JEB state, and try to draw out 
the principles that are most pertinent for extrajudicial comment-making. These include: 
ensuring judges do not become a source of negative entertainment; guiding judges to prevent 
constitutionally improper comments; allowing judges to comment freely, but with caution, 
over issues affecting the proper administration of justice; and the issue of extrajudicial 
comment becoming too commonplace. We can then effectively summarise the meritorious 
concerns and considerations judges should have when commenting extrajudicially, and 
identify how those concerns relate directly to the constitutional propriety of a method of 
communication. This then informs an investigation into what regulations are necessary to 
ensure continued judicial independence but still allow for extrajudicial comment; whether 
the seven principles suggested by Lord Neuberger and the JEB Guidance can work together; 
or are a pre-cursor for more stringent control, or a more formalised mechanism to make 
constitutionally acceptable representations to Parliament.  
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Before the Kilmuir Rules, there was in effect no regulation as to what judges could and could 
not say, extrajudicially. Judges have long been aware that outside of the court room, they 
must not behave in a way which undermines their role as judges. Indeed when the Kilmuir 
Rules came into being, this was not as a reaction to judges being outspoken. It was out of 
concern that with the dawn of a media age, organisations like the BBC might seek to use 
judges for ‘entertainment’ purposes. 
 
In setting the rules aside, Lord Mackay argued judicial independence was much an individual 
concept as an institutional one. He therefore granted judges a discretion to choose whether 
or not to speak extra judicially. This discretion continues to this day, but if a judge does 
choose to speak, then what consideration should they bear in mind when commenting? 
 
In setting out a series of suggested principles Lord Neuberger stated that he thought speeches 
were becoming more and more frequent. He did not however state that judges were being 
too outspoken, or speaking on issues upon which it was improper for them to do so. The 
examples he gave which raised concerns about judicial independence on matters such as the 
fox hunting bill, were from very senior judges speaking extrajudicially as members of the 
Lords. Even here, Neuberger suggested that such comments had been concerning, but still 
constitutionally acceptable. The only example outside of this was from Scrutton LJ speaking 
on integration of the ECHR into English law. So does that one example from over two 
decades ago really warrant any new guidance? 
 
Reading the guidance from Lord Neuberger and the JEB, there is still nothing that might 
appear new to judges. Many of the principles are long established conventions of the 
expected standards of conduct and behaviour of serving judges. Nor is there any evidence 
124 
of judges stepping outside of this. In chapter one we saw that from our sample of speeches, 
Lady Hale was by far the most political in substance. But even so, our analysis in that chapter, 
with the Neuberger principles, did not show any impropriety. Lord Neuberger himself spoke 
out in his Holdsworth club speech, citing the speech by Lady Hale, stating that Lady Hale 
had done nothing wrong. Lady Hale had attacked the legal aid cuts as ‘fundamentally 
misconceived’ and a ‘false economy’.266 In his speech, Lord Neuberger acknowledged that 
these comments entered the ‘territory of government policy, and indeed a particularly 
controversial aspect of policy’.267 But he went on to note that judges could ‘properly 
comment publicly on matters which go to the heart of the functioning of the judicial branch 
of the state’. Most importantly for our purposes he concluded: 
 
 ‘In some circumstances, it could be said to be their duty to do so. In the past, it would 
have been easier for them to do so while donning their legislative hats in the House of 
Lords, or via the Lord Chancellor. But those days are now gone. Public comment in 
respect of the proper administration of justice, an accepted exception to the Kilmuir 
Rules, is more important now that it was when those rules were in place.’ 
 
In setting out his principles to guide judges in speechmaking, it is clear then that Lord 
Neuberger was not intending to prevent comments of the kind made by Lady Hale. That is 
to say, comments in respect of the proper administration of justice. This will be an important 
consideration to accommodate in creating a new uniform set of regulations. 
 
                                                          
266 Lady Hale (n75) Pages 3 and 5 
267 Lord Neuberger (n11) para 43 
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Perhaps the only new concern, to have arisen over recent years, is the final point by Lord 
Neuberger that too many speeches may ‘devalue the currency’. But again, we have seen that 
the rise in the number of speeches could very likely be linked to the increasing demand for 
academic institutions, NGOs, and professional bodies to have a prestigious speaker to open, 
or speak at an event they are organising. Whilst this in and of itself should not detract from 
the importance of the judges words, it could ‘devalue’ the practise of extrajudicial speech 
making by recasting it as a sales and marketing exercise, or publicity drive.  
 
Greater concern clearly exists when judges appear before Parliamentary select committees. 
We noted in chapter three that judicial attitudes towards committee appearances were 
outwardly positive about the value of meeting with Parliament in this way, but always 
followed by caution that it was becoming too frequent. The reasoning adopted we saw ranged 
from concerns over judicial impendence, the public perception of judicial impartiality, and 
the large-scale time commitment and preparation required to be undertaken by judges. The 
different approaches by different judges are a sign that some judges perceived workings of 
Parliament could be outdated.  
 
We also noted that the JEB Guidance suggested that judges appearing before committees 
was a new thing since the CRA 2005. This is however not the case. On the 26 March 2001, 
for the first time, the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Woolf, the Master of the Rolls Lord Philips, 
and a senior Law Lord, Lord Bingham, together appeared before the JCHR.268 The inquiry 
was into the effect of the Human Rights Act on the higher courts and senior judiciary. The 
then chairman of the committee, Jean Corston MP (now Baroness Corston), commented: 
                                                          
268 JCHR, inquiry was into the effect of the Human Rights Act on the higher courts and senior judiciary, Session 2000-01 
available at http://www.publications.Parliament.uk/pa/jt200001/jtselect/jtrights/66/1032601.htm 
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We are well aware that there are certain matters upon which you would not feel it 
proper to comment, notably, but not exclusively, individual cases. I can assure you 
that we have no wish to place you in an awkward or invidious position and 
if…some of our questions appear to you to nudge you up against the constitutional 
boundaries between the roles of the legislature and the judiciary, I am sure you will 
not hesitate to let us know. 
 
This adds support to the argument made earlier that judges (and Parliament) are well aware 
of these core constitutional principles and the importance they have when considering their 
comments and conduct. With concerns raised as to the separation of powers and the 
importance of judicial independence, even before the CRA was drafted, it is not surprising 
that the current guidance draws on long established Parliamentary conventions such as the 
sub judice rule to help formulate the guidance for current judges.   
 
Similarities Between the JEB Guidance, and the Neuberger Principles 
 
Now that we know the salient features that should be included in guidance to judges for 
extrajudicial comment-making, we can begin to create a new set of principles. To help with 
this, we noted in chapter two that there were clear similarities in the guidance for judges on 
speaking extrajudicially. Be it lecturing and the informal guidance of Neuberger, or oral 
evidence and the guidance from the JEB, there are common considerations to be had in 
speaking extrajudicially. The opportunity that arises here is to fashion a constitutional role 
for judges speaking extrajudicially that is appropriate in a modern democracy.  
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We can bring the items of JEB Guidance, and Neuberger principles together, to demonstrate 
just how similar they are and create a uniform set of principles: 
JEB Guidance Neuberger Principles 
 
Item 1. The merits of individual cases, 
whether or not the judge giving evidence has 
adjudicated on that case, and whether these 
are pending, ongoing, or have concluded (but 
by exception in paragraph 7, this does not 
include discussion of cases in a jurisprudential 
context); 
 
 
Principle 1: it seems to me only proper that 
judges, with their wisdom and experience, 
should be free to comment extra-judicially on 
a wide range of issues. In doing so they play 
an educative role.  
 
Principle 5  Fifthly, judges should think 
carefully of their audience, and the impact 
their comments might have upon it …Might 
that impact, or potential impact, call into 
question their independence, their ability to 
carry out their fundamental role of doing 
justice according to law? 
 
 
Item II. The personalities or merits of 
serving judges, politicians, or other public 
figures, or more generally on the quality of 
appointments; 
 
 
Principle 3: a judge should consider the 
effect on the judiciary generally of any view 
expressed. The judiciary’s claim to 
institutional independence depends in part on 
its institutional reputation and standing. It 
may be inevitable that judges may disagree on 
a policy or constitutional issue when sitting in 
court, and it may occasionally be inevitable 
out of court (e.g. when appearing before a 
Parliamentary committee). 
 
 
Item III. The merits, meaning or likely effect 
of provisions in any Bill or other prospective 
legislation and the merits of government 
policy (but see paragraphs 12 -13 – providing 
an exception for comments which are 
educative and for policies which affect the 
administration of justice ); 
 
 
Principle 2:  any comment should be made 
following careful consideration of the impact 
which it might have on both aspects of 
judicial independence. 
 
Principle 4: [could it be] that the statement 
trespasses into forbidden territory, and, if so, 
can it be justified on the basis that it falls 
within the appropriate ambit of judicial 
speaking out? And, if it can, is it expressed in 
terms suitable for a judge entering the arena 
in a non-judicial capacity?  
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Item I (and its exception) is an acknowledgement by the JEB that judges may on occasion 
speak on matters of legal theory, or the history, development and academic treatment of an 
area of law, or the matters of legal procedure, or professional matters such as the working 
life of a legal practitioner or judge. This specific exception is indirectly approved of by 
Neuberger’s first principle that a judges educative role is invaluable, and the fifth principle 
that a judge refrain from commenting on live cases or matters which they may later need to 
decide in court. 
 
Item II, which requires judges to avoid personal attacks on fellow judges or other figures, is 
again supported, this time in Neuberger’s third principle, to be cautious in criticism, and 
where absolutely necessary, to behave in a ‘seemly’ manner.  
 
 
Item IV. Issues which are subject to 
government consultation on which the 
judiciary intend to make a formal, institutional 
response, but have not yet done so (but see 
paragraphs 16-17). 
 
 
Principle 2: as above, any comment should 
be made following careful consideration of 
the impact which it might have on both 
aspects of judicial independence. 
  
Principle 6: judges should not seek publicity 
for its own sake, or use their ‘office as a 
springboard for causes (however worthy). 
 
  
Principle 7: there are rather a lot of judicial 
speeches being made at the moment. I 
wonder whether we are not devaluing the 
coinage, or letting the judicial mask slip. In the 
light of the fact that I may be characterised as 
a serial offender, perhaps the less I say about 
that point, the better. 
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Item III, preventing judges from commenting on the merits of prospective legislation or 
government policy, is very similar to Neuberger’s concerns that judges have regard for the 
separation of powers and should not comment on policy. This also echoes some of the fifth 
principles as judges should refrain from commenting on policy which may later by the subject 
of judicial review and litigation. But again, the JEB and Neuberger agree on two exceptions 
—firstly where the comments are educative and secondly where the comments are on 
policies which affect the procedure or administration of justice .269 
 
Finally Item IV, requires judges avoid giving personal views where the government is 
consulting and the judiciary intends to respond as a collective. This item is more reminiscent 
of Lord Kilmuir’s requirement that nothing be said that is inconsistent with the position of 
the Lord Chancellor, but has similarities with Lord Neuberger’s point that that personal 
views differ from judge to judge. 
 
This then leaves two additional principles, set out by Lord Neuberger but not included in the 
JEB Guidance.  These are principle six (not to seek publicity for publicity’s sake) and 
principle seven (the concern over devaluing the practice by making too many speeches). 
Principle six is perhaps not so much a concern in oral evidence sessions, as the structure of 
the sessions centres on a line of inquiry which wouldn’t allow for a judge to deviate and refer 
to charitable causes or the things envisaged by Lord Neuberger. The seventh principle 
however, is perhaps more important in oral evidence sessions. Too many judicial appearances 
would not only devalue the practice, making appearances regular routines rather than notable 
and important opportunities, but would also affect judicial independence. Regular meetings 
                                                          
269 Para 12 of the JEB Guidance (n130) and page 12 para 44 of Neuberger, Where Angels Fear to Tread (n11) 
“Public comment in respect of the proper administration of justice, an accepted exception to the Kilmuir 
Rules, is more important now that it was when those rules were in place” 
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of MPs and peers with judges, especially in so public a way, might suggest that the judiciary 
and politicians are not only communicating, but are close and ‘comfortable’. Whilst good 
relations are central to effective communication, judges must be independent and impartial, 
free from any interference, whether by appearance or in fact. This is especially important 
given the likelihood, however small, that cases involving politicians, whether judicial review, 
or otherwise, may come before judges in the courts. 
 
Part B: Reform: Overarching Principles of Guidance 
 
Part B sets out the significance of the underpinning similarities between the guidance from 
Lord Neuberger and the JEB. These two pieces of guidance deal with extrajudicial comment 
in isolation as lectures, and separately as oral evidence to Parliament. Together the similarities 
between the two can be used to inform an overarching set of regulatory principles for 
extrajudicial comment as an overall practice.  
 
We have drawn together the common themes in the guidance to judges on oral evidence, 
and Neuberger’s seven principles. But we can go further by reformulating them. In Justice 
Wide Open, McNamara270 reorganised Neuberger’s seven principles following the common 
threads that appear in them. These common themes were twofold: ‘The first is freedom. It 
is concerned with scope and limits of when a judge should be able to speak. The second is 
caution. It is concerned with whether a judge who is legitimately able to speak should choose 
to do so.’ 
                                                          
270 L McNamara, Judicial Perspectives on Open Justice and Security, in Justice Wide Open from Page 101, 
(http://www.scribd.com/doc/97591792/Justice-Wide-Open-Lawrence-McNamara-Judicial-Perspectives-on-
Open-Justice-and-Security) 
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On this basis, McNamara identified that the proper process of approaching an extrajudicial 
comment is to determine first, the ambit of what you are able to speak about (for example 
in light of  policy and the separation of powers, matters which may later become justiciable), 
and secondly, whether or not you should then speak (given the audience, the wider reception, 
the views of the judiciary as an institution and individuals, the possibility you may later need 
to rule upon the matter in court). 
 
This is a much more appropriate way to issue guidance judges; these are the things you may 
speak about, this is what you should consider beforehand, in deciding whether or not to 
speak about them. This format appears more in the JEB Guidance, where the stages of the 
process are outlined. 
 
McNamara also reformulates the Neuberger’s principles along these lines, this is respectfully 
reproduced below, to include the JEB Guidance as well in order to create overarching 
guidance to judges on extrajudicial comment. 
 
Overarching Guidance: 
1. Judicial freedom: Judges must not, no matter how worthy the cause may be, use their office 
as a spring board to solicit publicity for, or lend authority to, causes (Neuberger Principle 6). 
However judges may speak on a wide variety of issues which include legal theory, 
jurisprudence, ‘areas such as constitutional principles, the role and independence of the 
judiciary, the functioning of the legal system, and access to justice, and even important issues 
of law’, particularly when speaking in an educative or explanatory role (Neuberger Principle 
1 and JEB Guidance Para 3 Item I and para 7). 
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2. Judicial caution: Where the judge feels that they are free to comment, they must consider 
any potential effects any extrajudicial comment may have on: 
(a) the separation of powers. The judge should pay careful consideration to the 
importance of judicial independence from both the legislature and the executive. 
(Neuberger principles 2 and 4) This is especially important where the proposed 
comment will address ‘politically controversial issues, or matters of public policy’. The 
judge should consider the potential effects in light of both the substance of the 
proposed comment and the terms in which it will be made. A judge should not trespass 
on the territory of the other branches of the state, and reticence may be preferable on 
issues which may appear to tread too closely with these ‘borders’. (Neuberger principle 
4 and JEB Guidance para 3 Item III.) 
 
(b) the individual judicial independence of the judge. Very importantly, a judge must 
consider whether the specific issue may later arise for determination in court. If it may 
then the judge should make it very clear that ‘the judicial mind is not closed.’ A judge 
should also consider the audience and the impact a comment may have. In particular, 
she or he should consider whether, if disseminated widely (including via the media), it 
might call into question ‘their ability to carry out their fundamental role of doing justice 
according to law.’ (Neuberger principles 2 and 5 and JEB Guidance Para 3 Item I.) 
 
(c) the institutional independence of the judiciary generally. A judge should take 
account of the reputation and standing of the judiciary in all the circumstances at the 
time. Those circumstances include considering the frequency, nature and content of 
comments he or she has made previously, and which other judges have made. A judge 
should also include consideration of the most appropriate way to express differences 
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of opinion with other judges. A judge should note particularly that the Constitutional 
Reform Act 2005 makes the Lord Chief Justice the head of the judiciary in England 
and Wales, and only in exceptional circumstances would be it be appropriate to 
comment if the view was ‘on a policy or constitutional issue which is inconsistent with 
the LCJ’s position.’ (Neuberger principles 3 and 7 and JEB Guidance Para 3 Item II 
and IV.) 
 
The approach taken by McNamara is much more academic in the sense that it draws on the 
core constitutional principles that explain and reason the seven Neuberger principles, to 
provide a structure for the guidance. Given that the main core principles are the separation 
of powers and judicial independence, this allows McNamara to streamline the principles into 
just two limbs. By then drawing on the common features between the JEB Guidance and 
Neuberger principles, McNamara’s approach helps us to create a set of guiding principles 
focused on the constitutional theories that shape them. Rather than a seven box check list, 
we are left with two questions that should guide and ‘regulate’ the practice of extrajudicial 
comment. Firstly, is the judge free to comment on the matter put? And secondly, if the judge 
is free to comment, then should the judge in fact comment? In answering these questions 
judges already consider the matters above. But in restating them in the JEB Guidance and 
Neuberger principles, it is perhaps hoped to reach a uniform approach. Given the different 
judicial personalities however, uniformity of approach will always be a matter of degree.  
 
New Mechanisms for Judicial-Political Communication 
 
This guidance helps to keep judges from creating tensions with the political branches. In 
chapter one, we looked at the proliferation of Lady Hale’s speech on legal aid cuts. And 
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despite profoundly disagreeing with the assessment of Carl Gardner in his follow up article271, 
he was right in his observation that ‘if judges take publicly political stands, calls will increase 
for them to be subject to a public confirmation process such as happens in America.’ This 
was not the case with Lady Hale, and the guidance above serves to avoid such a situation, 
and the ensuing inevitable politicisation of the judiciary.  
 
But perhaps more can be done with this guidance. The JEB Guidance for example already 
exists, and judges already appear before committees. But we have seen that the attitude of 
some judges is outdated. Perhaps to help change this, there would be merit in creating a joint 
committee of both house for the judiciary. 
 
We have already seen that on occasion a minister or MPs may be in attendance at speeches; 
for example in the audience of think tanks, or as members of the inns, but that their 
attendance is not always guaranteed. Perhaps an annual address from the Lord Chief Justice 
and the Presidents of Divisions, whether public or private.  
 
As well as the guidance for speeches and oral evidence, Lord Neuberger has hinted that more 
radical reforms may be instituted to remedy the loss of being able to speak in the House of 
Lords. Indeed Lord Judge CJ had made the point that he felt he would be better off being 
able to speak in the chamber of the Lords.272 The situation post 2005 has left the judges 
without a direct means of communication and involvement with Parliamentary debate or the 
Cabinet, and thus extrajudicial comment has become more frequent, and starting to 
formalise. But what reforms could address this issue? 
                                                          
271 C Gardner, Lady Hale’s injudicious speech, Blog Head Of Legal, entry December 2, 2011available at 
http://www.headoflegal.com/2011/12/02/lady-hales-injudicious-speec/ 
272 Lord Judge, HLCC (n199) Q2 
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In 2007 the Lords Select Committee on the Constitution reported on the relations between 
the three branches of government.273 The committee looked at the relations between the 
judiciary and the other two branches of government in turn, as well as the judiciary’s 
engagement with the public and media. In the investigation into the relationship between 
Parliament and the judiciary the committee looked at the various means of communication 
open to the LCJ. The summary of the report begins with the most obvious: section 5 of the 
CRA.274 The committee then looked at Parliamentary appearances, and the merits of 
dedicated Parliamentary committee for the judiciary. Finally the idea of allowing the LCJ to 
speak on the floor of the house is considered. 
 
The reasons for choosing to look at these possible reforms centre on their reception and 
consideration by Parliament and academics.275 These reforms have been investigated by the 
Constitution Committee, though they were all dismissed for the time being. These proposals 
have again been revived for consideration by the Constitution Committee. In July 2014, 
Lords Hope, Judge and Woolf were asked about the office of the Lord Chancellor, and the 
effects of the CRA 2005 upon representation of the judiciary in Parliament and the Cabinet. 
Whether because they are the most obvious, or popular, or easy reforms, we will soon 
discover, but they seem to be the focus of current discussion.276 In assessing these reforms 
for their plausibility as a means of communication, we can use the three criteria set out above: 
efficiency, constitutional propriety and success. These criteria are informed by our study of 
the current popular practices of speeches and oral evidence, and by using these criteria we 
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are able to see if these reforms meet the same standard as we presently have, or provide 
better avenues of communication. 
 
Parliamentary Committee for the Judiciary 
 
The use of committees, the favourable attitude to them by some judges, the comprehensive 
guidance and important Parliamentary rules governing them, and the direct interaction with 
members of Parliament could also be adapted in another way. The constitution committee 
elucidated the argument behind establishing good channels of communication by stating: 
‘Good communications are indeed both desirable and necessary, because there must be a 
mechanism for effective Parliamentary oversight of, and two-way dialogue with, the judiciary 
now that there is essentially no judicial representation in the legislature.’277 
 
When the idea was put to the LCJ, the answer was far short of a resounding endorsement. 
That the idea ‘merits consideration’ is true. Parliament and the Courts would be seen to 
communicate via judges appearing before a joint committee of both houses, on matters 
relating to the judiciary and administration of justice.278 It would be a clear reference point 
for judges, as well as the Committee on the Constitution and Commons Committee for 
Justice. However, the sixth report of the Lords concluded that no such committee was 
necessary. The Constitution committee and Justice Committee were already engaged with 
the judiciary and had organised annual appearances with leading figures. Though the reasons 
of the LCJ and the committee are not detailed, we can see that this proposal does not do 
                                                          
277 HLCC Relations between the executive, the judiciary and Parliament (n26) Para 126 
278 For a brief overview of this and the concerns for judicial independence see also Turenne, Judicial 
independence in England and Wales, in A Seibert-Fohr, Judicial Independence in Transition (Springer 2012) 
137 
well when subjected to our criteria for assessment, and in fact falls shorter than the 
assessment of oral evidence to Parliamentary committees more generally. 
 
In terms of efficiency, oral evidence is currently sought or volunteered by the committee 
concerned with that topic of business (constitutional matters, to the Constitution Committee; 
financing and value for money, to the Public Accounts Committee; immigration and policing, 
to the Home Affairs Select Committee). Whilst some business may overlap, and some reports 
reference the work of other committees, Parliamentary business operates along clear lines, 
normally allowing for members of Parliament and committees to build up experience of their 
respective areas.279 To break, or supplement this practice, with one dedicated committee 
would unravel these benefits and lead to a committee receiving evidence on a broad variety 
of issues from the process of judicial appointments, to the importance of child services in 
the family courts. This evidence would need to be sorted and passed to the relevant 
committee, which may or may not have had all of its questions answered. Making the process 
unnecessarily longer and inefficient would also damage how successful committee 
appearances are at communicating a judge’s comments to Parliament and vice-versa.  
 
As for constitutional propriety, we can again see that a dedicated committee would be less 
suitable than the present practice. Whilst providing for a lawfully constituted committee for 
the judiciary, the creation of the committee would actually damage judicial independence by 
making it appear as though the judiciary and Parliament were overly intimate and in regular 
contact. These concerns do not arise with the likely infrequency of the s.5 reform proposed 
above. Nor do they arise with the present system of committee appearance, where hearings 
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are in public, but more importantly, they are not more frequent than on an annual basis, and 
are before different committees of MPs. It is inevitable that a committee for the judiciary 
would be unable to fill its time, and would probably only convene a few times a year, and 
meet especially for the annual evidence sessions of senior judges—another inefficiency. 
 
Laying Written Representations Before Parliament Under S.5 of the CRA. 
 
The first of these to be discussed here is s.5 of the CRA. Laying written representations 
before Parliament has already been referred to earlier in this paper. S.5 allows the LCJ, the 
LCJ for Northern Ireland and the Lord President of Scotland to ‘lay before Parliament 
written representations on matters that appear to be matters of importance relating to the 
judiciary, or otherwise to the administration of justice’. Despite this, since Lord Phillips as 
LCJ, s.5 has been used to lay reports before Parliament by those CJs that choose to produce 
them (though not always with agreement between judges and the Parliamentary clerks).280 It 
was described as a nuclear option by Lords Falconer and Judge, only to be used as a last 
resort—despite its frequent use to facilitate the laying of court administrative reports before 
Parliament.281  
 
The Constitution Committee considered how Parliament should respond if written 
representations were made to them by the LCJ.282 The conclusion was that the House 
convene the relevant select committee and hold progress of any legislation to which the 
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document might refer. The select committee would then invite the LCJ to appear before it 
to consider the written representations made. 
 
The use of Parliamentary committees as a platform for interaction has come to the fore again. 
Of course a written response from the government to the LCJs representations would be 
expected. But ultimately, it seems the effect of s.5 would be to trigger a select committee 
appearance by the LCJ. S.5 therefore cannot be considered an alternative to the existing 
channels of communication, but merely a more formal means of causing a Parliamentary 
committee appearance. Though judges may volunteer themselves to give evidence to a 
committee on an inquiry, the senior judiciary have no formal power to set the agenda, or 
request an inquiry into a particular area. Using s.5 to initiate this process, leading to a 
committee, and Parliamentary discussion of the LCJs comments provides that. It also goes 
far beyond speech-making and oral evidence, in satisfying our criteria for constitutional 
propriety, since s.5 provides a statutory trigger for the communication; albeit the process 
itself is not provided for in the statute, but a convention suggested by the Constitution 
Committee. Furthermore, in ensuring the constitutional propriety of the subsequent 
committee hearing and Parliamentary discussion, we already have the JEB Guidance and 
Parliamentary rules which we discussed in chapter three on oral evidence sessions. These 
rules already guide both judges, and members of Parliament on what is and what is not 
constitutionally acceptable. 
 
As to the efficiency of this method, we again overlap greatly with the earlier study of oral 
evidence, since the committee appearances are very much the result of activating s.5 in this 
reform. Judges of all positions in the judicial hierarchy and courts volunteer or are being 
invited to give evidence to different Parliamentary committees. Though the individual judges 
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may have different attitudes to the appearance—some being more restrained and cautious 
than others. There is a plausible suggestion that the increased frequency of appearances 
indicates a greater preference for, or acknowledgment of the effectiveness of, committee 
appearances. With this increasingly positive attitude, it may be regarded as cumbersome to 
make the process longer and possibly cumbersome, by first requiring the LCJ to lay written 
representations before Parliament. But that is not always going to be necessary. Agreed, it is 
hard to see why a puisne judge would need to initiate a committee appearance or inquiry. But 
for those with new administrative responsibility such as the LCJ, providing a constitutionally 
grounded method for initiating a Parliamentary discussion does seem necessary. There is also 
discussion of s.5 being amended to include the president of the Supreme Court, and if 
necessary the heads of divisions in the High Court.283 Some of these senior judges, with these 
new administrative responsibilities already benefit from annual appearances, where 
suggestions might be made for inquiries in the coming year. But should new matters arise 
during that year, or an inquiry be felt absolutely necessary, then senior judges would have the 
power to ensure they are heard. Though this gives judges the power to influence the 
Parliamentary timetable to some small degree, it still preserves the principles of a separation 
of powers and judicial independence since the process is public, formal, and merely a 
mechanism for initiating a committee appearance and Parliamentary debate. The business of 
committees and Parliamentary debate are already subject to guidance and rules to ensure 
constitutional propriety. 
 
This then leaves the question of success of the intended purpose. Arguably s.5 being used in 
this way, again far exceeds the ordinary method of speech-making and oral evidence. This is 
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because s.5 would require as a matter of course that Parliament hear the senior judge, and 
discuss the comments of the judge in the chamber. Currently an extrajudicial speech is rarely 
mentioned in the mainstream press, or perhaps included as a committee question to ‘break 
the ice’ early on in a session. Similarly evidence to a committee may be included in the 
committee’s final report, but there is no assurance that Parliament will discuss it, or that the 
government will take note of it. It is highly unlikely that s.5 would be used to discuss 
jurisprudential matters, but far more likely that s.5 would be used in this way where senior 
judges were very concerned over government proposals, or actions which (as required in the 
JEB Guidance) would impact upon the function, or business of the judiciary or justice 
system, or the administration of justice. 
 
There is also a concern that using s.5 in this way would revive the comments that s.5 is to be 
used as a means of last resort—a nuclear option. At the very worst, judges calling for 
Parliamentary business to be set to judicial agenda on a frequent basis would lead to an 
outcry. But given the reticence at present with using s.5 to lay written representations (not 
including reports, but on pertinent and sensitive matters such as cuts or law reform), it is 
likely that this proposed reform would not be over-used. But that is not to say it is not a 
necessary mechanism, to be savoured until needed. It provides the easiest way to allow the 
senior judiciary to force a discussion over judicial opinion or concerns, where other means 
fail. Other means, might include consultations for example. But ordinary members of the 
public might submit a response to a government consultation. The judiciary is a branch of 
the government, and it is essential for the branches to communicate in order to ensure 
effective government. This special status of the judiciary should then allow for a 
constitutionally proper means of ensuring that the other branches of government properly 
consider the impact, concerns, or opinions of the judiciary, on Parliamentary or government 
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business which may adversely affect the judiciary, or the administration of justice for which 
the judiciary are responsible. 
 
To conclude, expanding s.5 to enable the SC President, and perhaps the heads of divisions, 
to lay written representations before Parliament, would give the benefit of normalising s.5 so 
it is no longer a nuclear option for the LCJ. Further, amending s.5 so as to adopt the process 
suggested above would also create a mechanism which is more efficient, constitutionally 
proper, and successful as a means of judicial-political dialogue, than speechmaking and oral 
evidence alone.  
 
Should the LCJ Have a Right to Speak on the Floor of the House? 
 
In chapters one and two, we saw how sometimes an extrajudicial comment may be picked 
up on by Parliamentary clerks and be referenced in papers to brief Parliamentarians for 
forthcoming debates. That is as far as the proliferation of extrajudicial comments go, into 
the chamber. There is no clear evidence for example, that Lord Thomas LCJ, or any previous 
LCJ, had their concerns over legal aid cuts heard, repeated, or cited in the chamber of either 
house. It is strange to so easily shut out the concerns of the person who is responsible for 
the judiciary. A judiciary which has noted how legal aid cuts will affect their working, from 
the delays due increased litigants in person, to the worrying concern that access to justice be 
limited to the wealthy. 
 
How then can we ensure that the LCJs thoughts and concerns and those of the judiciary are 
heard and considered in the house, satisfying in part the criteria for success? Rather than give 
oral evidence to committees, and see the LCJs words reproduced in summary in a final 
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report, which may or may not be read my MPs, but more likely summarised even further by 
their clerks; wouldn’t it be reasonable to allow the LCJ to return to the Lords? 
 
The sixth report of the Lords Committee already noted that prior to the CRA 2005, Law 
lords normally adhered to strict conventions, which limited their contributions to the 
legislative activity of Parliament. The senior judges including the Lord Chief Justice were 
cross benchers, in the Lords, and would on occasion address the House from the cross 
benches. One example would be of Lord Woolf, Lord Chief Justice from 2000 to 2005. Lord 
Woolf addressed the house once in 2000,284 once in 2002,285 twice in 2003,286 and seven times 
in 2004.287 Were the LCJ to return to the Lords, there would be no reason for the judge to 
contribute to debates on the creation of, for example, the debate over free schools and 
academies. Instead the LCJ would be expected, and respected, where debates concern 
legislation that would affect the administration of justice, the operation of the courts, access 
to justice, and the proper working of the legal professions. There are many reasons why we 
can expect this convention to be observed. The new role of the LCJ as head of the judiciary 
already means that the office of the LCJ is busier than ever. Increasing media and public 
engagement, the preparation of annual reports, the implementation of new duties and 
responsibilities regarding the running of the courts, and procedures, and the oversight of 
divisional heads exercising delegated powers. It would be difficult practically for the LCJ to 
spend lengthy periods of time in the house and speaking on matters on a regular basis.  
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In assessing constitutional propriety, critics may argue that this simply reverses the efforts of 
the CRA to guarantee a separation of the judges from Parliament, and ensure that judges are 
not only independent in name, but also seen to be independent and separate. This is an 
undeniable observation. Allowing the LCJ to resume sitting as a member of the Lords does 
exactly that. This is a step backwards, after the reforms of the CRA.288 
 
There does seem to be a possible compromise. If the LCJs words are not making it clearly 
from the committee rooms to the chamber. But it is also constitutionally unacceptable for 
the LCJ to sit in the Lords. It might be possible for ministers in both houses to be placed 
under a duty to read, for the record, the words of the LCJ aloud to gathered Parliamentarians, 
and the content then be debated. Going further this might be changed, or extended, to 
include judicial consultations and group responses from the judicial college or judicial 
executive board. This would maintain the independence of the judiciary and keep the LCJ 
separate from Parliament. But present an onus on Parliament to listen to the judiciary and 
receive communications. 
 
A clear disadvantage of this is however, that the LCJ would have to have considered every 
possible question arising from speech to be read out. Since the LCJ would not be in 
Parliament to answer any questions or criticisms that would arise in the ensuing debate. The 
need and major significance for a two-way dialogue again arises, which is possible in 
committee appearances. But again the problem remains that Parliament may not necessarily 
be interested in, nor listen to, the goings on in committee rooms. Perhaps this is where s.5 
of the CRA comes into its own? The Lords Constitution Committee have already intimated 
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that where s.5 is invoked, the LCJ written representations must be responded to by the 
government, and debated in the house. The LCJ must also be called before either this 
committee or the justice committee to give an account of the representation and discuss it 
further. This seems to be a very clear mechanism for more efficient and successful 
engagement. A power for the LCJ to initiate a debate in Parliament where and when the 
judiciary requires it. A major attitude change is needed to remove the negative connotations 
surrounding s.5 as a nuclear option or a tool to criticise government. The use of s.5 to lay 
annual reports is hardly controversial, where it serves to facilitate communication between 
the judiciary and Parliament as the functioning of the courts, and business of the judiciary. 
Likewise, where the LCJ lays other written representations aside from annual reports, these 
should be seen as an olive branch for constructive debate and the valuable discussions that 
can follow from the contributions of our most senior judges.  
 
However these reforms that may be considered wider and far reaching, would be redundant 
if s.5 was no longer viewed as a nuclear option, especially if the accepted practice was for 
such representations to trigger a debate or consideration of the content, by both houses. 
There is no reason for s.5 to be viewed as a nuclear option or a means of last resort.  
 
Discussions between the judiciary and executive, and Parliamentarians are known to go on 
in private, whether over the telephone, letters, or meetings, or via office staff289. More so, s.5 
is used without much trepidation already. This thesis therefore suggests that the best way to 
preserve the positive changes of the CRA, is by embracing those changes and exercising the 
new powers of the LCJ properly and fully. Of course the frequency of use of s.5 will vary 
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from LCJ to LCJ. And it would be wise to follow the conclusion of Lord Neuberger in the 
Holdsworth speech, that if invoked too often, a judge may devalue the currency and worth 
of their contributions.  
 
Conclusion: A Way Forward? 
 
In this chapter we have drawn together the findings of our research into extrajudicial 
speeches and oral evidence before Parliament. In so doing we have created a series of criteria 
in order to assess the various means of extrajudicial comment for their success as a means 
of communicating judicial ideas and interacting with government and Parliament. Further 
we have been able to establish an overarching set of principles to guide judges when 
considering firstly, whether to comment extrajudicially, and secondly, what they should 
actually say.  We have also looked at the possible alternatives that exist to make 
communication easier; specifically the means provided or founded in statute such as s.5 of 
the CRA 2005.  
 
When looking at the fundamental principles of the separation of powers and judicial 
independence in the chapter one, we noted that a paradox exists. The more politicians push 
for a separation of powers, the greater the need for effective communication between the 
branches of government. Creating a UKSC, with its own finances, premises, and staff was a 
clear separation of the Law Lords from the upper chamber. But it brought with it new, and 
increasingly important topics of communication, including seeking financial approval from 
the government.290 Similarly, reforming the office of Lord Chancellor, and replacing him as 
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head of the judiciary with the Lord Chief Justice, transferred vast administrative 
responsibilities for the courts in staffing and administration, as well as legal procedures to 
the office of the Lord Chief Justice—some of which have had to be delegated to Heads of 
Divisions in order to make this manageable. To ensure that these senior judges are 
undertaking their new administrative responsibilities effectively, Parliament has a duty to 
scrutinise their work and hold them to account. But so too, where the means made available 
to judges by the government are insufficient or inadequate, Parliament has a duty to listen to 
judicial concerns and do something about it. Pre-2005, the key methods to do this included 
senior judges addressing fellow peers in the Lords, or the Lord Chancellor as head of the 
judiciary being minded to speak of these matters in Cabinet meetings. Post-2005 however, 
Law Lords are removed from the Lords, and the Lord Chancellor is solely a minister and 
member of the Cabinet. If the Lord Chief Justice lobbies the Lord Chancellor to speak about 
an issue in Cabinet, the Lord Chancellor is free to refuse to do so.291  
 
Of the remaining avenues for extrajudicial comment, we have seen the increasing importance 
of speechmaking and oral evidence, not only in isolation but in complimenting each other as 
a part of a larger process of communication, post-2005. Speechmaking by judges, whilst still 
sometimes educational, has evolved to become policy-orientated in substance, often to 
publicly highlight issues over which private interactions have been unsuccessful. Likewise, 
judicial oral evidence to Parliament is still sometimes educative, but increasingly it has 
become a platform for communication between senior judges and influential MPs and peers. 
Significantly, we have found in this thesis, that speechmaking can be a trigger for a committee 
appearance. Especially where the matter is the subject of the committee’s current inquiry, or 
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the committee feels a need to probe and look deeper into the judge’s extrajudicial comments. 
These judicial concerns may then be noted in the committee’s final report and published, 
and accessible to all MPs and peers. It seems that this is the prevailing means of judicial-
political communication, post-2005. 
 
There are a number of inadequacies we have seen to this. We know that committees have a 
discretion to include whatever comments they see as central to their line of inquiry in the 
final report. Therefore judicial concerns are not guaranteed to appear there. Similarly, even 
if included and published, there is no guarantees that all MPs and peers will read that report, 
with an even smaller assurance of the possibility of any of them acting upon it. This 
deficiency for judicial-political communication is currently addressed by retired judges, such 
as former Chief Justices, and Presidents of the Supreme Court, taking up their seat in the 
Lords and moving amendments where necessary, and speaking to other peers about 
pertinent issues. But this subtle, and ‘back-door’ action cannot be considered sustainable or 
effective, despite its limited success.292  
 
Far from commending the repeal of certain parts of the CRA, or proposing more radical 
reform, this thesis suggests that the best way forward is to address the deficiencies in the 
current status quo. Extrajudicial speech-making and oral evidence before Parliamentary 
committees have evolved, and at times linked together, to establish a way for judges to 
communicate with MPs and peers. But there are shortcomings i.e. the discretion of 
committees to discard judicial concerns when preparing the final report, and the real chance 
that few MPs and peers will read the reports containing these judicial concerns. It is suggested 
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that a way forward can be found using s.5 as set out in the CRA, with an amendment to 
include the President of the Supreme Court and Heads of Divisions, and agreeing a process 
for receiving the written representations of the senior judges. Initiating a subsequent 
committee appearances over the issues contained therein, and forcing a Parliamentary debate 
over the issue. It is accepted that this may still face problems, for example where the 
Parliamentary timetable cannot allow for a hearing or debate at an early stage, or where MPs 
and peers refuse to be drawn in or attend the debate in the chamber. But it seems that such 
a response will only be likely if the power under s.5 is used too often, so much so, that it 
would devalue the significance attached to senior judges initiating a Parliamentary discussion. 
Given the reluctance by Chief Justices to use s.5 in its current state, there should be little 
concern of this happening. 
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